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Summary
This study explores attempts to regulate working time in a particular part of the medical 
sector. The specific focus is upon the perceptions and experiences of those in whose 
benefit the legislation purports to be, namely the junior doctors. It considers how the 
broader debates surrounding the European Working Time Directive (EWTD) are 
manifested in this specific section of the medical profession.
The study argues that historical modes of regulation through self-governance, 
professional autonomy and minimal state intervention have helped to foster opposition 
to the EC law among many senior doctors. Their views about working-time regulation 
are compared to those provided by junior doctors. This enables an assessment of the 
ways in which traditional self-regulation has been overtaken by subsequent forms of 
governance in the medical profession, namely new public management and statutory 
control. The accommodation in process underlines the significance of the medical 
profession’s exclusive culture and socialisation processes. These processes facilitate the 
transmission of ideas on issues such as work conditions, and occupational resistance to 
measures such as the Directive. Conversely, the difference in attitudes between senior 
and junior doctors reflects the evolving nature of the profession in response to 
increasing in managerial authority and state intervention.
Following on from these debates, the study explores the processes by which the various 
modes of regulation have been implemented and enforced. It considers the respective 
roles played by the state, hospital managers and the medical profession, exploring the 
impact of working time regulation, with particular reference to doctors’ health, medical 
training, and medical staffing and services. The study provides an assessment of the 
emerging impact of the regulation itself.
The study draws upon a mix of methods including semi-structured interviews with Pre- 
Registration House Officers and elite figures. The latter comprise policy-makers at EC, 
UK and devolved levels; senior figures within the medical and health services, 
including employer and employee representatives; and members of both the UK and 
European judiciary. Questionnaire surveys were also administered to all PRHOs 
practising in Wales.
The study concludes that a combination of factors have diluted the potential impact of 
the EWTD. These include the inadequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of a 
regulation whose fundamental terms have been ‘fudged’ by the state on the one hand, 
and the widespread application of a rigid shift system by the medical profession and 
hospital managers to junior doctors’ training and service on the other. As a result, views 
on the EWTD are inconsistent and the degree of compliance with its provisions is 
variable.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The European Working Time Directive 1998 (EWTD) is the first general pan-European 
legislation aimed at regulating working hours in the European Union. Passed under Article 
118a of the Treaty of Rome, it is underpinned primarily by concerns about the safety and 
health of workers in the EU. The Directive was implemented in the UK on 1 October 1998. 
Junior doctors were initially excluded from the EWTD’s ambit, but amending legislation now 
provides them with, among other rights and entitlements, an average 48-hour weekly working 
limit which is to be phased in over a period ending on 31 July 2009. The interim periods 
impose a 58-hour week and a 56-hour week from the Augusts of 2004 and 2007, respectively. 
This has occurred within the context of wider debates surrounding the training and working 
conditions of junior doctors, and the broader strategy of National Health Service (NHS) 
modernisation.
Given the nature of their professional roles, the long hours associated with their work, and the 
underlying rationale of the Directive, one would assume that doctors would welcome these 
regulations. After all, the maximum working week is intended for their benefit by way of 
promoting better health and quality of life. The importance it attaches to the protection of 
NHS users by ensuring that they are not treated by exhausted doctors also conforms to the 
professional ethos of serving the patients’ best interests. Why, then, is the regulation so 
controversial? The study explores this puzzle, and looks at its different facets to acquire an 
understanding of the outlook from which doctors argue for and against the legislation’s form 
and content. It explores attempts to regulate working time in a particular part of the medical 
sector, with a specific focus upon the perceptions and experiences of those in whose benefit 
the legislation purports to be, and how the broader debates surrounding the EWTD are 
manifested in this particular segment of the medical profession.
The study argues that the historical modes of regulation through self-governance, 
professional autonomy and minimal state intervention have helped to foster opposition to the 
current EC law among many senior doctors. Ideologically, the Directive represents a centrally 
imposed legal control negotiated by politico-legal bargaining which is beyond the jurisdiction 
of UK doctors. Its failure to conform to an arrangement that is the product of internal and 
sector-specific discussions has led to an occupational resistance within the higher ranks of the
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medical profession. The senior doctors in this study criticised the application of a monolithic 
form of regulation that does not take account of the concerns voiced by the medical 
profession, such as medical training, staffing and services. Furthermore, the Directive’s weak 
monitoring and enforcement regimes implemented by the state provide an opportunity for 
some of these ideals to be manifested through the continuance of long working hours, 
irrespective of the legislative provisions.
Some of the junior doctors also drew upon the criticisms voiced by senior members of the 
profession. The EWTD, for a proportion of them, was seen as adversely affecting their ability 
to undertake the necessary service and education which met their professional expectations. 
The similarity in views between senior and junior doctors reinforced the significance of the 
exclusive medical culture and its socialisation processes which facilitated the transmission of 
ideas on issues such as work conditions, and an occupational resistance to measures such as 
the Directive.
The general inconsistency in the junior doctors’ responses demonstrates some resistance to 
change within the profession and reflects some of the mixed attitudes towards EC regulation 
adopted by the elite informants interviewed in this study. While the prospect of better work 
hours, health and work-life balance influenced a pro-regulatory school of thought among 
many of the juniors, they perceived the EWTD as adversely affecting other facets of their 
work. The partial fragmentation of the medical community’s outlook on external regulation, 
evidenced by the Pre-registration House Officers’ general acceptance to work shorter hours in 
compliance with the EWTD, illustrated the evolving approach to work organisation among 
members of the medical profession. It also shows that the profession’s opposition to the 
Directive may not be sufficiently organised to prevent the further intervention and 
implementation of management-led initiatives that aim to secure compliance with the 
regulations’ provisions. This argument accords with the relevant literature that discusses the 
profession’s diminishing authority on the one hand and the ascendancy of managerialism and 
state control on the other.
Having identified these themes, the study then attempts to explore the factors underpinning 
the differences in opinion between the informants, and the impact of the EWTD. It concludes 
that the discontent associated with the regulation -  instances of ill health and poor work-life 
balance among some doctors, criticisms associated with inadequate medical training, and
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difficulties related to medical staffing and services -  can be attributed to the failure of the 
medical profession to respond to the EWTD effectively, and in line with the needs of its own 
members. By attempting to address juniors’ working time through the widespread 
implementation of shift patterns, the profession and hospital management have lacked the 
necessary innovation to apply more appropriate systems that accommodate the specific 
concerns voiced by the profession. Focusing solely on the role of the regulation therefore 
represents a narrow interpretation of the Directive’s impact, and fails to take account of the 
responsibility of the profession for the current state of affairs.
The criticisms raised by the medical profession in response to the EWTD echoes the 
discontent among its members and external commentators in relation to the profession’s 
previous attempts at dealing with work conditions through both self-regulation and the New 
Deal. Other measures such as the EWTD should now be considered in light of the 
profession’s failure to address these fundamental work conditions, together with a revision of 
both cultural ideals on professionalism and the delivery of medical training and services in a 
modernising NHS.
Rationale
My reason for focusing on the regulation of doctors’ working time stems from both an 
academic interest in employment law and my experiences of working at a Medical School for 
two years prior to the commencement of the research. The latter post regularly brought me 
into contact with medical students and doctors of different seniorities, practicing within a 
variety of specialisms. Conversations with friends studying medicine and work colleagues 
already in the profession provided me with various insights on how doctors approached their 
work, including their working hours. Most of these people had heard of the EWTD and a 
substantial proportion had an opinion on the law, all of which ignited my interest to explore 
these issues in more depth and to gain a further understanding of the factors underpinning 
their responses. Limiting the study to analysing the attitudes of PRHOs in Wales was an 
example of opportunistic research, which took advantage of my existing networks and ease of 
access to this sample population. It also provided me with an insight into how the UK 
regulation process applied to a professional sector within recently devolved policies and 
practice.
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My studying of the relevant law at undergraduate level (graduating in 2002 with a LLB in 
Law and Criminology) had equipped me with the necessary understanding of the 
Regulations’' provisions and the position at common law. I was also aware of the fact that 
doctors had sought redress at the European Court of Justice on two different occasions as 
regards their working time, in addition to their average working week in the UK compared 
with Europe. The more material I read on the topic, the more I came to realise how 
controversial the application of the EWTD was in terms of implementing a standard law for 
junior doctors across Europe. Of particular interest was the apparent contrast between the 
profession’s past forms of regulation, namely self-regulation and the New Deal, and the 
EWTD. This gave rise to the question as to whether the EC law would address the limitations 
of past attempts to regulate doctors’ work conditions. How would the profession respond to 
the Directive, and to its subsequent interpretation at the European Court? Would the response 
shape the overall impact of the legislation? The prospect of studying contemporary regulation 
which was apparently dividing those whom it sought to benefit, and which could bring about 
certain change, was central in my decision to pursue the topic at a doctoral level.
Such a topical piece of legislation also meant that very little research was available at the 
initial stages of planning the study. The existing work was focused upon particular themes 
such as work-life, health and safety, medical training and shift work, but there was no 
research which brought all such issues within the parameters of one study. This research 
aimed to address that data lacuna, exploring long-standing debates on work regulation 
together with findings on individual topics to present a topical thesis on the EWTD, and its 
implementation in the medical sector.
Research themes
The study seeks to analyse the process and impact of legal regulation on working conditions 
in UK labour markets, with specific reference to the European Working Time Directive 1998 
and its impact on the junior medical profession. Emerging from this general aim is a number 
of subordinate objectives:
1. To analyse the views of elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates 
surrounding the regulation of working time;
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2. To examine critically the ways in which the EWTD has been implemented and 
enforced in practice in relation to junior doctors, and the sources of support and 
resistance to such processes; and,
3. To analyse the apparent impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of 
junior doctors.
The study explores the way in which a generic and supranational regulation affects a closely 
defined professional group that has hitherto enjoyed modes of regulation that are internally 
based and sector-specific. The first form corresponds with the tradition of voluntarism and 
clinical self-regulation. The second relates to the rise of managerialism in the 1980s prompted 
by a more interventionist state concerned with the rationalisation of healthcare (followed in 
recent years by clinical governance and consumerism). The third and final form of regulation 
is statutory, namely the EWTD. All three of these modes of regulation are now 
simultaneously visible in the way that junior doctors’ hours are being organised. This study 
looks at the ways in which these different modes of regulation combine with and contest each 
other.
Following on from these debates, the study then explores the processes by which the various 
modes of regulation have been implemented and enforced in practice. This focus directs us to 
the respective roles of policymakers, those providing medical services, and the judiciary. The 
complex interaction between the stakeholders is analysed, and contextualises the tensions and 
collaborations as a prerequisite to evaluating the likely levels of compliance with the various 
modes of regulation and their consequent impact.
Exploring the experience of regulation provides different informants directly and indirectly 
affected by the Directive with the opportunity to discuss their perceptions of the EC law. 
Those debates considered most salient to the informants are examined in detail; they include 
the role of work time on doctors’ health (Baldwin 1997; Spurgeon and Harrington 1989), 
work-life (Cooper at al 1989); the perceived regulatory impact on medical training (Mather 
2004; Paice and Reid 2004), staffing (Fox 2007; Pickersgill 2001), and services (Scallan 
2003). Some of the informants’ responses corresponded to their personal degree of 
compliance with the Directive’s provisions. Thus it was possible in some instances to gauge 
its impact by reference to comments made in both the interviews and the data recorded in the
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surveys. In the majority of cases, however, this was not possible as many of the junior 
doctors provided mixed views on what they claimed to be the impact of the Directive. The 
final objective attempts to assess what directly flows from the regulation itself in comparison 
with the claims made by the study’s informants. This process involved distinguishing the 
individual roles of the EC law, the juniors’ perceptions as influenced by their peers and senior 
doctors, and the shift system implemented by both the profession and hospital managers. 
These themes are developed in the thesis’s nine chapters.
The research objectives were addressed by using a mix of methods, including postal 
questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews and diaries. The diaries, completed by two 
PRHOs while on their respective shifts, raised my awareness of the work and issues facing 
juniors on a daily basis but avoiding the difficulties of observation techniques. Two surveys 
were conducted with different cohorts of PRHOs, the first being the 2004-05 cohort and the 
other comprising the 2005-06 group, all of whom were training under the direction of the 
Postgraduate Deanery in Wales. The surveys sought to identify and compare attitudinal 
patterns towards the regulation of working time in the junior medical profession immediately 
preceding the date for the Directive’s first implementation phase in August 2004, and a year 
after its enforcement in August 2005.
The forty-four semi-structured interviews provide the main component of the study, and took 
place between the two surveys, that is August 2004 and February 2005. They were used to 
generate an in-depth understanding on the perceptions of those directly and indirectly 
involved in, or affected by the EWTD, and to contextualise the generic statistics collected in 
the survey. The sample is broadly categorised into two groups, namely PRHOs and elite 
figures. The latter comprise policymakers at EC, UK and devolved levels; senior figures 
within the medical and health services, including practitioners, employer and employee 
representatives; and, members of both the UK and European judiciary.
The original intention was to undertake a case study of junior doctors in one hospital location 
in Wales, but the limitations of this approach soon became apparent. For example, the nature 
of junior doctors’ medical training allows PRHOs to divide their time between different 
hospital and trust sites. I therefore felt that a study focusing on a sample based at one location 
would not reflect doctors’ variation in experiences. It became clear that the regulation of 
doctors’ working hours at the local level was shaped by decisions taken at national, UK and
supranational levels, and it became an important objective of the study to explore these 
processes. More pragmatically, the level of research access required for an intensive local 
case study posed formidable obstacles for the researcher. In the event, it was decided to 
undertake a more wide-ranging study, collecting quantitative and qualitative datea regarding 
junior doctors in Wales, but also drawing in ‘elite’ perspectives from the EU and the UK as 
well as Wales.
Structure
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the 
methodological approaches adopted to address these themes. It commences by 
contextualising the study, focusing particularly on both location and participants, before 
turning to the methodology and the mix of approaches adopted to gather the data. These 
included analysis of the existing documentary sources, the findings of which are reported in 
the next three chapters; semi-structured interviews; and two postal questionnaires. Electronic 
diaries were used to supplement this data. Issues of sampling, administration and response are 
discussed for each method, including their limitations in order to reflect upon the validity and 
reliability of the findings. It concludes with reference to the approaches used to access the 
elite and PRHO informants, followed by some ethical considerations provoked by the overall 
work.
Chapter 3 addresses the study’s overarching aim of analysing the process and impact of legal 
regulation on working conditions in the UK labour market by summarising the historical 
attempts at such regulation. It also examines the tensions which have arisen in the evolving 
process of regulating work time in the UK through individual and collective bargaining to 
state intervention by way of the EWTD. It looks at the main impact of the Directive on both 
working conditions and employment relations in Britain as part of the study’s objectives of 
examining the different ways in which the regulation has been implemented and enforced in 
practice (Deakin 2001; Mclvor 1987). These debates serve to underscore the differences and 
similarities between the Conservative and New Labour governments (Smith and Morton 
2006), while contextualising the general situation within which doctors in the UK are 
currently being regulated (Williams 2001; Davies 2000). They also illustrate how tensions 
about centralised statutory control exist outside this study’s primary focus on the medical 
profession.
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Chapter 4 provides an historical account of the different modes of regulation that have 
governed the medical profession’s conditions of work, with reference to the broader 
developments in employment relations and the evolution of state intervention in the labour 
market. It explores the cultural and ideological bases for each form of regulation, 
contextualising both the tensions and collaborations between professionals, managers and the 
state, and their respective struggles for authority (Ham 2004; Ex worthy and Halford 1999; 
Flynn 1999; Famham and Horton 1996; Hood and Scott 1996; Harrison and Pollitt 1994; 
Freidson 1994; Pollitt 1993). Providing such an account is fundamental to our understanding 
of the response of the profession to external regulation such as the EWTD. This corresponds 
with the research objectives addressed by the study, namely to analyse the views of elite 
stakeholders about the political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of working time 
in a particular professional sector, and to examine critically the ways in which the 
Regulations have been implemented.
Chapter 5 explores the sector-specific debates on the regulation of working time in the UK 
junior medical profession (Mather 2004; Davies 2004; Scallan 2003; Davies 2000; Stacey 
1992). It introduces both the New Deal and the EWTD as the two co-existing forms of 
control that currently govern doctors’ working hours, and assesses the latter’s interpretation 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These discussions set the scene for the second part of 
the chapter which explores the perceived impact of the legislation, including doctors’ health, 
medical training, and medical staffing and services. The profession’s responses to these, 
particularly if they are supported by the study’s findings reported in the latter chapters, 
indicate the levels of EWTD compliance among junior doctors in the NHS. The chapter 
therefore attempts to provide a context within which it is possible to assess the impact of 
regulating work time on the work and lives of junior doctors. This corresponds to the third 
research objective, while setting the scene for the exploration of viewpoints provided by 
informants in later chapters.
Chapter 6 is the first of three which presents the findings arising from the primary data 
collection phase of the study. It explores the perceptions of elite groups on the issue of 
regulation, with specific reference to the EWTD, drawing upon qualitative data gathered from 
policymakers, medical service providers, and the judiciary. This relates to the first objective 
listed above: to analyse the views of elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates
surrounding the regulation of working time. It maps the profession’s sequential modes of 
regulation and the limitations apparent in each model to explain why the informants initially 
embraced a Directive that represents a form of centralised control, and which contrasts 
significantly with their historical forms of self-govemance. It then explores the impact of 
intervention of the European Court of Justice which has subsequently shaped a marked 
opposition among elite figures towards the legislation. This has given rise to the paradoxical 
situation in which doctors, as participants in a health-based profession, vehemently criticise a 
measure interpreted by the judiciary in such a way that explicitly prioritises their health.
Chapter 7 bridges the broader arguments surrounding the regulation of the medical profession 
with the experiences of doctors and their managers at a hospital level. In line with the study’s 
second objective, it aims to examine critically the ways in which the EWTD has been 
implemented and enforced in practice, and the sources of support and resistance to such 
processes. It analyses the roles of the state and managers in the implementation of the 
Directive, and explores how the process has shaped regulatory compliance with the current 
limits in addition to how it may affect the stricter provisions in 2009. The chapter then 
assesses the monitoring and enforcement regimes which operate alongside attempts to apply 
EWTD-compliant work strategies in the medical profession. It concludes with a discussion 
on the interaction between junior and senior doctors and their managers to analyse how each 
of them support and resist the processes implementing the Directive.
Chapter 8 explores the impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of junior 
doctors, with specific reference to the European Working Time Directive, in line with the 
third research objective. It does so by looking at the claims made by both junior and senior 
members of the medical profession on what they perceive to be the regulatory impact on their 
life within and outside work. They are organised thematically under the topics of health and 
work-life, medical training, and medical staffing and services, and include discussions on the 
significance of the widely used shift systems to ascertain the impact of factors unrelated to 
the regulation. The views of junior doctors surrounding the issue of regulation are also 
explored to gauge the consistency in opinion between senior and junior members of the 
medical profession, and to assess whether this will shape the way in which the latter approach 
their work in a way that complies with the EWTD.
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The final chapter concludes with an overview of the study’s findings and discusses some of 
the wider themes raised by the research, including the role of law as a regulator of workplace 
relations.
10
Chapter 2 
Research Methods
Introduction
It is conventional to locate discussions on methodology immediately before the chapters that 
report the fieldwork. Analysis of the existing literature in chapters 3, 4 and 5, however, also 
constitute a method of gathering data which provide the basis for development of the study’s 
key research themes. This chapter provides a discussion of the methodological approaches 
adopted to address these themes, elaborating on what is discussed in Chapter 1. It commences 
by contextualising the study and focusing particularly on both location and participants, 
before turning to the methodology and the mix of approaches used to gather the data. This 
includes primarily reviews of the existing research including secondary data analysis, 
followed by considerations raised by the use of semi-structured interviews and two postal 
questionnaires. This data was supplemented by a small amount of information gathered from 
electronic diaries by two junior doctors. Issues of sampling, administration and response are 
discussed for each method, including their limitations, in order to reflect upon the validity 
and reliability of the findings. The chapter concludes with reference to the approaches used to 
access the elites and PRHOs, followed by some ethical considerations provoked by the overall 
work.
Context
This study broadly aims to analyse the process and impact of legal regulation on working 
conditions in UK labour markets, with specific reference to the European Working Time 
Directive 1998 and its impact on the junior medical profession. Emerging from this general 
aim is a number of objectives which this study attempts to address:
1. To analyse the views of elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates 
surrounding the regulation of working time;
2. To examine critically the ways in which the EWTD has been implemented and 
enforced in practice in relation to junior doctors, and the sources of support and 
resistance to such processes; and,
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3. To analyse the apparent impact of regulating working time on the work and lives 
of junior doctors.
The study explores attempts to regulate working time in a particular part of the medical 
sector, focusing upon the perceptions and experiences of those in whose benefit the 
legislation purports to be, and how the broader debates surrounding the European Working 
Time Directive are manifested in this segment of the medical profession. It examines the 
ways in which a generic and supranational law affects a closely defined professional group 
that has hitherto enjoyed modes of regulation that are internal and sector-specific. The 
processes of implementing the various modes of regulation are considered by looking at the 
respective roles of policymakers, those involved in the provision of medical services and the 
judiciary.
The focus of the study on junior doctors, and on PRHOs in particular, emerges from concerns 
reported in the literature on the EWTD’s implications on their health and safety and medical 
training. The generally poor health among PRHOs is well documented (chapter 5), and so it 
was anticipated that the Directive would deliver real changes to their work and life quality. 
However, this segment of the profession is also adapting from the strictures of medical school 
to the labour market, and commencing their long and demanding medical training. The 
educational perspective is therefore perceived by them as an important aspect of their work 
but this has been associated with long working hours (and has, to a degree, fuelled ill health). 
The study therefore explores these tensions that involve junior doctors, and which are set 
against the broader ideological debates surrounding the state’s direction towards more 
centralised modes of regulation and away from the medical profession’s historical trends of 
self-governance. By reference to the general literature and the data gathered from both the 
surveys and interviews, the study attempts to assess the impact of the EWTD.
The decision not to confine this study to the analysis of a single hospital site was related to 
the objective to explore the experiences of junior doctors as broadly as possible. Their PRHO 
year is divided into two composites, during which they spend time training in different 
medical specialties and often in different hospitals. The Foundation programme, which has 
recently replaced the PRHO and Senior House Officer (SHO) years, is similarly split into two 
years of training -  FI and F2 -  with each year divided into three medical specialities lasting 
four months each; both years can be spent at different hospitals. Thus conducting a study
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based at one hospital or NHS trust would not have reflected the doctors’ variation in 
experiences.
The richness of the data gathered from the nine junior doctor informants working at different 
hospital sites was reflected in their different experiences of work organisation under the 
EWTD. The study’s focus was able to highlight the inconsistent implementation, 
enforcement and compliance with the Directive’s provisions not only between different trusts 
and specialties, but also between EC Member States. It was also able to underscore the 
degree of inconsistency in views held by both senior and junior members of the medical 
profession. In hindsight, had the focus been confined to either Wales or a single hospital or 
trust site, the study would not have necessarily identified some of these differences. As a 
result, it may not have elicited the necessary data to correspond with the research themes.
The study’s elite informants -  policymakers, medical service providers, and the judiciary -  
come from across the UK and parts of Europe. Partly as a result, some of these their claims 
related to a mix of both their individual and specific experiences of work regulation, and the 
more centralised and general views represented by their organisations. It was therefore 
difficult to define the study’s boundaries not only by reference to the individual hospital site 
or NHS trust, but also to the context in Wales. The views of many doctor informants -  both 
junior and senior -  notably perceived themselves as representing the views from a UK rather 
than from a Welsh perspective. This may be attributable to the centrally governed nature of 
their profession. Many of them were also unaware of any differences as regards the situation 
in Wales compared to the UK.
Nonetheless, there are distinctly ‘Welsh’ issues that should be considered, and these have 
been noted accordingly. Examples include policy divergence between England and Wales on 
issues such as free prescriptions and the use of private facilities, and notably the opposition 
by the devolved governments in both Scotland and Wales to the establishment of NHS 
Foundation Hospitals (chapter 4). The Welsh Assembly government plays a role in 
monitoring the overall implementation of the Directive, collating information and 
disseminating best practice but, like England, leaves the issue of enforcement to the relevant 
central authorities. In line with the state’s general intervention with the employment 
relationship, negotiations regarding individual conditions of work are privy to the employees
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and their employers, though they are constrained by a series of basic rights contained in UK- 
wide regulations.
As discussed in chapter 4, devolution has not significantly affected the national frameworks 
that exist to regulate the working time of junior doctors. NHS trusts are obliged to comply 
with the provisions contained in both the New Deal and the EWTD in arranging doctors’ 
rotas. The latter’s other general terms and conditions are determined centrally by national 
bargaining conducted almost exclusively by the BMA and the government. The medical 
profession’s remuneration in the NHS is also centrally decided by the state, which takes into 
account the recommendations made by the Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ 
Remuneration (DDRB). The Welsh Assembly government does have a presence in Brussels 
and interviews for this study were carried out there, but its role in dealing with doctors’ 
labour conditions is severely restricted as Whitehall negotiates with other Member States on 
the issue. While devolution has therefore had a limited impact in the short term, this study 
does not rule out the potential differences that could emerge in the longer term.
Methodology
One’s perspectives on the qualitative and quantitative paradigms often shape the character of 
the research (Bryman 1992). Methodological rifts between the two concepts continue to 
permeate text books on research methods (for example, Jones 2004; Smith and Hershusius 
1986):
Quantitative research is associated with a belief in the objectivity of the social world, 
and the idea of causation in social processes. This is linked to the belief that social 
research can draw on the methods of the physical sciences, in particular the use of 
numbers to measure the relationship between ‘things’. Qualitative research tends to be 
associated with the idea that social life is the product of social interaction and the 
beliefs of actors, that the social world is not populated by things, but by relationships 
and actions.
David and Sutton 2004: 36.
Having regard to the debates associated with each paradigm, the predominant strategy 
followed in this study was to consider the feasibility of conducting work that would best
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address the research themes, taking into account the demands of cost, time and 
administration, in addition to my access to the informants. As a result, no more priority was 
given to positivistic techniques than to more constructionist models:
employing a range of methodological strategies means that the researcher does not 
necessarily privilege a particular way of looking at the social world.
Philip 1998: 261.
The study’s methodological strategies included a mix of methods including postal 
questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews and diaries. The first sought to both 
identify attitudinal patterns towards the regulation of working time in the junior medical 
profession and to obtain a sample of interviewees. The interviews, designed to contextualise 
the generic statistics, provided the main component of the research to generate an overall 
understanding on the doctors’ perceptions and experiences of the EWTD. Finally, two 
electronic diaries carried around the hospital by two PRHOs raised my awareness of their 
work and typical issues facing them on a routine basis. In transcending the narrow 
qualitative/quantitative classifications, the decision to gather data from both a range of 
methods therefore attempts to avoid arbitrary categorisations between qualitative and 
quantitative research:
all social research relies upon qualitative and quantitative aspects...The dispute 
between quality and quantity in social research obscures the fact that there is always a 
degree of quantification in any form of qualitative research and there must be a 
qualitative dimension in any attempt at quantitative research. All research is 
qualitative and quantitative.
David and Sutton 2004: 39.
While mixed methods may be a more effective approach from which it is possible to draw 
conclusions and causal inferences, Spicer (2004: 297-98) points out that it is often based on 
the “naive realist assumption that a single, fixed and coherent reality can be converged on 
through the use of more than one method”. That data can be corroborated and authenticated 
only because the researcher adopts the triangulation technique is misguided; different 
findings are likely to emerge (and be subsequently interpreted) from different research 
methods. Furthermore, even if research employing a package of methods generates consistent
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findings, it is by no means certain that an additional method would not reveal different, 
contradictory findings. While triangulation has become more popular among social scientists, 
it therefore remains important that the researcher understands that there are differences in the 
qualitative and quantitative mediums:
If integrated research became increasingly popular, it is possible that some 
investigators which combine quantitative and qualitative research would be 
undertaken in such a way that it is difficult to detect what advantages have accrued or 
even what advantages the investigator anticipated.
Bryman 1992: 508.
Despite these limitations to triangulation, it was felt that the mixed method approach of this 
study did produce robust findings that addressed the key research themes. However, some 
decisions were taken at the initial stages of the study which have, in some respects, limited 
the findings. The use of survey and interview methods were considered satisfactory medium 
to address the research themes posed by the study, while acknowledging the practical 
considerations of cost and time. A postal questionnaire confined to PRHOs in Wales 
conformed to all these factors. The ease of accessing this particular population also shaped 
my decision to restrict the number of surveys. A second wave of identical questionnaires 
were posted a year after the first cohort and found very few differences in responses, which 
suggests that extending the survey sample beyond junior doctors in Wales to a UK-wide 
survey would not have added any substantially new findings to those reported in this study. 
Furthermore, there are seventeen Deaneries in total, including Wales. Guaranteeing similar 
cooperation from and the necessary access to, the same information that was obtained in 
Wales from the other sixteen Deaneries was not possible in the time available.
The decision not to undertake research of an ethnographic nature partly reflected the concerns 
surrounding time and access. Early discussions with key informants indicated that there 
would be major difficulties in gaining access to a politicised setting such as the NHS to 
observe PRHOs at work. The process would have involved acquiring the key support of the 
PRHOs being observed, in addition to their medical and healthcare team members and 
patients. Of more importance, however, the emphasis placed on intimate settings by the 
ethnographic approaches, including their subjective focus on time, place, social 
circumstances and language (Kirk and Miller 1986), were not perceived as the most
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appropriate methods of addressing the research objectives of this particular study. The 
practical limitations and demands of time spent with relatively small groups of people in 
order to understand the social milieu which they inhabit would not adequately deal with a 
study focussed on large-scale cases such as big organisations (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1983). This would have directed the study away from the broader analysis of debates 
surrounding the regulation of a centrally organised medical profession, operating within a 
National Health Service. It was therefore felt that the objectives would be best addressed 
through the use of semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys with the Wales 
Deanery providing the PRHOs, and the senior medical staff and policymakers, as well as 
judicial informants necessarily coming from Wales, the UK and the EU.
Reviewing existing research
As the first key stage in the research, much time was initially spent analysing documents and 
other secondary sources on subjects related to the EWTD and other forms of regulation. The 
study attempts to incorporate a number of broad debates relating to working-time regulation, 
which is discussed below. With the aim to address as many of the primary and relevant 
debates as possible, it quickly became apparent at the initial stages of the study that wide- 
ranging sources of literature were available. The M.Sc. dissertation had already identified 
some of these in preparation for the doctoral study. As a result, parts of the analysis explores 
existing research looking into factors directly related to the EWTD, such as doctors’ health, 
work-life, medical training, medical services and staffing. However, it was also necessary to 
review some of the broader debates to contextualise the overall study and its findings.
In this respect, the contribution of both this study and research method in particular is two­
fold. First, on a micro level, it addresses a lacuna in the existing academic research on work 
time legislation from the perspective of the general labour market in the UK and from the 
specific view of the junior medical profession in the NHS. At the time of writing, there was a 
distinct lack of research that focused on the formation, implementation, enforcement and 
impact of such regulation on these sectors which incorporated a balance of both qualitative 
and quantitative methods of data collection. Individual themes were discussed in different 
literature. For example, the medical literature focused intensely on the perceived impact of 
the legislation on professional training, whereas other health-based research considered the 
effect of such regulation on health and work-life. This study attempts to address the apparent
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‘gap’ in the existing research by consolidating as many of these concerns within the confines 
of one project.
Secondly, and related to the first point, the study on a macro level locates the available 
discussions on the EWTD within the broader theoretical debates applicable to employment 
relations and regulation. These can be classed into three groups, which have been explored 
using secondary data analysis as a method in itself. The first group of debates comprises 
literature reviews on workplace relations in the UK, focusing on the longstanding tensions 
between voluntarism and collective bargaining on the one hand, and centralised state 
regulation on the other. The study applies these theories to the present context by arguing that 
historical forms of regulation are very apparent in the way that legislation is formed, 
implemented, enforced and subsequently perceived in the UK today, particularly so in the 
junior medical profession. The EWTD is a prime example of a minimalist regulation which 
contains numerous exemptions and derogation and whose enforcement is critically under­
resourced (see chapter 3) which has subsequently contributed to instances of non-compliance. 
The State has therefore adopted a particular stance on the EWTD which is closely associated 
with its traditional voluntarist approach to regulation.
The second broad debate discussed in the study is the development of New Public 
Management (NPM) and rationalisation policies applied initially by the Conservative 
government in 1979 within the public sector labour market including the NHS (see chapter 
4). This literature is equally as applicable to the current circumstances in which the EWTD 
has been implemented as it reinforces the increasing authority of management, as agents of 
the State, over the medical profession. It represents a further encroachment on the working 
autonomy to which doctors have historically been accustomed. The rise in managerialism and 
regulation has inevitably conflicted with the self-regulatory nature of the profession. This 
study argues that this tension may have been reflected in doctors’ responses towards the law.
The third general contribution towards the current debate is regulation theory, and the 
questions it raises in respect of the limits of law as a tool to govern social behaviour (see 
chapter 9). The study shows an attempt, via the EWTD, to control an area of social life by a 
highly centralised statute which has historically been regulated in less formal ways. The 
outcome of this study will therefore determine if law is the most effective way of dealing 
with specific working environments, and whether it serves as more of a symbolic rather than
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instrumental statement that is able to actually effect change. This argument is approached by 
reference to the ambiguous terms of the legislation which has been written by the state 
legislature, and which has consequently provided the space to implement and enforce the 
regulation in an inconsistent manner.
Both the micro and macro aspects of this study’s contribution, and its references to the 
specific debates in the medical profession in addition to the broader discussions associated 
with regulation, are addressed by the author’s investigation of the existing research. The 
findings of documentary analysis are reported in the next three chapters, and are subsequently 
assessed in light of the study’s findings in chapters 6, 7, and 8. The next three chapters are 
therefore integral to one’s understanding of how the various debates are inter-linked. They 
also provide necessary background detail which allows the reader to comprehend the 
contribution that this study is making to the existing literature, and to locate its relevance 
within both the broader and more specific debates:
The aim in doing this is to place your own work within an existing research context, 
for example, the kinds of theories which have underpinned the key writers in the 
chosen field and the methodological questions they raise...Through doing this search 
and intensive reading, gaps and lacunae in existing research can be identified.
Gray 2003: 59.
The findings which are reported in the next three chapters arise from a detailed review of 
secondary sources (including academic papers, government reports and other published 
reports and statistics) conducted by the author using academic journals, legislation, case law 
and a very wide range of authors which address the present lacuna in data referred to by Gray 
(2003).
This process provides a further example of how this study has attempted to triangulate the 
available data using a combination of documentary and secondary data analysis with primary 
data collected by way of semi-structured interviews and the postal questionnaire surveys. The 
secondary research provides informed reference points to which the later findings form the 
primary data collection phase can be compared and understood. This interaction also provides 
the critical ability of corroborating and augmenting evidence from a variety of sources (Yin
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1981). As a result, the incorporation of both primary and secondary data sources allow for 
exploration and greater insight into the lives of those studied, exploiting the strengths of the 
mixed methods approach.
The process of locating documentary sources, both official and unofficial, involved the use of 
broad and more specific search terms (such as regulation, EWTD, medical, profession, 
industrial relations, and work time, used individually and in various combinations) in the 
‘Voyager’ library cataloguing service and the larger on-line databases such as Ingenta.
In addition to identifying key authors and text books, the searches also identified a number of 
journals which commonly featured articles on particular themes. They included the British 
Journal o f Industrial Relations; the British Medical Journal; Industrial Law Journal; Law 
and Policy ; and, Sociology o f Health & Illness, to name a few. The research published by the 
Department of Health, the (then) Department of Trade and Industry, the TUC and the BMA 
provided the necessary information on the broad policy debates and national data in the UK 
to further contextualise the study. The European material was taken from the EU databases 
and the Industrial Relations Observatory Online (http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie) in particular. 
The topical nature of the study’s focus meant that reports, revisions, consultations and case- 
law regarding the EWTD were regularly being produced; similar changes were occurring 
within the medical training system. In addition to using the sources discussed above, other 
search engines were used to ensure that the study was kept up to date. They included the BBC 
Online (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news), the use of legal databases, such as Nexis-Lexis 
Butterworths and Westlaw, and European sources documenting the relevant EC political and 
legal developments (http://ec.europa.eu/prelex).
The overall process of reviewing existing research provided, on the one hand, an 
understanding of the issues facing junior doctors, and on the other, it highlighted the 
methodological strengths and weaknesses of existing studies. These reviews subsequently 
helped to shape the current study’s research themes, and introduced the methods chosen to 
address them:
To determine the questions that are most significant for a topic, and to gain some
precision in formulating these questions, requires much preparation. One way is to
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review the literature...experienced investigators review previous research to develop 
sharper and more insightful ‘questions’ about the topic.
Yin 1994: 9.
Problems of ‘data overload’ emerged early in my writing of relevant, albeit very long 
chapters that reviewed the relevant research literatures. It was recognised that difficulties in 
drafting literature reviews before the data collection stage could lead the research to veer 
from its original aims and objectives. In a similar respect, fieldwork could influence and 
sometimes change the orientation, questions and method of the research, placing doubt on 
earlier literature reviews (Branley 2004). To limit this potential problem, and in preparation 
for the questionnaire survey, a set of initial interviews were conducted with some key figures 
to gain a better understanding of the most relevant and salient issues facing the medical 
profession. These exercises, which included semi-structured interviews with a senior 
clinician, a BMA regional representative and two PRHOs, retained my general focus on the 
research themes and helped to identify the relevant materials of the literature reviews. 
Combining these experiences eventually allowed me to piece together a working draft survey 
encapsulating all the issues that conformed to my aims and objectives.
Semi-structured interviews
Interviews in social research entail an interviewer and interviewee attempting to develop a 
shared understanding of a particular topic (Yates 2004). The flexibility associated with the 
more qualitative semi-structure interview method adopted for this research elevated the 
involvement and participatory role of the interviewees, and allowed them to discuss the issues 
that they considered most salient. In turn, this reduced the effect of interviewer bias and 
prejudgements of what constituted the most relevant line of enquiry:
For in [the structured methods] interviewers have already predicted, in detail, what is 
relevant and meaningful to their respondents about the research topic; and in doing 
this they have significantly prestructured the direction of enquiry within their own 
frame of reference in ways that give little time and space for their respondents to 
elaborate their own.
Jones 2004: 258.
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The less structured approach to interviews provides for the informant’s a ‘voice’ to be heard; 
there is far greater room to explore the interviewee’s point of view, and his or her 
representations and accounts. The very nature of an exploratory exercise also allows for an 
insight into voices and experiences which they believe have been ignored, misrepresented or 
suppressed in the past (Byrne 2004). PRHOs arguably fall within this category even though 
they have the status of professionals because of their junior position and lack of 
empowerment (Lowry 1993). Democratising ‘suppressed’ views by interview methods does, 
however, have limitations insofar as time and cost preclude their widespread use, making the 
data difficult to extrapolate and to subsequently generalise beyond the confines of the study. 
Moreover, given that the exercise is prepared, conducted and analysed by the researcher, 
subjective interpretation of the data raises the possibility that if he or she was substituted for 
another then the study’s findings may well come to a different conclusion.
As the primary method of the study, the interview sought to gain a more in-depth and 
contextual understanding of the EWTD among policymakers, medical service providers, and 
the judiciary. Its semi-structured format incorporated methodological components ranging 
from a closed questionnaire to an open ‘conversation’, thus attempting to attain a degree of 
standardisation on the themes identified between the existing empirical research and those 
provided by the informants. It was felt that adopting a more structured design would not only 
restrict the interviewees’ responses, but would duplicate the information already gathered in 
the survey. The forty-four interviewees can be grouped into the following categories: policy­
makers; those involved with providing medical services (including employer and employee 
representatives); and, the judiciary. They are listed as follows:
Policymakers (11)
•  The Welsh Local Government Authority;
•  The Junior Doctor Coordinator at the National Assembly of Wales;
•  The Chief Medical Officer at the National Assembly for Wales;
•  Two MEPs, representing Labour and the Conservative parties,
•  Assembly Member, Plaid Cymru (and GP);
•  The National Assembly for Wales’ delegates in Brussels;
•  Two spokesmen from the Department of Health (DH) and Modernising Medical
Careers (MMC);
• The Health and Safety Executive (HSE); and,
• An EC Commissioner;
Medical Services (33)
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• Eight full-time and one part-time PRHOs (5 females and 4 males);
• A Medical Director of an NHS trust;
• A Dean of Medicine;
• A Vice Dean of Postgraduate studies of a Medical School and consultant of Palliative 
Care;
• A Vice Dean of Undergraduate Studies at a Medical School;
• The Director and Dean for Postgraduate Dental and Medical Education for Wales;
•  The Dean for Flexible Training;
• A consultant anaesthetist;
• A consultant occupation physician;
• A consultant surgeon;
• A Professor and Honorary consultant in paediatrics;
• A Medical School Admissions tutor and consultant in haematology;
• Head of Postgraduate Recruitment and Widening Access at a Medical School;
• Undergraduate medical student and NUS President;
• Undergraduate nursing student;
• Three prospective medical students;
• Members of the allied professions (a nurse, physiotherapist and occupational 
therapist);
• An operating department practitioner;
• The Deputy Chairman of the Junior Doctor Committee and Chairman of the Working 
Hours Sub-committee of the BMA (and GP);
• A chairman on the EWTD steering group at the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS);
• A representative of the NHS Confederation;
• The Royal College of Nursing (RCN); and,
• Senior Medical Staffing Manager
Judiciary (2)
•  An Advocate General at the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg; and,
• An ex-ECJ judge presiding for the UK.
The classification, however, has its limitations insofar as there is a significant degree of 
cross-over between some of the informants’ roles. The Assembly Member for example is 
both a politician and a GP; the Deputy Chairman of the BMA is also a GP; whereas the Vice 
Dean of postgraduate studies of a medical school is also an active member at the House of 
Lords and a consultant in palliative care. On numerous occasions, an informant from one 
group was therefore sufficiently qualified and experienced to talk from a perspective of 
another group. This had its advantages in my use of ‘snowball sampling’, which is discussed 
below. With the exception of the PRHOs, the prospective medical students and, to a certain 
extent, the members of the allied health professions, the interviewees comprised generally 
‘elite’ stakeholders. Elites can be loosely defined as those with close proximity to power or 
policymaking (Lilleker 2003). They are a powerful, talented and privileged in society 
(Zuckerman 1972).
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Looking at these relatively straightforward categories, the different groups of interviewees 
can be linked to the particular research objectives that guide the study. The analysis of the 
elites’ views about the political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of working time 
reflects the study’s first objective. Attempts to critically examine the implementation, 
enforcement and the consequent sources of support and resistance for the regulations can also 
be gauged by their responses. The views of the PRHOs together with those of the senior 
medical providers correspond to the third objective of analysing the emergent impact of 
regulating working time on the work and lives of junior doctors.
The interview schedules between elite and non-elite interviewees differed according to the 
information with which they could individually provide me, and were shaped by the research 
objectives. Preparation was therefore important prior to the interview (McHugh 1994) and, 
for the elites, research was carried out on most of the individuals’ backgrounds through their 
published materials, biographical details contained on the internet, and by cross-referencing 
information from other interviews. These processes enabled me to draw up a list of 
appropriate questions. Overall, the schedules, in line with the interview format which was 
adopted, were structured loosely to permit subsequent comparisons between the answers 
provided. The PRHOs’ schedule was as follows:
• General conditions of work in the NHS
What is it like to work there, as a doctor?
• Working time
Work hours and monitoring in practice; does this exceed their contracted hours?
If so, explain longer hours and discuss relevance of professional expectations / culture
• Time spent at hospital
Views on time spent committed to service and medical training;
Willingness to take time off and relations with managers;
• Health
Personal experiences of poor health, if any, and relevance of working time.
• Work-life & flexible training
Personal experiences and relevance of salary (would they work longer hours?)
• The EWTD
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Most salient issue; should doctors be exempt? Is 48 hours per week realistic?
The effect of asking such questions was to obtain subjective views about the apparent impact 
of regulating working time on the work and lives of junior doctors, in line with the third 
objective of this study. Drawing upon personal experiences contextualised the regulatory 
issues discussed in the literature on a distinctly local level. Their responses informed the 
study of the most salient debates (thereby reducing the effect of researcher bias), and 
illustrated the degree of regulatory compliance among junior doctors, their senior 
counterparts and the trusts, as employers. Together with the survey findings, the issues raised 
by the PRHO interviewees were corroborated by the elite informants, and used as a basis to 
relate the broader regulatory debates with what was being discussed and implemented at a 
micro level.
Elites can soon detect whether questions are standardised or tailored to their interests and 
histories, and begrudge being encased by standard lines of enquiry (Zucherman 1972). For 
this study, certain questions were therefore earmarked for all informants, but each schedule 
included particular questions for each individual elite. For example, the acting Director of the 
Modernisation Agency at the Department of Health was asked about the implementation of 
the pilot programmes as a means of applying the Directive in different medical specialities 
and NHS Trusts. The interview with the consultant occupation physician centred largely on 
the health of the doctors and the perceived impact of the EWTD (including the role of shift 
patterns) to corroborate the concerns of junior doctors, but also to explore the issue of health 
among senior doctors. The supranational roles of the EC legislature and the ECJ were 
discussed in more depth by the EC Commissioner and the Advocate General of the European 
Court, respectively as part of the broader context facing Member States’ health systems.
‘Professional preparation’ for the PRHO year formed the core themes of the interviews with 
the various Deans of the Medical School, in addition to the rise in female medical graduates 
and its perceived impact on both the general medical workforce and on the NHS. The 
questions directed to the Dean for Flexible Training specifically covered these issues. The 
Senior Policy Adviser at the HSE was inevitably asked about the enforcement regime in place 
for the EWTD, whereas the Senior Medical Staffing Manager was asked about the 
implementation of the legislation within the context of such a regime. Interviews with the 
Manager of Widening Access and a Medical Schools admissions tutor explored the
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backgrounds of medical students, as a prerequisite to looking at how these factors shaped the 
medical profession. Like the PRHOs’ interviews, however, the following themes and sub­
questions formed the core of each of the elites’ interview schedules:
• Working Time
o How did the working hours reported in the study’s survey correspond to their 
experiences of the time spent by junior doctors at hospital?
o Was there a long hours’ culture in the medical profession, and how would the 
EWTD address this?
• EWTD Impact
o What were their views on the health rationale of the EWTD?
o Impact on training
o Was compliance with the EWTD’s phased limits possible, and what was their 
experience of regulatory compliance among the profession and employers?
o Views on ECJ case law and the definition of working time
• EWTD Implementation
o The implementation of the EWTD through shift system: what were the 
effects?
o What was the state of Government preparation and guidance?
• Regulation
o How did the EWTD fit into the broader context of regulating the medical 
profession (with particular reference to the historical modes of self-regulation 
and the more recent New Deal)?
o What is the most appropriate body to regulate working time, drawing from 
their experiences of centralised negotiation by the BMA, governmental 
agreements such as the New Deal, and now the EWTD?
o Exclusion of doctors from EWTD
The elites’ schedule is therefore different from that adopted for junior doctors, largely 
because of its emphasis of elevating debates to the broader professional, national and 
supranational context. This corresponded to the research objectives of analysing the views of 
elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of working 
time, and to examine critically the ways in which the EWTD has been implemented and 
enforced in practice, and the sources of support and resistance to such processes.
The sample of ‘elite’ interviewees was drawn up during the literature reviews, and through 
informal networking with individual informants. A number of them suggested that I seek the 
views of another named person, thus giving effect to a form of ‘snowball’ sampling. This was 
particularly the case for contacting individuals in Europe and in the medical profession. Many 
of the senior informants held more than one post and worked, for example, both in academia 
and as a clinician and/or in policymaking. This allowed me to capture the views of
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individuals representing ‘two sides of the coin.’ The overall experience of sampling therefore 
made it easier to access the figures appearing on the interviewee list. The fact that they had a 
dual role essentially meant that their names and responsibilities were known by a wider 
audience within the confines of a relatively closed professional group.
Only three elite sources declined to be interviewed. The first was the Medical Defence Union 
(MDU). Despite assurances of confidentiality, they were reluctant to discuss any confidential 
and litigious issues with external individuals and agencies. The second and third potential 
interviewees were an ex-ECJ Judge representing the UK, who gave judgment at the European 
Court of Justice in the early EWTD cases, and the Senior Policy Advisor for the HSE. Both, 
however, provided helpful written responses to the interview schedules that were 
electronically mailed to them.
A total of nineteen PRHOs provided me with their contact details at the end of the first 
survey indicating that they wished to further participate in the research. Of that figure, nine 
responded to a follow-up letter requesting an interview and/or a dictaphone diary. Seven 
subsequently attended interviews at different dates and two juniors registered interest in the 
diaries. A poster was sent to every doctors’ mess (a common room) in hospitals across Wales 
from which two responded and later attended an interview. Doctors E and F are the only two 
from either cohort of PRHOs whose views were sought by all three methods.
The names appearing on the overall interview list were approached midway through the first 
year of the research (while administering the survey for the first cohort of PRHOs) in 
anticipation of the difficulties in accessing ‘elite’ informants. The intervening period between 
the two surveys -  August 2004 to February 2005 -  was fully occupied with interviewing. 
Undertaking forty-four interviews within a short timescale was at times demanding given that 
the process of interviewing, transcribing and analysis were being attempted simultaneously. 
The results of the first survey had to be addressed and subsequently evaluated, and 
preparation for the survey to the second PRHO cohort took place at the same time. The 
interviews were conducted in a variety of public and private settings. While aware that the 
consistency in responses may be shaped by the different locations, the relatively coherent 
comments which were gathered suggest that the informants were not adversely affected by 
this factor. Rather, the onus was on myself to respect the wishes of the interviewees as to the 
location of the interview, and to elicit the optimum responses irrespective of the setting:
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It is important for the researcher to identify a time and a place where the interviewee 
is going to feel comfortable ...
David and Sutton 2004: 90.
Methodologically, the key difference between both the private and public places was their 
implications on the quality of tape recording and the subsequent difficulties involved in their 
transcription. This was particularly the case as regards the background noise at some of the 
public settings. A tape recorder was used in most of the interviews allowing me to 
concentrate on the interviewees’ responses. In turn I was able to probe either for clarification 
or to expand on the answer without having to take written notes:
Qualitative interviewing is a skilled process as you need to develop the ability to 
listen carefully to what you are being told at the same time you consider how to take 
the interview forward and what your next question will be.
Byrne 2004: 190.
A tape recorder was found to have the added advantage of minimising the possibility of 
distorting the informants’ answers and of reducing error. Note-taking restricted some 
essential components of the interview such as visual and semi-verbal cues that would 
ordinarily contribute to the development of a good rapport. Some of the literature discusses 
the issue of elites’ requests for their comments to be treated ‘off the record’ (Lilleker 2003). 
This was particularly the case for the civil servants at the Welsh Assembly government who 
were bound under the Official Secrets legislation, and the Advocate general at the ECJ. 
Welch et al. (2002) found that the business elites in their study answered some questions in a 
guarded fashion because of fears that their comments may be used against them. The majority 
of elite interviewees in this study, however, appeared unaffected by the device presumably 
because their positions meant that they were used to being recorded (Ball 1994). Doctor B 
was the only non-elite who showed some anxiety about being recorded and identified in the 
research process. In order to allay the informants’ concerns, the anonymity of each 
interviewee -  elite and non-elite -  was guaranteed both in writing (in the correspondence 
before the interview), and verbally at the commencement of the meeting. Transcription took 
between two to three hours per interview with the longest interview taking an hour and a half
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(Dr C) and the shortest being approximately fifteen minutes (the consultant in palliative care 
and the Medical Director).
Gender is inevitably an important issue to consider in interviewing, but it is difficult to 
generalise about the precise nature of its importance (Johnston 2001), simply because very 
little research has focused on the ways gender differences frame or influence the research 
findings (Bryman 2001). Some research questions may elicit responses or perspectives for 
which gender has great relevance in response (Cotterill 1992), whereas others may not. The 
same would apply to . factors such as race, class, age or other characteristics (David and 
Sutton 2004). Feminists such as Oakley (1981) have regarded the interview as a situation in 
which women should be able to feel comfortable to tell their own story as they see it. The 
interviewer should not dominate the direction and the agenda of the interview (Puwar 1997), 
and much emphasis is placed on establishing empathy, trust and ethics (Finch 1984) typically 
using in-depth and unstructured interviews. It departs from the conventional mode of 
interviewing which has attracted feminist critique:
The traditional interview is seen not only as paternalistic, condescending in its 
attitudes towards women and not counting for gendered differences, but also as based 
on a hierarchical relationship with the respondent in a subordinate position.
Punch 2005: 173.
The feminist model is therefore based on reciprocity and intimacy, aiming to produce non- 
hierarchical, non-manipulative research relationships which have the potential to overcome 
the separation between the researcher and the researched. This is in contrast to the elite 
interviews in which elites assume interviewers are like journalists, who are to be manipulated 
or used but never trusted (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Furthermore, the time constraints imposed 
on elite interviews make it difficult for the researcher to build a relationship of trust.
It is therefore important to think about how the researcher’s characteristics might enhance or 
intrude on data collection. The feminist critique would advocate minimising status 
differences between interviewer and respondent, and developing a more equal relationship, 
enabling greater openness and insight, and richer data (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). While 
interviewer effects must be acknowledged and controlled if they endanger the validity and 
reliability of response, there are limits to the extent of matching which can be achieved, not
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least by the labour-market conditions and administrative demands (Hyman et al. 1954). For 
some, the desirability of such an approach is also doubted. Lewis (2003), for example, argues 
that in studies on sensitive issues, people may find it more helpful to speak with someone 
who is outside their own community or population group. Matching the interviewer and 
informant is not always a useful approach. There is a risk that similarities between 
interviewers and interviewees will preclude effective communications, and the elicitation of 
rich data:
Interviewing people similar to yourself can pose difficulties, because the interviewees 
assume that you know what they know evidence suggests that interviewing across 
class, gender, or ethnic barriers can actually be more effective than matching the 
backgrounds of the interviewer and interviewee.
Rubin and Rubin 1995: 111.
Assumptions, created by the interviewer and interviewee’s shared experiences, may impact 
on the quality of data collection, and participants might hold back from giving fulsome 
accounts, relying on the interviewer to draw on their own background rather than giving a full 
and explicit account. The methods literature, however, notes the importance of critical self­
scrutiny that should be afforded by the researcher in his or her reflections of the research 
process (Byrne 2004):
Far better to acknowledge that the researcher is part of the world which he/she is 
researching, that different factors will influence the interviewee, and to take account
of these in the kinds of claims you might make on the basis of the data that is
generated through this necessarily unpredictable and often shaky and perplexing 
process.
Gray 2003: 72.
In a consumer attitude survey, Groves and Nancy Fultz (1985) analysed the effects of
interviewer gender on response rates and found that female interviewers were more
successful at getting responses than were male interviewers. Bernard (2000) and Seidman 
(1998) document a handful of studies which have similarly attributed different response 
effects to the gender of the researcher, but the overall impact of interviewers’ characteristics 
are inconclusive (Williams and Heikes 1993; Bryman 2001). Reinharz and Chase (2001) cite
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the work of Padfield and Procter (1996) which found no significant differences in women’s 
attitudes in response to the interviewers’ genders, even on sensitive topics such as feminism 
and abortion. In their telephone survey, Huddy et al. (1997) found that their younger 
respondents and those with less formal education were more susceptible to interviewer’s 
gender, but the differences were not significant and were not repeated in a later survey. 
Catania et al. (1996) found that in allowing people to choose their interviewer’s gender, 
women typically selected women, while men split relatively evenly. The study, however, was 
confined to examining a number of highly sensitive sexual topics, and the authors concluded 
that in general, their results did not support the proposition that women are more influenced 
than males by interviewer-gender differences.
In this study, the elite interviewees were primarily men, though women Welsh Assembly and 
MEP policymakers, and medical service providers -  including two Deans and two senior 
consultants amongst others -  were also interviewed. There were no identifiable differences 
among the responses of male and female elites. The nature of their occupational positions 
meant that they were generally used to being questioned (Ball 1994) whether by political 
journalists or (public and private) health system users.
The PRHO interview informants were initially all female. Concerns over the possible 
‘gendered’ nature of the data led to a series of interviews with male doctors, thus balancing 
out the views to five female and four male interviewees. For reasons related to the junior 
doctors’ lack of status compared with the elites, it was anticipated that responses may vary 
according to their respective genders. Like the elites, however, this was not the case. The 
length of every interview, based on a loosely standardised schedule of questions, took 
approximately an hour, with little variation in the types of responses elicited. This was most 
surprising as some lines of enquiry were quite sensitive, particularly relating to experiences 
of ill health resulting from working time. Other questions surrounding work-life balance were 
expected to be approached differently between the male and female informants, given the 
importance afforded within the general labour market to flexible working arrangements and 
part-time work to accommodate women’s childbearing roles (chapter 3). Despite some of the 
different circumstances between the PRHOs, such as Dr C being married compared with the 
single status of her other junior doctor counterparts, and Dr G’s ‘flexible’ training following a 
history of depression put side by side with the other PRHOs’ general good health, the overall
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process revealed a distinct similarity in the responses given by both male and female PRHO 
informants.
This supports the conclusions drawn from general research that the interviewer’s gender can 
be minimal. It also enhanced my confidence in the reliability of the methods used. To further 
reinforce the applicability of this argument within the present study, one could refer to the 
literature which looks at the general heterogeneity of the medical profession and it’s largely 
closed social culture within which attitudes and ideas are recycled between generations of 
doctors (chapter 4). Looking at the responses from this perspective explains the general 
commonality in outlooks. This is not to suggest that all PRHOs think alike, but the study 
found a set of common themes and priorities which linked this population in a particular way. 
It is possible that owing to the nature of the routine work associated with the profession, that 
the PRHOs simply applied their clinical ‘bedside mannerisms’ to the interview situation 
(Atkinson 1995). Like their everyday patients, I was concerned to extract a particular facet of 
their knowledge, that is, their knowledge and experience of work time conditions, rather than 
the patient’s ordinary concern for clinical expertise. Room for emotional responses was 
limited in the social science interview as it presumably is in the clinical environment. 
Consistency, clarity and confidence in responding to my questions were applied as though the 
interview comprised an encounter between the doctors and their patients. As such, the 
interviewer’s characteristics played a minimal role.
Postal Questionnaire Survey
The questionnaire survey was another element of the study, and had two main objectives. 
First, it aimed to gather basic information on the working patterns of PRHOs, and to provide 
a descriptive overview of attitudes on the regulation of working time. Second, it acted as a 
‘sift’ through which a sample of PRHO interviewees could be obtained at a later stage of the 
study. The survey questionnaire was informed by the issues raised in the initial literature 
reviews and the concerns reflected in the research objectives:
The aims and objectives of a social survey emerge from the theoretical concerns of an 
academic discipline as set out in the literature, from the concerns of policy makers or 
from the personal interests of the researcher.
Bloch 2004: 164.
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An identical set of questionnaire surveys was posted to two different cohorts of PRHOs 
practising under the direction of the Postgraduate Deanery in Wales: 267 surveys were sent to 
the 2004-05 cohort in April 2004, which was four months before the compulsory 
implementation of the EWTD. A year later, 256 questionnaires were posted to the 2005-06 
cohort. The response rate for the first survey was 30% (80 questionnaires), and 23% (59 
questionnaires) for the second. Although this figure may appear relatively low, low response 
rates are not unusual for postal questionnaires of this type. Nevertheless, caution should be 
taken in interpreting the data recorded by the survey in view of the low response rate. It is 
difficult to assess non-response bias, owing to the limited amount of demographic 
information collected (although the response rate for male and female doctors was similar), 
and to the lack of comparative data for the wider population of junior doctors. The response 
rate for male and female doctors was similar. The difficulties in assessing the actual non­
response bias do reflect a limitation on the survey’s findings. It is not possible to explore 
whether the non-responders would have responded differently on the issues raised by the 
regulation. However, it is reasonable to speculate that doctors who were particularly 
concerned about the issue of working time might have been more likely to return the survey. 
This may consequently have tilted the overall results towards expressing more concern about 
the EWTD. For example, the respondents supporting the EWTD referred to the need for 
regulation in order to limit the detrimental impact of working time on their personal health. 
Over 40% of respondents perceived that they had experienced some form of ill-health as a 
result of their working time. Having said this, a similar proportion of respondents (56%) 
argued against the EWTD as they saw it as curbing their potential earning capacity.
Overall, the survey did not identify a general strong opposition to the EWTD. In fact, 80% of 
the respondents were of the opinion that doctors should not be excluded from within the 
scope of the legislation. Chapter 8 discusses these findings in further detail, and illustrates the 
junior doctors’ mixed reaction towards the EWTD depending on whether the respondents 
chose to talk about its perceived impact on health, work-life, salary, medical training and/or 
medical service. Chapter 6 reinforces this inconsistency by identifying a similar degree 
contradiction in the elite informants’ responses that were elicited in the interviews. These 
findings typically show that while the survey respondents did include a mix of those who 
argued both for and against the Directive, it also consisted of a group of junior doctors who 
did not hold strong views either way, and who appeared seemingly unconcerned about the
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issue of working time. This does not necessarily prove that the findings are more or less 
valid. There is no straightforward way of testing non-response bias in the absence of 
comparative samples against which the responses of this study can be compared. However, 
the survey findings do provide a basis upon which the author can make informed judgments 
about the perceived impacts of the EWTD. In light of the above comments, it is reasonable 
to argue that the findings were not skewed by a sample of junior doctors who felt particularly 
affected by the Directive. Thus, although the low response rate is unfortunate the author felt 
confident that it does not mean that the research findings are fundamentally flawed, although 
clearly the possibility of non-response bias should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the results.
The self-reporting nature of the survey also poses certain questions about the reliability of the 
data gathered, particularly as there is no comparable research against which the responses can 
be verified. The subjective nature of the responses raises questions about the variability 
between respondents’ individual responses, all of which undermines the ability to provide an 
authoritative measurement of the specific impact of the Directive’s provisions. The findings 
therefore only provide a basis for informed speculation about the effects of the regulations’ 
implementation.
The survey attempted to balance factual, opinion-based, closed and open-ended questions (a 
copy is included in the appendix), and was shaped by the aims and objectives of the study. 
Concerns over poor response rates influenced my decision to limit both the number of open- 
ended questions and the overall length of the questionnaire survey. In spite of the sample 
population, it also avoided medical jargon in order to retain simplicity and avoid potential 
confusion. The questionnaire was separated into five short sections. Following the request 
for general demographic data, section 2 of the questionnaire sought to gauge compliance with 
the legislation by enquiring about the respondents’ average weekly hours. The third section 
explored PRHO attitudes towards the impact of working hours and health, given that this 
relationship was a key concern of the Directive. Subsequent questions in the section related to 
the willingness to take time off from work; work-life satisfaction; and the availability of 
flexible work arrangements in the NHS. Section 4 considered the effects of the EWTD on 
medical training and service. The questionnaire concluded with a section on regulation, 
examining the respondents’ feelings about the EWTD, returning once again to themes of 
compliance. The overall layout therefore aimed to make the respondent feel as comfortable as
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possible in answering the questionnaire, logically covering working hours, their effects, and 
the general impact of the Directive in their everyday work.
The initial reason for using two surveys was to compare the attitudes of PRHOs towards the 
regulation of their working time immediately preceding the date for the Directive’s 
implementation with the experiences of PRHOs a year after the regulation’s enforcement. It 
became apparent, however, that a strict before-and-after analysis was not possible. The 
validity of such an exercise was affected by the inconsistent implementation of the Directive 
between different NHS trusts, particularly after the unanticipated European case law. 
Nevertheless, the object of the two surveys was achieved, which was to provide a general 
understanding of the work attitudes and practices surrounding regulation. They substantially 
increased the amount of data, thus making quantitative analyses more credible, and afforded 
two opportunities to recruit a sample of PRHO interviewees.
At the time of each sweep of the survey, the PRHOs usually spent two six-month periods at 
different hospitals in Wales. The questionnaire surveys were posted to doctors’ permanent 
home addresses mid-way through their two composites so as to allow them sufficient 
experience to properly evaluate the survey’s questions. Posting the survey at an earlier date 
may have left the respondents with inadequate experience to provide a holistic impression of 
their PRHO year. Had the survey been posted later, then the response rates may have been 
jeopardised by the PRHOs’ preoccupation with their final part of training and GMC 
registration. Under these conditions, it was doubted whether much priority would be afforded 
to the survey, which would reduce the response rates even further.
The questionnaire was sent with both a prepaid self-addressed envelope and a brief cover 
letter guaranteeing the informants’ anonymity. A copy of the letters sent by the Junior Doctor 
Coordinator at the Welsh Assembly government and the Postgraduate Deanery in Wales 
endorsing the study were also enclosed to lend credence to the research. ‘Reminder surveys’ 
were sent to those respondents who had not replied within two weeks, reasserting the nature 
and aims of the survey. Caution was taken not to allow for an excessive time interval between 
the first survey and the reminder. A rapid follow-up would emphasise the importance 
attached to the study and, in terms of validity, it would minimise the potential for intervening 
events which could shape the respondents’ answers. The choice of a postal rather than 
telephone or face-to-face questionnaires was largely a pragmatic decision. The postal option
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was the most feasible and cost-effective in gathering data of a standardised nature from such 
a large cohort of respondents. Furthermore, finding a convenient time to carry out telephone 
or face-to-face questionnaires was too demanding, particularly given the PRHOs’ working 
patterns. Access and exclusion were also considered important issues as not all respondents 
had listed telephone numbers, whereas they all had a postal address to which a questionnaire 
could be sent.
The reliability of the surveys was underscored by their identical questionnaires administered 
to the same target population on two separate occasions. Furthermore, the results from each 
one yielded few differences in the responses provided. The consistency of the data may have 
been further tested if the same respondents were surveyed twice, that is either twice during 
the same PRHO year, or by a follow-up study a year later during their senior house officer 
(SHO) training. The first of these ideas was dismissed given that the first of the two surveys 
would have to have been posted at an earlier stage of their PRHO year. I decided that the 
respondents may not have gained sufficient experience in this time to form adequate 
impressions on the regulation of their working time. The reliability of the second option 
encompassing a survey in both the PRHO and then the SHO year would have been equally 
contentious. Each year may raise training and service demands of a different nature, thus 
making the reliability of the data less consistent.
Diaries
To grasp an in-depth understanding of PRHOs’ experiences inside the hospital environment 
and the impact on personal life, two junior doctors contemporaneously recorded their 
thoughts on a Dictaphone on two separate days at work. Having recruited them from the 
survey in very much the same way as the interviewees, the nature and aims of the research 
were explained to the participants, who were also provided with a list of loosely worded 
questions arranged thematically upon which they were required to comment (see appendix; 
the questions appeared in the same order as both the survey and interview schedule for the 
purposes of maintaining consistency and efficient coding). Owing to the impracticality of 
having to regularly refer to this list at work, the informants were asked to read the questions 
thoroughly before and after their shift. The detail of each entry was left for the informant to 
determine thereby reducing the effects of researcher bias. The contemporaneous nature of the 
diary overcame the problems of recalling events that were probed in both the surveys and
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interviews, but there was no guarantee that the participants strictly adhered to the instructions 
given to them:
Informants may deviate from instructions...by failing to record the events while they 
are fresh in their memories; the main strength of the diary approach is the avoidance 
of reliance on memory, but, if the informant does not keep the diary up-to-date, at 
least part of that strength is lost.
Moser and Kalton 1971: 82.
One informant used her diary during a period of on-call whereas the other recorded her 
thoughts during a normal shift. The disadvantages of the method, however, became quite 
clear at an early stage. The extra work involved in carrying a device around the workplace 
recording contemporaneous thoughts and experiences deterred many from taking the method 
up. It was far more demanding than completing a short questionnaire and the problem was 
reflected in the poor participation. The method was intended to gather more information to 
compensate for the decision not to pursue ethnographic techniques but only two females 
came forward despite a generous financial incentive, which consequently limited its value in 
terms of extrapolating the data.
Access
Two approaches were taken to accessing the study’s informants. These are discussed in turn, 
looking firstly at the way in which the survey sample was obtained; the second section then 
explains the issues surrounding the access to elites. The survey sampling frame comprised of 
two cohorts of PRHOs under the Postgraduate Deanery for Medical and Dental Education in 
Wales. Having undertaken part-time work at a Medical School for some time before and 
during the research, my senior manager, who had taken particular interest in the study, was 
able to provide me with the addresses of all PRHOs training in Wales through another 
internal source at the School. This is an example of ‘convenience sampling’ (Bryman 2001) -  
an opportunity which I was reluctant to turn down. Feldman et al. (2003) argue that accessing 
a sample can be largely attributable to an element of good fortune, which was the case for this 
study:
37
Luck was also an important part of gaining access...luck that involved preparedness 
meeting opportunity...luck has this funny quality: You cannot make it happen, but it 
does not happen if you sit around and wait...[it] often involves meeting the right 
person, a person who can help open the doors that you need to go through.
Feldman et al. 2003: 10.
By the time of the fieldwork, I had worked with this person for a period of three years, and 
had developed a high degree of trust. This was, at the time, also justified given that none of 
the respondents questioned my access to their personal information. As a matter of 
professional courtesy, the process involved assurances of confidentiality and that the 
information, in addition to it being guaranteed for proper research use, would subsequently be 
destroyed. Had accessing the survey population proven difficult, a second strategy was to rely 
on the cooperation of both the Postgraduate Deanery and the National Assembly for Wales. 
Both were made aware of the research from an early stage, and had endorsed the study by 
way of written letters. These were photocopied and enclosed with each questionnaire survey 
to elevate the credibility of the work being undertaken.
Studies on elite interviewing advise researchers to draw attention to their institutional 
affiliation, use personal connections where possible, and seek to obtain an influential 
“sponsor” whose endorsement of the project will ensure the cooperation of the rest of the 
group (Welch et al. 2002). In this study, the research was explicitly endorsed by both the 
Junior Doctor Coordinator at the National Assembly of Wales and by the Postgraduate 
Deanery in Wales. These were expressly acknowledged in the covering letters addressed to 
the elites, and explained the nature of the research, the importance of that particular 
informant’s input to the study with an indication of the sorts of questions that would be 
asked. This also provided them with time to consider and to prepare answers (Lilleker 2003). 
A list of high-profile figures emerged as the process of interviewing progressed and, to 
elevate the credibility of the study, some of these names were referred to in the later letters 
sent to the elites. In addition to the study’s ‘sponsors’, part of the process of accessing elites 
involved using other sampling techniques which went beyond the personal networks 
established at the Medical school. Snowballing, as a means of both identifying and locating 
key informants, was used by asking other interviewees for their recommendations on the 
most appropriate figures to interview in respect of a particular aspect of the study’s 
investigations (Undheim 2003).
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Compared to general informants, access to elites is regarded as particularly difficult because 
by their nature they “establish barriers that set their members apart from the rest of society” 
(Hertz and Imber 1993: 3). Locating them was not a significant problem, and the majority 
could be contacted using recognised channels, such as e-mail or by the more conventional 
written methods. Increased mobility, however, has meant that people are difficult to find in 
their offices (Undheim 2003). A greater difficulty arises when one seeks to interview those 
who are no longer active in public life. This was illustrated in the problems of locating an ex- 
ECJ Judge who presided for the UK in the case of SIMAP. Having explored the ramifications 
of the judicial ruling from the perspectives of medical service providers and policymakers, it 
was felt necessary to balance these views with those of the judiciary. The route to locating the 
judge involved quite some research using European electronic sources, legal literature and 
general internet searches. The process can therefore be far more time-consuming and 
expensive than making contact with non-elites (Undheim 2003). Meeting the policymakers in 
Brussels -  the Welsh Local Government Authority, the National Assembly for Wales’ EU 
delegates, and an EC Commissioner -  followed by interviews in Luxembourg with the 
Advocate General of the ECJ, and in both London and North Wales with BMA 
representatives -  were costly.
The limited time for which many of the elites reserved for the interviews more often than not 
meant that the meetings would be held at a place convenient to them. In some instances, the 
restrictive times dictated the pace of the interview, the length of the schedule and the overall 
quality of data gathered. Although an hour’s interview was requested in the letters, some 
declared at the meeting that they could only manage half an hour or less as a result of their 
busy schedules. These experiences echo the commentaries by Puwar (1997) in her interviews 
with women MPs. By attempting to accommodate the informant’s time commitment as far as 
possible, the elite interviews at time involved quickly prioritizing questions and deciding 
what to ask and what to leave out at the same time as the questions were being asked:
The exchanges...were rather more hurried than we would have wished. We also 
edited the schedule as the interview proceeded, in order to give priority to what we 
thought were the key questions.
Fitz and Halpin 1994: 47.
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This is a clear illustration of the imbalance in authority between the interviewer and 
interviewee, and reflects the broader difficulties in analysing the data provided by the elites. 
This concern forms a core theme of the next section on data analysis.
Analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data
Discussions on accessing the elite interviewees demonstrate how studies incorporating such 
samples “are irrevocably immersed in issues of power, domination, and authority” (Undheim 
2003: 105). This contrasts with the qualitative research tradition that is frequently associated 
with studies of marginal or powerless groups, in which it is generally assumed that researcher 
is the one with the higher status (Taylor and Bogdan 1998). Studies on elite interviewing, 
however, are almost unanimous in arguing that the power balance is likely to favour the 
informants over the researcher (Welch et al. 2002). This tendency was particularly evident in 
the current study as the elites’ accounts comprised certain themes such as political and 
professional policy that were beyond my knowledge and experience. Several of them 
described how some clinical procedures and other technical aspects of medical training were 
adversely affected by the EWTD. This issue became particularly problematic in the first set 
of interviews. I became immediately aware that my knowledge of the politico-clinical aspects 
of some debates in this field derived mainly from documentary-based research and analyses 
of official and unofficial reports. My consequent ability to assess critically the interview data 
was a concern of which I was very aware, a concern encapsulated in the following extract:
It’s easy to make oneself believe that one account is more accurate than the other
because a subject was more knowledgeable.
Berry 2002: 680.
The challenge in this study was therefore to be as objective as possible in evaluating critically 
the accounts provided by the informants. The literature refers to interviews as co-constructed 
narratives, which are constructed both by the interviewer and interviewee (Yates 2004). 
Looking at the issue from this point of view, I did not interpret the narratives as 
straightforward factual accounts, but rather of versions of perceptions that could be compared 
against other sources of data, particularly the official and unofficial documentary sources that 
were used (the findings of which are reported in the next three chapters) and the primary data 
gathered in the surveys. I also attempted to ‘check’ the various accounts by cross-referencing
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the data gathered in the various elite interviews (Phillips 1998). This illustrates the further use 
of triangulating data to corroborate the data elicited from different sources (Bryman 1992).
The survey data was subsequently checked and systematically entered into computer files 
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Analysis of the data was not 
overly problematic as the survey had been designed with this feature in mind. The majority of 
structured questions made it easier to conduct comparisons and to allow for some 
generalisations. The intention in carrying out the survey was only to carry out one large 
descriptive analysis; the data gathered from the semi-structured interviews would provide the 
study with a more in-depth understanding. In this sense, both methods complemented each 
other.
The interview data was analysed in a number of stages (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The first 
involved the transcription process. The decision not to delegate this task of transcribing to 
somebody else was partly influenced by the expense of doing so, particularly given that forty- 
four informants were interviewed. More importantly, it provided an opportunity for me to 
revisit the data and to listen again in detail to every interview. This practice familiarised me 
very closely with the data, and started the process of distilling key themes and categories 
from the data. The second stage of analysis involved careful reading through each transcript, 
highlighting the main themes and sub-themes that were emerging from them, and annotating 
the hard copies accordingly. Thirdly, a framework of thematic grids was developed onto 
which the summary information and references to key quotes for each interview were 
transferred (May 2001). This process facilitated a comparative analysis between the 
responses given by different informants. The following headings were used:
• Working Hours
o Experience (Actual/Prescribed)
• Impact
o Health and safety, and work-life 
o Medical training 
o Service 
o Staffing 
o Re-defining roles 
o Implementation strategies
• Regulation
o EC legislature 
o UK state
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o Management 
o Self-regulation 
•  Misc
These headings reflect the concerns raised in the study’s aims and objectives. As such, the 
findings served to confirm or falsify existing research, whilst encapsulating all themes 
relevant to the topic of work-time regulation under one broad project. The fourth and final 
part of the analysis involved reviewing these grids to explore the major patterns and themes 
that were emerging from the data. These were used as the basis for developing the main 
findings chapters.
Ethical Considerations
A central objective of any social research is to acquire and disseminate reliable information in 
ways that cause no harm to those being studied (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Ethical issues are 
particularly likely to arise using qualitative research methods because, “while all social 
research intrudes to some extent into people’s lives, qualitative research often intrudes more” 
(Punch 2005: 276). Not only is the integrity of the researcher put under scrutiny, but attaining 
high ethical standards is imperative to preserve the professional research community:
Sociological research is a valuable activity and contributes to the well-being of 
society. Members should strive to maintain the integrity of sociological inquiry as a 
discipline...
British Sociological Association (BSA) 2002: pt 5.
To varying degrees, the interviews required a relationship of trust between the researcher and 
the researched (Yates 2004). This was achieved by addressing issues of informed consent and 
confidentiality at the study’s outset. These are discussed in turn.
Informed consent
Informed consent was necessary particularly in relation to the study’s attempts to explore the 
informant’s personal lives and health issues. Each interview commenced with a verbal 
rationale for that which was being studied in order to give the informants a sense of 
participation in the research process. This could have been achieved by obtaining written 
consent, but over-formalising the situation did not correspond with the aim of achieving a
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relaxed, informal rapport. A brief rationale containing the aims, objectives and methods of 
gathering data was therefore distributed to each informant accompanying their postal 
questionnaires and subsequent letters requesting interviews. It was felt that this information 
was sufficient to provide the informants with the details and purpose of the study, the use of 
the data, and their role and contribution. It explicitly noted the confidential nature of their 
comments, and my respect for their anonymity.
At different points in the interview, the informants were reminded that they were not obliged 
to answer specific questions, particularly in relation to those focusing on health. Two doctors 
spoke in length about their history of mental illness and depression without any apparent 
reservation. This may be attributable to their everyday dealings with poor health, and 
professional obligations to be honest and direct. It was a common aspect associated with all 
the PRHO interviews, and realised more so in hindsight than at the time. There was no 
conscious intention within the interview situations of taking advantage of or taking for 
granted the frank and voluntary exchange of information provided by the PRHOs.
Anonymity and Confidentiality
The interviewees were assured that no information which could be used to identify them 
would be made available without their consent. They were also informed as to who could 
potentially read the findings in line with the relevant code of ethical issues:
The anonymity and privacy of those who participate in the research process should be
respected
BSA 2002: pt 34.
In quantitative research it is relatively easy to anonymise records and to report findings in a 
way that restricts the identification of individual informants (Bryman 2001). For this study, 
each survey respondent was identified by a random 3-figure digit. The PRHO interviewees 
have been referred to as Drs A-I, whereas the elites are classified by their occupational 
position. The latter, however, are more identifiable as a result of their public roles, and will 
be known to some of their fellow informants because of the ‘snowball sampling’ procedure 
which was adopted. Nevertheless, these interviewees showed little sign of apprehension of 
the prospect of being identified. Moreover, attempts were made as far as possible to 
anonymise their contribution by referring to them in the findings in their occupational and/or
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organisational capacity, such as “staffing manager”, “EC Commissioner”, and so on. Those 
interviewees who were named gave their explicit permission for this to take place.
Conclusion
The research process has embraced a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to address 
the research objectives posed by the study. The emphasis on triangulating data has exploited 
the strengths and minimised the inadequacies associated with each individual method. These 
discussions have set the scene for the next three chapters which provide the necessary 
context, upon which the later chapters will report the findings. In turn, they set out an 
historical review of general employment relations in the UK, before focusing more 
specifically on the regulation of the medical profession. The regulation of doctors’ working 
time is then discussed, thus giving the reader an understanding of the broader issues which 
are relevant to this study’s aims and objectives in addition to the more specific debates that 
are voiced in the current climate.
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Chapter 3 
Regulating working time in the UK
Introduction
This chapter summarises the history of the regulation of working time in the UK. It addresses 
the study’s overarching aim of analysing the process and impact of legal regulation on 
employment conditions in the UK labour market, with particular reference to the European 
Working Time Directive (EWTD). The chapter commences by briefly reviewing the EWTD, 
which forms the focal point of this study. It then concentrates on the longstanding campaigns 
by both trade unions and workers in Britain to reduce hours of work through collective 
bargaining, before mapping out the EWTD’s turbulent passage. These discussions highlight 
the tensions arising from the evolution of state regulation at both European and UK levels on 
an issue of labour conditions, which has been conventionally determined by employers and 
employees and, particularly during the last two centuries, trade unions.
The chapter concludes with an examination of the main impact of the Directive on both 
working conditions and employment relations in the UK. This part addresses the study’s 
objectives of examining the different ways in which the regulation has been implemented and 
enforced in practice. The focus is on the labour market as a whole rather than looking 
specifically at the medical profession. It is important to show that tensions about centralised 
statutory control exist outside this study’s primary focus on the medical profession. The 
EWTD’s origin, nature, opportunity for trade union participation and overall impact on 
labour market regulation underscore the differences and similarities between the 
Conservative and New Labour governments’ policies, while contextualising the general 
situation within which the doctors are currently regulated.
The European Working Time Directive
European Community directives are “binding as to the result to be achieved upon each 
Member to which it is addressed, but leave the national authorities the choice of forms and 
methods” (Art. 249 EC Treaty). In permitting the EC states to implement the measure in a 
form of their choice, it facilitates the harmonisation of national and EC law in a flexible 
manner and within a stipulated timeframe. The national authorities have a duty to interpret
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EC measures in accordance with the spirit under which they were passed. This duty is more 
commonly referred to as the ‘mischief rule’,1 and was explicitly applied in the UK case of 
Barber v RJB f 19991 where the High Court acknowledged that the provisions of the EWTD 
imposed an explicit contractual duty which should be recognised between all employers and 
their employees. The nature of European law also means that all pre-existing national 
legislation must also be interpreted in conformity with the stated objectives of the more 
recently enacted EC measure.2 For the UK, then, the courts must construe the Directive with 
existing legislation such as the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Any conflict arising 
between Community ahd national law will result in the former prevailing.3
The EWTD comprises a number of provisions which aim to regulate working time across the 
European Community. It imposes maximum weekly working time of 48 hours which is 
generally averaged over 17 weeks. The regulation also covers minimum and weekly rest- 
periods, annual paid holidays, and restrictions on night work. The philosophies underpinning 
the legislation relate to the EC Treaty Article under which it was passed, namely to protect 
the health and safety of workers. The Directive was adopted by Member States on 23 
November 1996, but the UK delayed its implementation following the then Conservative 
government’s unsuccessful appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to have the 
Directive annulled. The task of implementing it therefore fell to New Labour which, 
following the General Election in May 1997, laid the Working Time Regulations before 
Parliament on 31 July 1998; they subsequently came into force on 1 October 1998. The 
Regulations similarly correspond with the EWTD’s stated health and safety intentions, but 
also encompass a broader aim to address work-life balance:
To achieve benefits for workers including a better balance between work and family
life, with commensurate improvements to Health and Safety.
DTI 2002b: Section 6.
1 Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen Case 14/83 f 19841 ECR 1981.
2 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Intemacional de Alimentacion SA (case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I- 
4135. This was applied by the House of Lords in Webb v EMO Air Carso (UK) Ltd f 19931 1 WLR 
49.
3 Costa v ENEL Case 6/64 U9641 ECR 585.
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This is the first legislation of its kind governing working time in the UK. The Directive 
permits individual workers to agree with their employers to derogate from the maximum 
weekly limit provided that the agreement is recorded in writing, and is available for 
inspection by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) officer or any other authority 
responsible for the Regulations’ enforcement. This agreement is commonly referred to as the 
‘opt out’ and is contained in Article 18(l)(b)(i) of the EWTD. The task of enforcing the 
Regulations is split between different authorities: the weekly working time and night work 
limits, health assessments and record keeping are enforced by the HSE, local authority 
environmental health departments, and some sector-specific regulatory bodies. The 
entitlements to rest and leave are enforced by the individual worker through employment 
tribunals.
Subsequent amendments to the Directive have brought junior doctors and some of the other 
previously excluded sectors within its ambit. The ECJ has also had the opportunity to provide 
essential definitions on what constitutes working time for the purpose of the Directive. 
Nonetheless, in order to understand how the Directive has been embraced in the UK, it is 
necessary to analyse the political debates about working time in the UK.
The historical regulation of working time in the UK
Working time has long been subject to clashes between employers and unions. The historical 
campaign for reducing time spent at the workplace has been the focus of union struggle, 
resulting in a sporadic statutory patchwork of regulation (Bishop and Mayer 1995). The 
campaign to reduce time spent at the workplace in the UK spans over two hundred years, 
during which trade unions have successfully lobbied for reductions from about 90 hours per 
week in 1750, to around 40 today. Hunt (1981) and Evans and Palmer (1985) document 
attempts by Sheffield silversmiths and petitions by a union of Journeymen Taylors in London 
to reduce their working hours in 1680 and 1720. These accounts trace this contested history.
Poor working conditions -  overstrain, exhaustion, excessive work amounts, and inadequate 
rest -  brought about during the industrial revolution (Mclvor 1987) led the unions to mount a 
general campaign during the 1830s and 1840s for a standardised 10-hour working day; a 
‘Nine Hours’ Movement’ followed between the 1850s and 1870s. Their efforts initially 
culminated in legislative protection for factory workers, and Parliament subsequently passed
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the Factory Acts of 1850 and 1853 which extended the provisions to the cotton and woollen 
mills in the 1860s. Further legislation resulted in 1872, 1886 and 1893, implementing 
maximum limits on the hours of work for young coal miners, shop assistants and railwaymen, 
respectively. Governments were also responsible in 1889 for establishing a 48-hour week in 
dockyards, workshops and arsenals in line with a campaign for an eight-hour day. By the end 
of the 1890s, more than five hundred workplaces across the country had adopted the 48-hour 
week (Evans and Palmer 1985).
Conditions at work, coupled with their adverse impact on health and educational 
development, underpinned the state’s intervention (Dawson et al. 1988). At the time, political 
survival following the expansions of the franchise between 1884 and 1928 ultimately meant 
that governments were under pressure to respond to its growing working-class electorate and 
to address their concerns over workplace conditions. This was balanced against the 
industrialists’ opposition to reform, who feared the impact of a regulated market impinging 
on productivity, profits and national competitiveness (Mclvor 1987; Hart 1987). As a result, 
there was no attempt to regulate the labour market as a whole; in fact where legislation was 
enacted, it was largely sector-specific -  factories, mines and mills for example -  and it 
targeted those workers who were perceived by the state as the vulnerable and exploited by the 
labour market. These measures were invariably restricted to women and children.
Child exploitation was addressed by the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802, which 
limited apprentices to 12 hours per day, though like other laws it was only partially enforced. 
Consequently, other legislation followed in 1819, 1833 and 1844 to improve the policing 
mechanisms, and to develop in piecemeal forms some blanket exclusions on child 
mistreatment at work. The 1833 and 1844 legislation applied predominantly to the textiles 
industry (and was extended to mining in 1842 and during the 1860s) and at first, limited the 
employment of workers between the ages of 13 and 18 to 10 hours per day, and then later 
banned female workers and males under 10 years from working in coal mines. The Factory 
Act of 1874 introduced a 10-hour day for women and young workers (in addition to reducing 
the overall working hours in the textiles industry to 56 Vi per week by increasing meal breaks 
to two hours and shortening Saturday working by an hour). The intervention was 
accompanied by a change of attitude and employment patterns, together with a degree of 
compulsory education (made mandatory by the Education Acts of 1870, 1876 and 1880). 
Statutory limits on the working hours of girls and women to ‘protect’ them from the
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harshness of factory life also served to sanction their dependence on men in order to protect 
the family, the institution responsible for the reproduction of labour-power (Arrowsmith 
2002).
Campaigns to reduce working time continued into the twentieth century, particularly among 
the munitions workers in 1914-15 who worked, at times, up to 80 hours per week. In 
piecemeal fashion, the government, during the First World War, began to address such 
conditions by abolishing Sunday working, introducing systematic rest pauses, and capping 
the working hours of women and juveniles at 60, and 67 for men. Legislation was passed in 
1919 reforming its 1908 equivalent to reduce the miners’ working hours from an eight-hour 
to a seven-hour day. This represented the first legal restriction of adult male workers’ hours 
following trade union campaigns within the industry. Various strikes and stoppages led to 
similar working time reductions in engineering, railway workers, printing, building, dock 
workers and the cotton industry.
The Factory Act of 1937 repealed its earlier counterpart passed in 1901 to impose a 
maximum 48-hour working week with a host of other provisions curtailing overtime, 
introducing rest breaks and medical inspections, and to make the provision of seating, 
washing and cloakrooms compulsory in all factories. This legal framework was consolidated 
in the Factories Act 1961, which was enforced primarily by the factories inspectorate, and the 
Health and Safety Executive after 1974. The Act also limited spells of continuous work, and 
protected certain holidays for women and young workers, such as bank holidays and 
Christmas day. The Shops Act 1950 consolidated similar measures applicable to the retail 
industry, by limiting working hours generally and on Sundays.
Having agreed to suspend action during the Second World War, the unions’ promotion of a 
five-day/44-hour week followed soon after, with a similar campaign for a 40-hour week in 
the 1960s, spurred on by the printers’ industrial action in 1959. The government passed a 
plethora of legislative reforms but these were sector-specific and continued to limit the hours 
of specific workers, mainly women and young people. Further attempts to achieve a 35-hour 
basic week in the 1970s followed, particularly among painters, electricians and tobacco 
workers (for further detail, see Evans and Palmer 1985) and, despite the high levels of 
inflation and subsequent unemployment in the wake of the 1974 oil crisis, the campaign to 
reduce working hours did not lose momentum. The TUC and the European Trade Union
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Confederation (ETUC) pressed for further reforms, drawing together policies that dealt with, 
among other issues, a reduction in the basic working week to 35 hours. At the time of the 
Conservative Party’s election victory in May 1979, employers, particularly in the engineering 
industry, were pressured by industrial action and threats of further disputes, and had initiated 
concessions that entailed a phased reduction in working time to 39 hours per week.
Set against a backdrop of recession, international and European competition, working time 
was a focus of successive Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s “deregulatory 
zeal” (Fitzpatrick 1997: 135). The Wages Act 1986 restricted the power of Wage Councils. 
Among other functions, Wage Councils were established to set minimum levels of 
remuneration, maximum working hours and paid holidays in specific industries (notably 
agriculture, clothing and textiles, retail, food, hotels and catering) where collective bargaining 
mechanisms did not exist (Dickens et al. 1999). Twenty-five Wage Councils were abolished 
in 1993 by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act by repealing Part II of the 
Wages Act (the Agricultural Wages Board was not abolished (Brown et al. 1997), and 
continues to set minimum wages for agricultural workers (DEFRA 2007)). The UK was the 
only Member State of the EU to have dismantled its general minimum wage setting 
machinery, however New Labour’s introduction of a national minimum wage with effect 
from April 1999 brought the UK back into line with other EU Members (see below).
The Sex Discrimination Act 1986 repealed the existing restrictions on hours and overtime 
imposed on women workers, and the Employment Act 1989 removed the restrictions on the 
working hours of young people below the age of 18. The Deregulation and Contracting Out 
Act 1994 repealed the statutory regulation of shop workers’ hours and the prohibition of 
Sunday working by betting workers, while the Sunday Trading Act 1994 repealed the general 
provisions previously in place limiting opening hours. Other statutory repeal included the 
provisions governing the number of hours spent underground by mineworkers, and night 
work by bakery workers. At the same time, legislation was passed to curtail the powers and 
authority of trade unions and shop stewards, consequently leading to the decline and 
decentralisation of collective bargaining arrangements. Such machinery had been 
fundamental to the organisation of the working class and the development of labour solidarity 
which had secured, at various times, the reductions in working time (Arrowsmith 2002).
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The judiciary, at the same time, exercised its longstanding tradition of refusing to intervene 
with the fundamental terms contained in the employment contract that governed the 
employer-employee relationship, even if they were heavily weighted in favour of the former. 
The case of Tucker v British Levland Motor Co. Ltd (1978) held that the worker was not 
entitled to any general restriction on weekly working hours; such conditions were for the 
individual parties to negotiate. The ruling followed previous decisions that endorsed the 
conventional voluntarist principles of the master and his servant (McMullen et al. 2001; 
Ewing 1996). In the case of NCB v Galley 119581. for example, an employer was held to 
have legitimately requested his employee to work eleven shifts on consecutive days and to 
subsequently dismiss the employee after he refused to work a twelfth shift, even though the 
worker’s refusal was based on grounds of exhaustion and poor health. In practice therefore, 
the traditional freedom between the employer and employee to agree on the terms of their 
relationship often left the latter, as the weaker bargaining party, with insufficient protection 
(Napier 1991).
The emerging politico-legal context, drawing upon an historical legislative patchwork, 
resulted in the absence of a general regulation of working time in the UK labour market. The 
EWTD therefore represented a conspicuous attempt at introducing a concept foreign, in both 
territorial and ideological terms, to Britain’s employment regime. The next section looks at 
the tensions between Europe and the UK in the former’s attempts at regulating working time 
across the EU by way of supranational legislation and non-statutory controls. In so doing, it 
provides an understanding of the reasons underlying the state’s attitude towards workplace 
regulation, and explains the conceptual grounds that have shaped the Directive’s ultimate 
form in Britain.
Britain and the European Working Time Directive
Given Britain’s then deregulatory policy, it comes as no surprise that the EWTD was 
generally opposed by the Conservative governments. As Secretary of State for Employment, 
Michael Howard, encapsulated the argument for challenging the Directive in reply to a 
Parliamentary question on the Directive:
British industry is virtually unanimous in its opposition to the proposals the directive
would be a needless strain to our competitiveness, and a threat to jobs and earnings.
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Hansard 1991-1992 Col. 536.
Resistance to the EWTD was based upon orthodox economic theory that rigidly controlling 
the market by such measures ultimately damages competitiveness (Adnett and Hardy 2001).
Opposition to the EWTD was consistent with the Conservative government’s attitude towards 
a host of similar proposals put forward by the EC. Having vetoed a 1983 recommendation on 
the reduction and reorganisation of working time following a replica Resolution in 1979, the 
UK government believed that national rather than supranational authorities were better 
equipped to tackle employment relations (Hantrais 2000). Its policy was reflected in the 
decision to exclude Britain from the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
the Worker, more commonly known as the Social Charter. The latter drew its inspiration 
from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a body that promotes certain standards and 
freedoms associated with work, including the right to work, to just conditions of work, fair 
remuneration, and to organise and to bargain collectively. Britain had been criticised for 
persistently breaching ILO standards and other international agreements, such as the 
Minimum Wage-Fixing Convention 1928, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise 1948, and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 1949 (Ewing
1996). Among the Social Chapter’s proposed measures, Articles 7 and 19 specifically related 
to the improvement of working conditions:
The completion of the internal market must lead to an improvement in the living and 
working conditions of workers in the European Community. This process must result 
from an approximation of these conditions while the improvement is being 
maintained, as regards in particular the duration and organisation of working time and 
forms of employment other than open-ended contracts, such as fixed term contracts, 
part-time working, temporary work and seasonal work.
Article 8 of the Charter explicitly acknowledged the need to regulate working time:
Every worker of the European Community shall have a right to a weekly rest period 
and to annual paid leave, the duration of which must be progressively harmonised in 
accordance with national practices.
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Britain’s consistent policy of opposing such social and workplace regulation meant that a 
“twin track” Europe rapidly emerged, with the UK “occupying the slow lane of social policy 
reform, at odds with a more socially orientated Commission and European Parliament” 
(McMullen et al. 2001: 3; Pollack 2003; Bishop and Mayer 1995). The UK’s exclusion from 
the Social Charter was similarly reflected in its decision not to participate in the 1992 
Maastricht summit and the Protocol on Social Policy. In its absence, however, the European 
Council was empowered, if it attained a qualified majority vote, to adopt directives and other 
measures covered by Social Action Programmes (SAP); among other areas, SAPs regulate 
issues involving health and safety and general working conditions. This authorised the EC 
institutions to proceed with the Charter and to make decisions without taking into account the 
oppositional views held by the UK government.
The UK government did, on the other hand, accepted the Single European Act 1986 and its 
goal of free trade within an integrated internal market (McMullen et al. 2001). However, the
Act also inserted a new Article 118a into the EC Treaty, which required Member States to
pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, 
regarding the health and safety of workers. Furthermore, the Article altered the voting 
procedures for measures introduced within its ambit from the requirement for unanimous 
decisions to a qualified majority. This was to accelerate the decision-making processes 
(whereas the passage of measures had previously been restricted by their need to obtain 
unanimous agreement), with the overarching aim of achieving the single market by the early 
1990s (Bishop and Mayer 1995). A prominent example of one such measure passed under the 
modified Article was the 1989 Framework Health and Safety Directive 89/391/EEC. 
Introduced to improve the safety and health of workers, it defines the employer’s 
responsibility to provide competent protective and preventive services; information 
concerning safety risks and protective and preventive measures; and consultation, 
participation and training of workers, including health surveillance (Nicholson 2002). The 
Directive also provides for a broad definition of health and safety reflecting that of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO):
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and does not
constitute only in the absence of disease or infirmity.
WHO 1948.
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It was against this backdrop that the EWTD’s proposals were adopted in 1993 (Adnett and 
Hardy 2001). The premise of the legislation is based on the health and safety of the European 
workforce. The broad WHO definition of health and safety was applied to link long working 
hours and the workers’ adverse physical, mental and social well-being (Craig 1998). 
Concerns over workers’ health and safety were drawn from significant empirical research 
which had investigated the relationship between work and health (Kodz et al. 2003). Stress 
and fatigue, for example, represent some of the most common work-related health problems 
among general workplaces in the EU (Merllie and Paoli 2000).
General studies have associated long working hours with various physical symptoms, 
including cardiovascular disorders (Buell and Breslow 1960), chronic headaches and bowel 
problems (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 2001). Other research also 
correlates long periods of time spent at work with stress and other psychological problems 
such as anxiety, frustration, mood symptoms and tension (Beswick and White 2003; Kirkaldy 
et al. 2002; TUC 2000; Baldwin et al. 1997a; McKee and Black 1992; Barton et al. 1995; 
Wilkinson et al. 1975; McManus et al. 1977). In the UK, 72 per cent of workers claim they 
are highly stressed (TUC 2002). The European Commission has also underscored the benefits 
that the general public may derive from workers' working-time regulation, particularly with 
regard to transport activities and doctors in training, where fatigue brought on by excessive 
hours of work may constitute a direct risk to the welfare and safety of others (COM 1997).
The straightforward hours/health relationship is contested by some commentators (for 
example, Trimpop et al. 2000; Spurgeon et al. 1997; Baldwin et al. 1997a: 1997/?; Cooper 
1996; Harrington 1994). Craig (1998) argues that there is little correlation between long 
working hours and poor health. For this reason, he argues that the 1998 Working Time 
Regulations will not significantly improve the welfare of the workforce as intended by the 
Directive. This view was reflected in the UK's initial rejection of the regulation, and was 
encapsulated in a reply by the then Prime Minister, John Major, to an oral question in the 
House of Commons:
The Working Time Directive cannot make any significant contribution to health and 
safety...It is precisely because of legislation like that and stupidities like that, that the 
European Union is becoming uncompetitive
Hansard (HC) col. 782, 12 March 1996.
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Various studies echo the concern that long working hours alone do not affect health. They 
typically adopt a multifactorial approach which considers the impact of other work conditions 
on health in addition to working time (Eamshaw and Cooper 1996; Bussing 1996; McKee 
and Black 1992; Cooper at al. 1989; Butterfield 1988; Scheiber 1987; Firth-Cozens 1987).
Nevertheless, with the legal basis for the Directive established, the modified voting 
procedures contained within Article 118a (as inserted by the Single European Act) meant that 
the UK’s Conservative government was bound by a qualified majority decision; it could not, 
as had long been the case, utilise its power of veto to prevent the passage of the legislation. 
Its response was to bring a case to the ECJ, attempting to annul the EWTD on the grounds 
relating to the legal basis upon which the measure was passed (UK v Council of the European 
Union 1T9971). The UK also claimed that the Directive did not respect the principles of the 
subsidiarity and proportionality, and that the European Council had misused its powers in 
passing the legislation. The ECJ rejected the thrust of the UK’s arguments. In spite of the 
ruling and Britain’s longstanding legal obligations to recognise the supremacy of EC law, the 
Conservative government continued to resist the Directive (DTI 1996).
The ECJ case and the Conservative’s persisting opposition meant that the Directive was not 
implemented on time. Britain was not alone, however, in its failure to meet the deadline for 
transposing the EWTD into national law. Ireland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Portugal also implemented the Directive after the 23 November 1993. Owing to the 
Conservative’s “fanatical opposition” to the EC legislation (Prondzynski 1994: 92), Northern 
Ireland faced a judicial hearing which consequently found the UK to be in serious breach of 
Community law (R v Attorney General for Northern Ireland, ex parte Bums \ 19991). Both the 
outgoing Conservative and the incoming New Labour governments therefore risked incurring 
liability for any harm resulting to individuals as a result of non-implementation.
It was left for the newly elected Labour government to transpose the EWTD into national 
law, and it did so by the Working Time Regulations 1998 which came into force on 1 
October of that year. During the stages of negotiating the Directive’s provisions, the 
Conservatives adopted a twin-track approach; the first opposed the legislation for its 
perceived impact on business interests. The Conservative’s deregulatory policies were 
conceptually and operationally incompatible with a rigid legal framework; these advocates
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argued that the regulation of working hours must be a matter solely for employers and 
employees to determine (DTI 1996: para. 1.6). The second outlook was more conciliatory, 
noting that the UK might be able to accommodate the Directive providing that its concerns, 
including voluntary opt-outs from the 48-hour week, excluded sectors, and other derogations, 
were addressed (Pollack 2003). These negotiations successfully secured a number of 
concessions to the British position. New Labour took full advantage of the derogations, thus 
replicating the conciliatory approach adopted by a proportion of their forerunners’ members:
By simply replicating the terms used in the directive the coverage of implementing
legislation will be minimised so far is consistent with proper legislation.
DTI 1996: Para. 3.5.
While the maximum weekly working time therefore rests at 48 hours, a significant proportion 
of the labour market was (and a lesser amount remains) exempt from the regulation. The 48- 
hour restriction is also generously averaged over a period of 17 weeks.
Impact
The EWTD provides a legal framework in an area of employment law where, as Fajertag’s 
(1998) survey shows, most Member States already had national working-time legislation that 
was more restrictive than the Directive. The UK, on the other hand, had no statutory 
restrictions on working time, and its decentralised arrangements surrounding negotiations 
over working hours had resulted in an uneven pattern across different regions and sectors of 
the labour market (Bishop 2004; Kodz et al. 2003). The differences between the UK and 
other Member States therefore suggest that the former had to adapt to the regulatory systems 
far more substantially than other European states (Bishop 2004; Pollack 2003).
The average collectively-agreed weekly working time in the EU is 38.7 hours, with the 
highest working hours being experienced in retail (38.9) followed by doctors in public 
hospitals (38.8) (Eurofound 2007). The findings have remained stable since 2005, but the UK 
is the only Member State wherein the number of weekly hours has increased over the past 
decade (EIRO 2004a); its (full-time) workers’ average number of actual weekly hours of 
work is 40.7, this being the ninth highest figure from a total of 27 Member States. The 
number of workers in the UK working in excess of 48 hours stands at nearly four million 
(TUC 2002). Working hours vary across the regions: London represents the highest
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proportion of workers experiencing 48 or more hours a week (19%), whereas Wales and the 
North West clock the fewest hours over 48 per week (13%) (TUC 2001). Males 
disproportionately experience the longest hours in the UK (Bishop 2004; Amicus 2003).
A host of empirical research has assessed different facets of the EWTD in the UK. This 
section of the chapter is concerned with the impact of the regulation in light of its historical 
absence of working-time statutory controls and long working hours. It firstly looks at the 
legislation’s effect on working conditions, and then focuses on its impact on labour relations. 
These discussions consider the debates focused at the level of the general labour market. The 
extensive debates within the medical profession and National Health Service surrounding the 
subsequent definition by the ECJ of what constitutes working time are reserved for chapter 5.
Working Conditions
The first point to note is that the EWTD does not cover the working conditions of all workers 
in the labour market. Owing to a number of operational difficulties, a total of 5.6 million 
workers were initially excluded from the provisions of the 1998 Directive (EIRO 1999). They 
comprised those in sea fishing and other work at sea, and of those in the road, rail, sea, air 
and inland waterways transport sectors, in addition to doctors in training. New Labour 
therefore implemented the negotiations specifically headed by the Conservative government 
almost six years earlier, retaining the minimalist features of the regulation.
Having launched a White Paper (COM 1997), the EC has now adopted new specific 
regulations bringing the excluded sectors within the ambit of the EWTD. They include the 
Road Transport Directive, the Aviation Directive and the EC Seafarers’ Directive, with the 
latter being transposed into UK law by the Merchant Shipping (Hours of Work) Regulations 
2002. Of these, the main constituent is the EC Horizontal Amending Directive 2003 (HAD), 
under which the working time of doctors in training is regulated. This has been implemented 
in Britain by the Working Time (Amendment) Regulations 2003. The HAD provides for an 
average 48-hour weekly working limit for doctors in training which is to be phased in over a 
period ending on 31 July 2009. The interim periods impose a 58-hour week and a 56-hour 
week in the Augusts of 2004 and 2007, respectively.
Some categories of workers remain exempt from the EWTD. They include the self-employed 
and domestic servants in private households, and those whose duration of working time is not
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measured or predetermined. The latter typically involve managing executives and others with 
autonomous decision-taking powers, family workers and workers officiating at religious 
ceremonies. Workers under 18 years of age have special provisions under the Directive 
concerning the Protection of Young People at Work.
The most commonly voiced debates surrounding the general implementation and impact of 
the EWTD in the UK involve the workers’ opportunity to voluntarily opt out of the 
legislation (Adnett and Hardy 2001). The Directive permits individual workers to agree with 
their employers to work over and above the maximum weekly limit provided that the 
agreement is recorded in writing and is available for inspection by the relevant enforcement 
authorities. This agreement is generally referred to as the ‘opt out’ and is contained in Article 
18(l)(b)(i) of the EWTD. The UK was the only Member State which insisted on its inclusion. 
It must be voluntary in order to prevent the employer achieving “by subterfuge or through 
intimidation, a situation whereby the employee renounces the right for his weekly working 
time not to exceed the maximum laid down” (Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 
Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreisverband Waldshut eV (2003)).
A review by the European Council of the opt out in practice cited findings by the CBI (2003) 
which revealed that as many as 33 per cent of all workers in the UK have signed an 
agreement; this figure constitutes more than double the number of those who on average 
work more than 48 hours per week (COM 2003). Neathey and Arrowsmith (1999) found that 
three-quarters of workers were actively being encouraged to sign the opt-out. Taylor (1998) 
further reported that as many as 74% of employers said they would be asking some of their 
existing employees to exclude the Directive. Evidence suggests that employers use the opt at 
the point of hiring, that is the formation of the employment contract (Barnard et al. 2003), 
which deprives workers from participating in an equal bargaining process at the stage of their 
employment relationship when they are most vulnerable (Kenner 2004). In a later study, 
Neathey and Arrowsmith (2001) found that from a total of twenty organisations, sixteen had 
employed the opt-out provision whilst eight had made or planned to make some changes to 
working patterns. Their follow-up study (Neathey 2003) revealed that only one firm from the 
original sixteen using the opt-out had since ceased employing the derogation.
The opt-out has therefore significantly diluted the regulatory stimulus for UK employers (and 
trade unions) to implement changes in work organisation practices (Barnard et al. 2003;
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Neathey 2003; TUC 2003c; COM 2003). Partly as a result of this and in light of the ECJ 
rulings (see chapter 5), the European Council commenced consultations to amend the EWTD 
on 20 October 2004 (COM 2004), and the Commission subsequently adopted a proposal on 
22 September 2004. The draft legislation proposes to extend the reference periods for 
calculating maximum weekly working time to 12 months. It also retains the individual opt- 
out, but its application is qualified by set of conditions which must first be satisfied. For 
example, the opt-out should be implemented by way of collective agreement or by national 
law, and both employers and employees are obliged to consider other flexible options before 
using the derogation.
Member states must maintain records registering the actual hours worked, and employers 
must ensure that no worker works more than 65 hours a week unless otherwise provided for 
by collective agreement. This would have addressed the worst excesses of long working 
hours while acknowledging the complexity and difficulty of regulating weekly working time 
in the UK (Rojot 1998). Furthermore, the Commission’s proposal acknowledges that, in 
Britain at least, many workers do not want to have their working hours limited by regulation 
and are motivated to work long hours for overtime pay, the prospect of promotion, and higher 
rewards in the future or a sense of autonomy in managing their own working time (Barnard et 
al. 2003; Kodz et al. 2003). The fact that many workers do not necessarily perceive the 48- 
hour limit as a desirable policy objective perhaps helps to explain the limited impact of the 
EWTD on weekly working hours in Britain (Hobbs and Njoya 2005).
The draft legislation also incorporates a new definition of working time in light of the 
uncertainty which has resulted from the ECJ case law (see chapter 5) and, in line with the 
judgments, it defines on-call time as the period during which the worker has the obligation to 
be available at the workplace in order to intervene, at the employer’s request, to carry out his 
activities or duties. An inactive part of on-call time is also defined as the period during which 
the on-call worker is on call, but is not required by his employer to effectively carry out his 
activity or duties (COM 2005).
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The proposal was endorsed by the European Parliament on 11 May 2005, however the 
difficulties on obtaining consensus among all Member States has been highlighted by the 
inability to obtain a qualified majority in a series of Council meetings in December 2007, 
November 2006, 2 June 2006, December 2005, and June 2005. The continuation of the opt- 
out after the political deadlock over the issue has therefore represented a tactical success for 
the UK (Watson 2007).
The UK Regulations initially required the employer to keep detailed records of the hours of 
both workers who had waived their entitlements to the 48-hour week via the opt-out, in 
addition to those who had decided not to do so. The government conceded to employers’ 
arguments that this procedure was overly-burdensome and subsequently amended the 
provision so that the Working Time Regulations 1999 now only oblige employers to merely 
keep a record of workers who opt-out. In the view of the Commission, this does not accord 
with the intention of the Community’s legislature (COM 2003), and may provide a basis 
upon which infringement proceedings against the UK could be initiated.
The Regulations’ enforcement is split between different authorities. The weekly working­
time and night-work limits, health assessments and record keeping requirements are policed 
by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), local authority environmental health departments, 
and some sector-specific regulatory bodies. However, discussions with a senior policy 
advisor at the HSE revealed that budget restrictions have meant that there are only nine 
Working Time Officers in HSE. He confirmed that the decision to prosecute was made in 
accordance with the Health and Safety Commission’s Enforcement Policy, and was largely 
reserved for the most serious breaches. The onus of enforcing rest and leave entitlements are 
left to the individual and/or his or her trade union through employment tribunals or collective 
mechanisms. Workers whose entitlements are denied or who suffer detriment as a result of 
asserting their working-time rights may make also make complaint to the tribunal. Section 
101A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 specifically provides employees with protection 
against unfair dismissal if they are dismissed for exercising their right not to work beyond the 
limits contained in the Directive.
The statutory regulations have therefore empowered individual workers to a certain degree. 
Recent case law in the UK has demonstrated this point. In contrast to its conventional policy
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of non-intervention with employment relations, the judiciary has acknowledged that the 
contractual terms relating to hours of work must be exercised in the light of other implied 
contractual terms such as the employer’s duty to take care of the employees’ safety. One such 
case -  Johnston v Bloomsbury Health Authority F19911 -  involved a doctor regularly 
working in excess of 100 hours per week despite a contractual obligation prescribing 40 
hours per week. Shortly after the Johnstone ruling, an industrial tribunal in Bury St Edmonds 
ruled that it was unreasonable for an employer to dismiss a worker who refused to work 12 
hours a day for seven days a week (George v Plant Breeding International (Cambridge) Ltd 
[19911). In response to the EWTD in particular, the High Court has declared that the 
regulation’s provisions represent an express contractual duty which should be recognised 
between all employers and their employees (Barber v RJB (1999).
Employment Relations
The twin themes of competition and flexibility have been a common feature of both 
Conservative and New Labour policy since 1979, though their approaches to manifesting 
these ideologies in practice have differed (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). To highlight the 
differences and similarities between the two governments, this subsection looks at the 
priorities and sources of working-time controls and analogous rights by reference to their 
origin, market regulation and trade union participation. By providing this context, it will 
address one of the study’s objectives which is to analyse the views of elite stakeholders about 
the political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of working time.
Internationalisation, Europeanisation, and globalisation transfer the decision-making 
capacities to supranational bodies, such as those in the European Union (EU) (Held 1995). 
Traditional state sovereignty is therefore eroded, particularly with the implementation of 
uniform laws binding numerous Member States. Discretionary actions and policies must 
consequently submit to new intensified forms of surveillance, monitoring, accountability and 
enforcement (Jessop 1997). Such systems of legal regulation are oblivious to state 
boundaries, illustrating the “distance that has been travelled from the classic, state-centric 
conception of sovereignty to what amounts to a new formation for the delimitation of 
political power on a global basis” (Held 2002: 11). Such ‘outside arrangements’ force internal 
processes within the nation-state to reconstruct their own rules, thus posing a set of “legal 
irritants” to the existing organisation (Teubner 2004). Some commentators believe that the
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sheer diversity between different states in terms of legal systems and cultures exacerbate such 
difficulties (Legrand 1995,1997).
The Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s were keen advocates of the principle 
of subsidiarity, and that both regulation and accountability should be vested within local 
jurisdictions (Bishop and Mayer 1995). The decentralisation of the NHS, discussed in chapter 
4, is modelled upon the same notion. Local authorities were seen as being better informed 
than highly centralised systems about the needs and preferences of those citizens who were 
affected by the regulatory intervention. In the context of working-time regulation, the 
Conservatives therefore believed that individual Member States were better equipped than 
supranational authorities to address such fundamental working conditions, particularly given 
its concerns surrounding the impact of a regulated market on its competitiveness:
Prime Minister Thatcher considered it quite inappropriate for rules and regulation
about working practices or welfare benefits be set at the Community level.
Thatcher 1993: 750.
The government was not in principle opposed to the extension of health and safety protection 
to the workforce. The Redundancy Payments Act 1965, passed under Harold Wilson’s 
Labour government, provided industrial tribunals with jurisdiction to deal with cases of 
redundancy. However, Edward Heath’s Conservative Administration introduced further 
individual employment rights under the Industrial Relations Act 1971, and extended the 
tribunal’s authority to cover such rights (Davies and Freedland 1993). Rather, the 
Conservatives were against the changes imposed by EC initiatives which, in its opinion, did 
not take account of the working of the market and the likely impact on labour costs (Napier 
1991). This was demonstrated by their consistent opposition to working time regulation and 
similar socio-economic policies proposed by the EC (Hantrais 2000). This helps to explain 
the relatively slow pace of European social legislation, and arguably why workers in the UK 
were faced with comparatively poorer pay, protection, control, employment rights, and longer 
working hours than the European workforce (Blair et al. 2001; Ewing 1996).
New Labour, in contrast, committed the UK in 1997 to both the Social Chapter and the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The latter was aimed at encouraging competitiveness and entrepreneurial
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freedom among EU Member States as part of a broader obligation to make the labour market 
more flexible (Adnett and Hardy 2001). It implemented the EWTD upon assuming office and 
has since transposed other similar EC legislation (see below). However, it has also attempted 
to block and/or limit the impact of other measures aimed at protecting workers. These have 
included rights on equal treatment for agency workers; information and consultation of 
employees’ representatives in the undertaking; and other trade union rights, such as collective 
bargaining, collective action and strike action contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the draft EU Constitution.
New Labour’s lukewarm approach to EC legislation supports the argument that a radical 
change of vision on industry regulation since the Conservatives left office has not occurred 
(Barnard et al. 2003), though it does distinguish the governments’ use of market regulation to 
control fundamental work conditions. Conservative policy on promoting individualism and 
deregulated markets (Dawson et al. 1988) while at the same time attempting to reduce 
dependence on the welfare state can “be understood as a ‘cultural crusade’ to construct 
Britain as an enterprise culture” (Exworthy 1999). It was reinforced by the state’s withdrawal 
of trade union immunities and legislation reducing statutory controls on industry. New 
Labour, on the other hand, has implemented maternity and paternity provisions; the National 
Minimum Wage legislation; the Flexible Regulations 2003; and the Employment Relations 
Act 1999. It has amended the regulations on redundancy, transfers of undertakings and 
embraced the extension of discrimination laws, and has implemented EC directives on the 
rights of part-time workers and working time.
The rhetoric of work life and flexibility is common to some of these provisions, but it is an 
area which has historically remained outside the EC’s regulatory domain. Recent social 
action programmes, however, have made reference to the implications of changing patterns of 
family vis-a-vis employment and social protection systems (Hantrais 2000). The EWTD is a 
health and safety measure, but New Labour has used the regulation to underscore the 
importance it also attaches to work-life by arguing that fewer working hours translate into 
more opportunity to spend time on activities away from work (DTI 2002b; DTI 1998b). The 
DTI’s highly publicised Work-Life Balance Campaign, launched in March 2000, highlights 
to employers the benefits of introducing innovative ways of working that meet the needs of 
the business and customers while simultaneously improving both the work-life balance and 
subsequent health of their employees.
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The ‘flexibilisation’ of working time rests on a number of rationales that are generally driven 
by concerns for both business and employee welfare (Martino 1995). Better working 
relations, healthier workforces and improved productivity (Palmer 2004), and diversification 
to meet customer demand (Walsh 1997) are among the most frequently voiced. Nearly half 
the full-time British workforce report that they enjoy their jobs but cannot cope due to work 
pressure (CHI 2004; Barnard et al. 2003; TUC 2003c; White et al. 2000), long hours, unpaid 
overtime, and stress (TUC 2000; Guerts et al. 1999; MacErlean 1998; Allen et al. 1997; Ferri 
and Smith 1996; Allen 1994). A poor work-life balance can adversely affect personal 
relationships; many men, for example, do not feel that they spend sufficient time with their 
children (Amicus 2003). Demographical changes, including the sustained growth of the 
female and ageing workforce (Avery 2004) and the increase in men assuming domestic roles 
(Casey et al. 1997) has also elevated the interest of participation in a more flexible labour 
market.
Flexible working arrangements have been reported by just over half of UK employees 
(Palmer 2004; Cully et al. 1999), particularly among part-time and public sector workers. The 
number of non-standard employment in the public sector increased between 1984 and 1998 
particularly those employed on fixed-term contracts (Millward et al. 2000). Short-term 
contracts were more common in public services than the private sector (Cully et a l  1999). 
The percentage of part-time workers in the public sector between 1995 and 2005 has been 
averaging 25 per cent and full-timers 70 per cent (Hicks et al. 2005). Only 10% of men work 
part-time compared with 44% of women (Bishop 2004). Women account for around 65% of 
employment in the public sector (Millard and Machin 2007). These trends have generally 
disadvantaged women economically, which continues to fuel occupational segregation 
insofar as women earn less than men and are less likely to occupy positions of high status 
(Worklife Program 2005). In addition to the continuing wage gap (BBC 2006) women with 
children in Britain lose as much as 57% of lifetime earnings after the age of 25 compared to 
her childless counterpart (Cully et al. 1999). One in five wants a better work-life balance but 
the majority fear that committing to such an approach would be detrimental to their career 
prospects (DTI 2002a).
The Flexible Regulations 2003 have attempted to address the situation, obliging employers to 
consider employee requests for flexible work options. The DTI has reported encouraging
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signs of compliance having found employers to be granting 77% of requests to work flexibly 
from a total of 24% of requests made by parents with young children (Palmer 2004). The 
evidence, however, is not conclusive. Various polls (Worklife Program 2005; TUC 2004a) 
have found many requests to be rejected unfairly in practice, with those receiving their 
requests seeing their pay cut or their job status reduced to account for the more flexible 
arrangements.
Furthermore, the dominant form of flexible work continues to be overtime rather than more 
innovative work patterns (Barnard et al. 2003; Bell and Hart 1999; Casey et al. 1997). In the 
UK, over 5 million employees work overtime (TUC 2003a); the average number of hours of 
overtime worked per worker per week is 1.5 (0.7 for women, 2 for men) (Eurofound 2007). 
Overtime provides flexibility in production scheduling and can help to meet rush orders and 
unexpected changes in demand without any difficulties in finding appropriately skilled 
workers. It also serves to circumvent the legislative and financial costs of having to recruit 
and dismiss workers (Hart 1987). Informal and unpaid overtime arrangements that can lead to 
excessive hours are usually found in managerial, professional and some administrative jobs 
(Evans et al. 2004; TUC 2003a; Casey et al. 1997). Working long hours and overtime also 
appear to have a strong effect upon promotion prospects, thus limiting the incentive to 
comply with work time regulations (Cully et al. 1999; Booth and Francesconi 1997; Landers 
et al. 1996).
The general lack of success in achieving changes in working-time patterns has been 
attributable to a number of factors, including the difficulties of conducting voluntary 
negotiations without any legislative imperative to do so (and industry-specific regulation 
rather than a general statutory floor to basic working conditions), declining union 
membership, and members’ fears of lower pay to correspond with fewer hours (Barnard et al. 
2003; Cully et al. 1999; (Casey et al. 1997). Deakin and Wilkinson (2005) also point to the 
failure of collective laissez-faire; while having attained some working-time reductions, the 
bargaining system has not dealt with the over-reliance of both employers and workers alike 
on high levels of overtime. In this sense, the EWTD -  “the most radical overhaul of labour 
market regulation” (CBI 2000) -  reasserts the issue of hours on the employment agenda, 
while consolidating all relevant aspects of working time under one comprehensive statutory 
roof. For the UK, at the very least, there is essentially now only one point of reference, 
currently for most -  but not all -  sectors of the labour market.
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Furthermore, the regulation presents trade unions with the opportunity to reinvigorate the 
issue of working time as part of their bargaining agenda. The European Commission’s 
proposed amendments to the EWTD add impetus for collective negotiations over innovation 
in working-time arrangements, pay and productivity. For example, before Member States can 
extend the reference period to calculate the weekly working hours, there must first be a 
consultation of the social partners concerned and every effort made to encourage all relevant 
forms of social dialogue, including negotiation between the parties if they so wish. It will also 
be possible to derogate from the maximum weekly limit of 65 hours by collective agreement, 
and the Commission also proposes that the use of the individual opt-out will require prior 
authorisation by collective agreement or agreement between the two sides of industry at the 
appropriate level (Hobbs and Njoya 2005). The EWTD therefore demonstrates how 
regulation of the labour market provides a framework to support dialogue and negotiation 
between the key players in the development and implementation of employment policy and 
regulation. Commentators, however, have embraced the overall changes cautiously:
The danger is overstating the impact of statutory regulation, for the fact is that 
employment relations tend to change relatively slowly and often in ways independent 
of the law. Increasing European integration is likely to further shape the course of 
British employment relations.
Cully etal. 1999: 299.
Thus, attempts by the Conservative governments to limit the authority and influence of trade 
unions were reflected in legislation passed by the state to control their activities (Smith and 
Morton 2001b). By the time New Labour assumed office, two-thirds of private sector 
workplaces were without a union presence, and only one in four unions were recognised 
(EIRR 1998). However, the make-up of trade unions across the labour market is far from 
uniform (Scheuer 1999). The presence of unions is twice as high in the public sector (87.4 per 
cent) as the private sector (34.4 per cent) and union density of 59 per cent is over three times 
as high as the public sector (18 per cent) in 2003 (Palmer et al. 2004). Public sector union 
presence and influence therefore remains higher than private sector in terms of both density 
and policy (Prowse and Prowse 2007). Evidence by Bailey (1994) and Hicks et al. (2005) 
indicates that the policy of privatising nationalised industries and corporations reduced public 
sector union membership from 1.85 million members in 1979 to 0.38 million in 2005.
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Whereas Conservative governments 1979-97 attempted to implement measures restricting the 
authority and influence of trade unions, New Labour has endeavoured to shape employment 
relations in a similar but more subtle fashion using the notion of ‘partnerships’ (DTI 1998a). 
For example, its Employment Relations Act 1999 legislation provides a statutory procedure 
under which an independent union may establish a right to recognition for the purposes of 
collective bargaining. In 2001 there were almost three times the number of recognition 
agreements reported than in the previous year; more than 470 new recognition agreements 
were signed, of which 450 were voluntary. The TUC estimates that more than 120,000 
workers have been covered by new deals over the 12-month period to October 2001 (EIRR 
2002). Looking at the issue over a longer period, between 1995 and 2002, recognition 
agreements were struck covering around one million workers, against decisions to 
derecognise covering just 60,000 workers (Gall 2004). The legislation, however, is limited in 
both its scope and influence on employers (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). Drawing from their 
research on the statutory recognition procedures contained in the 1999 Act, Smith and 
Morton (2001a; 2006) argue that in the light of recent labour-market regulation, the overall 
role of collectivistic representation has been limited in the statutory provisions implemented 
by New Labour, thus indicating a continuation of Conservative ideology vis-a-vis union 
influence in labour market regulation:
New labour has developed a distinctive form of neo-liberalism in which Conservative 
legislation on trade unions and industrial action has been integrated within a more 
subtle discourse of social partnership and collective and individual rights, and 
carefully defined intervention in the labour market and the employment relationship is 
designed to promote efficiency.
Smith and Morton 2006: 23.
The unions’ marginalisation -  initiated by the Conservatives and continued by New Labour -  
is set against the context of plethora of legislation strengthening the rights of individual 
workers. The wider discontent among unions towards the present government, is illustrated 
by the rise in working days lost in the public sector due to industrial disputes between 1997 
and 2003 (Blyton and Turnbull 2004) over which the majority concerned pay. The emergence 
of strategic and high-profile conflicts therefore shows that relations based on New Labour’s 
concept of partnership are less than clear.
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Further similarity between New Labour and the Conservative governments can be seen in the 
former’s goal to maintain maximum capital and labour-market flexibility. While New Labour 
has indeed adopted far more family-friendly policies and European regulation than the 
Conservatives through implementing a series of legislation, the measures have been distinctly 
minimalist in form. Thus, the EWTD transposed into UK law has contained all of the 
derogations that were negotiated by the then Conservative Secretary of State, Gillian 
Shepherd, and has not addressed the issue of overtime. The Information and Consultation 
Regulations, which similarly implement an EC Directive, establishes a right of employees to 
receive information and to be consulted, but unions are largely excluded from the process, 
particularly in the smaller organisations, and the protections are narrow (Smith and Morton 
2006). The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 has not escaped criticism either. It has, with 
very few exceptions, set a basic hourly rate covering the entire employed labour force, but the 
figure is not uprated without consultation. Furthermore, the initial rate was below an 
employment-weighted average of the rates last set by wages councils in the early 1990s. The 
impact has not, in the view of the Low Pay Commission (2003) been significant. In this 
respect, Barnard et al. (2003) synonymise New Labour’s concept of flexibility with a form of 
freedom from external constraints. It is also unclear whether the relevant measures would 
have been taken in the field of working time and similar legislation had it not been for 
pressure from the EC (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005).
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how Britain’s historical approaches to regulating both 
employment conditions and relations have contributed to comparatively long working hours 
across the UK labour market. Paradoxically, the ‘welfare’ state has, to this day, reserved a 
distinctly minimalist role in the protection of its workforce by failing to impose general 
statutory controls which address some of the longest working hours experienced in the EU. 
The EWTD’s implementation is basic in form, and Britain’s complete application of the 
legislation’s derogations has diluted its potentially significant impact on long working hours. 
We are therefore left with a ‘hybrid’ situation which does not conform to the rigour and strict 
parameters of an influential regulation; nor is there an expansive scope for trade unions to 
collectively bargain with employers regarding working time.
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In line with the study’s overarching aim, this chapter has explored the historical modes of 
regulating working time from voluntarism and collective negotiation to statutory control. It 
reflects the concerns raised by all three research objectives, namely the political and legal 
debates surrounding the regulation of working time; the implementation and enforcement of 
the EWTD; and, its apparent impact. These broad discussions set the scene for the study’s 
particular focus on the medical profession, and raise a series of questions. How will the 
medical profession, as a body of workers definitively governed by self-regulatory and 
voluntarist mechanisms, respond to statutory controls such as the EWTD? As its main trade 
union, what influence will the British Medical Association (BMA) have on the process of 
implementation, and its members’ compliance? Will there be room for continued negotiation 
on doctors’ labour conditions, in light of the restrictions placed on the general labour market? 
The next chapter explores these issues in more detail, focusing on the profession’s historical 
(and quickly evolving) relationship with the state, which has shaped the conditions of work in 
medicine. In light of this study’s objectives, the general discussions surrounding the various 
modes of regulation, mapped out in this chapter, are therefore applied specifically to the 
medical profession.
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Chapter 4 
Modes of Regulating the Medical Profession
Introduction
The chapter sets the context for the study by examining the different modes of regulation that 
have governed doctors’ workplace relations. It maps the transition in state activity from that 
of laissez-faire to an approach which nowadays intervenes more directly on the workplace 
relations within which the medical profession practices. It explores the state’s predominant 
ideological and rationalisation philosophies that underpin its regulatory intervention and NHS 
modernisation strategies. While the chapter makes reference to the more recent emphasis on 
clinical governance, it is predominantly concerned with the regulation of workplace relations, 
with a particular focus on work conditions and pay, in line with the study’s overarching aims. 
There are, nonetheless, instances in which state intervention has arisen as a result of a 
combination of both clinical and workplace concerns. Whilst there is a distinct overlap 
between these two aspects, the discussion attempts to distinguish between the two forms of 
regulation.
The focus on the different modes of regulation and their respective ‘regulators’ -  the 
profession, managers and the state -  is complemented by an analysis of the wider political 
and economic context in which the medical profession and their employers are located, to 
gain a fuller understanding of the process of employment relations reform. This account is 
key to our understanding of the response of the profession to the issue of regulation, 
particularly in light of the study’s specific focus on the EWTD. This corresponds with the 
objectives posed by the research, namely to analyse the views of elite stakeholders about the 
political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of working time in a particular 
professional sector, and to examine critically the ways in which the regulations have been 
implemented. The discussions contextualise the struggle for control between the state, on the 
one hand, and the profession on the other.
The problem of regulation
Medical professionalism rests on three key characteristics which together constitute the basis 
of doctors’ longstanding autonomy: expertise, ethics, and service (Irvine 1997). The former 
derives from a body of knowledge and skills that non-professionals are not necessarily
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equipped to evaluate or regulate, and whose utility is constantly invigorated by the results of 
research. Ethical behaviour flows from a unique combination of values and standards which 
are governed by a disciplinary and ethical code. Service embodies a vocational commitment 
to put the interests of patients first. In its report ‘Doctors in Society: medical professional in a 
changing world’, the Royal College of Physicians of London defined medical professionalism 
as “a set of values, behaviours and relationships that underpins the public trust in doctors” 
and lists the qualities doctors should strive for as integrity, compassion, altruism, continuous 
improvement, excellence, and multidisciplinary working (RCP 2005; Tallis 2006). 
Professionalism, according to the report, codifies the idea that a doctor’s responsibilities go 
beyond a mere contract of employment, and encapsulates the notion of partnership between 
patient and doctors. It will be argued below that a strained partnership between the medical 
profession and the state which developed in the latter part of the twentieth century has 
consequently led to the profession’s regulation by way of new public management.
In spite of the references above, there is a notable absence of a succinct definition of what 
generally constitutes a profession or a professional. Early work about the nature of 
professions and professional organisation were dominated by an approach which attempted to 
delineate the key characteristics or traits that were held to constitute a profession. Greenwood 
(1957), for example, identified five distinguishing attributes of a profession: systematic 
theory, community sanction, authority, an ethical code and professional culture. The 
difficulties of identifying agreed traits between the various professions has led in more recent 
times to literature on the sociology of professions drawing on the classical theories of Marx 
and Weber (Freidson 1994; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977). Here, the central concern is not 
with the identification of archetypal features of a profession, but with the range of ways in 
which professions, as particular kinds of occupation, conduct themselves. These include the 
role of abstract knowledge, processes of social closure, historical negotiations and 
collectivism, and a service ethic (Ashworth et al. 2002). Each of these features are applied to 
the medical profession in turn, in an attempt to understand the historical modes of regulating 
doctors, which forms the second part of this chapter.
At the heart of every profession is a legally sanctioned control over a specialised body of 
knowledge. Medical knowledge is generally specialised, complex and incomprehensible to 
the lay person (Cruess and Cruess 1997):
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Medical practitioners claimed, and claim, the uniqueness of their body of knowledge 
and set of skills; only they have this knowledge, the profession is cognitively 
exclusive.
Stacey 1992: 205.
In its use of medical knowledge, the medical profession has earned a relationship grounded 
on trust with society, and in return has been afforded a privileged position by the state 
manifested in clinical autonomy (Freidson 1970b; Merrison 1975; Stacey 1992; Lupton
1997). Such knowledge therefore represents the cornerstone of medical professionalism 
(Evetts 1998), occupational dominance and autonomy in this sector of the labour market:
This startling growth of knowledge forms the foundation for the rise of medical 
power.
Furst 1998: 12.
Some commentators argue that, with the computing age and access to information over the 
internet and through the media, doctors no longer possess a monopoly over medical 
knowledge (Coiera 1996; Irvine 1997; Tallis 2006). Lay people are also able to gain 
knowledge hitherto confined to an elite group of experts through self-help groups concerned 
with particular diseases, disabilities and other health problems. Contributing to the loss of 
exclusive knowledge is the rise of clinical regulatory bodies, administrative audits, clinical 
governance, monitoring, evaluation programmes and performance indicators associated with 
the ascendancy of managerialism and bureaucracy in healthcare (Berg 1997).
These arguments were addressed by Haug (1973), who felt that the number of professions 
and the strength of professionalism would decline in the future. She dealt specifically with 
medicine, stating that it was becoming deprofessionalised. Increased specialization had 
caused fragmentation of the body of knowledge, and then fragmentation of the profession 
itself, as different organizations commanded the allegiance of groups of physicians. She 
stated that information technology and the education of the public have increased the 
accessibility of knowledge, therefore decreasing the power of medicine over its knowledge 
base. The development of other healthcare professionals with comparable skills such as 
physician assistants, was also diminishing medicine’s dominance (see chapter 5).
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Writing ten years after this original publication, Haug (1983) looked at the issue again, and 
found that these concepts were still valid, but that deprofessionalisation had not taken place 
to the degree she expected. Similarly, Cruess and Cruess (1997b) argue that it has occurred, 
but it is not a significant factor. Rather, they claim that the principal threat to medical 
autonomy is corporatization and bureaucratisation. The process of bureaucratization involves 
the subordination of practitioners, patients or institutions to a hierarchical structure outside 
the profession (Weber 1947). It is largely external, and takes place either in the state or the 
corporate sector with the overarching aim to implement cost control. This, however, is not 
characteristically associated as an objective of the medical professional sector.
An equally significant argument, and one which has similar connotations to 
deprofessionalisation, has been put forward by McKinley (1982). He felt that medicine was 
becoming ‘proletarianised.’ This refers to a process whereby medicine loses control over the 
context and content of medical care because of the bureaucratisation and corporatisation of 
health care. For example, the rationing of medical services implemented by the state in light 
of the bureaucratic monitoring of clinicians’ behaviour has subsequently impinged on the 
latter’s ability to prescribe patient care free of any financial constraints (Coburn et al. 1997).
McKinlay and Marceau (2002) provide further examples how a variety of extrinsic and 
intrinsic forces have contributed to the decline of medical dominance in such a way. 
Extrinsically, the changing role of the state and its loss of historically institutional support for 
doctoring have substantially impacted on the medical profession’s autonomy, as have other 
factors such as the bureaucratisation of doctoring. The emerging competitive threat from 
other health care workers who are able to effectively provide the same medical services but at 
a cheaper rate than doctors not only satisfies the state’s rationalisation policy, but it also 
expands the traditionally monopolised medical knowledge base, referred to above. 
Globalization has affected medical dominance by permitting increased mobility of physicians 
between countries (and particularly in the EC), and multiplying the available sources of 
medical information which are consequently empowering patients, stripping doctors of their 
monopoly on medical knowledge, and subjecting their monitoring of their everyday 
behaviour. Intrinsically, and in the US in particular, there is an oversupply of physicians 
which is consequently weakening the physician’s labour market position (for a contrasting
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perspective in the UK, see Fox (2007)). The fragmentation of the physicians’ union through 
speciality and subspecialty differentiation is also having a similar effect.
McKinlay’s arguments on the corporatisation of medicine largely refer to the way in which 
the medical profession is organised in the U.S. (Hafferty and Light 1995). He claims that 
physicians are workers in a capitalist society and must sell their services, and that this 
competitive environment leads to a decrease in remuneration and professional autonomy. 
However, the majority of health care in the UK is not of a private nature, therefore for this 
strain of his argument, is has limited application in the UK.
In spite of these trends, however, the state continues to draw on the professionals’ expertise 
(Kendall et al. 1996), particularly since the recent expansion in the regulation of clinical 
activity requires such knowledge (Flynn 1999). Many of the new mechanisms are run by the 
doctors or are heavily dependent upon their advice and knowledge (Davies 2000). The 
essence of medical expertise means that doctors therefore remain crucial to informing health 
policy (Hunter 1994). Unlike most other sectors in the labour market, it has enabled them to 
monopolise the conditions and delivery of health of health care, and to negotiate 
advantageous working conditions with policymakers at a centralised level using a strong 
bargaining hand (Salter 2002). The result of such negotiations has, until the mid-twentieth 
century, guaranteed for them a history of self-regulation with very few attempts to externally 
control their conditions of practice. Freidson (1970a, 1970b) emphasises the overall influence 
medical professionalism on state policy in this respect:
[Medicine’s] pre-eminence is not merely that of prestige but also that of expert 
authority... it has an officially approved monopoly of the right to define health and 
illness and to treat illness.
Freidson 1970b: 5.
Maintaining this state of affairs has been facilitated by the British Medical Association and 
the General Medical Council (GMC), the primary professional bodies representing the vast 
majority of all practising doctors. Their presence and membership represents a collective
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power inherent in the profession to which the majority of other labour market sectors cannot 
compare (Stacey 1992).
Another defining feature of the profession is its social closure and a restricted access to its 
resources and opportunities (Beardwood 1999; Cobum 1993). The medical profession is a 
fiercely competitive and self-recruiting sector, to which entry is gained by a select few. This, 
in short, benefits the profession by ensuring that opportunities for income, job security and 
other privileges such as the capacity to control work and resources within employing 
organisations are maintained (Larson 1977). The state has been instrumental in reinforcing 
this phenomenon by severely restricting the funding and number of training places at UK 
medical schools, thus helping to limit the supply of qualified practitioners (Kirkpatrick et al. 
2005). The GMC and royal colleges try to insulate the UK labour market from the external 
market; for example, overseas doctors must satisfy the GMC that their medical qualifications 
are from approved universities (mainly from the Commonwealth and Europe) or take an 
examination in Britain, and are also required to show that they have expertise in the English 
language. Fox (2007) argues that the government’s establishment of the NHS together with 
professional licensure by the GMC and the way that it is administered has consequently 
created a bilateral monopoly, but this has failed to meet a sufficient supply of medical 
staffing and consequent patient demand (staffing is discussed in more detail in chapter 5).
Members of the closed profession have traditionally shared a common background, thus 
enabling both a homogeneity and continuity in group outlook on matters such as state 
regulation and health policy. Historical self-regulation and clinical autonomy have, for 
example, equipped the profession with a “groupthink” (Kirk-Smith and Stretch 2003) that 
doctors should be able to practice free from general governmental statutory intervention 
(Freidson 1970a). In similar vain, the conventional exclusivity attached to the profession’s 
membership also serves to nurture particular values among its newest recruits at medical 
school. Assisting this process is the intense socialisation between medical students during the 
years spent in education and training on the one hand, and their dissociation from other ‘lay’ 
students on the other:
They become immersed in the culture, the environment and lifestyle of the school.
They slowly lose their initial identity and become redefined by the new situation.
Shapiro 1987: 27.
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Thus, medical students’ and junior doctors’ long hours demanded by both their training and 
service lead them to share common experiences within a unique working environment which 
tend to exclude other non-professional influences, including university students, peers, lay 
workers and members of the allied health occupations (Stacey 1992; Kirk-Smith and Stretch 
2003), and consequently shape certain ideals within the parameters of a closed community of 
professionals (Cobum and Willis 2000; Kirk-Smith and Stretch 2003). There is little doubt 
that significant exposure to their professional colleagues leads the individual to acquire the 
cultural norms and values of that group which shapes their attitudes (Elliot 1972; Ginsburg et 
al. 2005), and medicine is no exception (Freidson 1970a). Becker (1961) and Merton (1957) 
drew attention to the medical school as a social medium in which students adopted the 
conceptions surrounding their expected professional roles from their seniors:
It is their function to transmit the culture o f medicine and to advance that culture. It is 
their task to shape the novice into the effective practitioner for medicine, to give him 
the best available knowledge and skills, and to provide him with a professional 
identity so that he comes to think, act, and feel like a physician.
Merton et al. 1957: 7. Emphasis added.
Becker et al. (1961) emphasised amongst other things the interactionist interplays between 
students and instructors. More recent literature supports the replication of work roles and 
expectations between senior and junior doctors (for example, Van de Camp et al. 2004; 
Stacey 1992). Haas and Shaffir (1987) and Huntingham (1957) argue that medical students 
are constantly observing their supervising clinicians and tutors and listening to their 
philosophies, which allow for the reprocessing and continuation of ideas, imagery and work 
practices which exist in the profession:
The physicians with whom they practice their clinical skills become models after 
which students pattern their own beliefs and behaviour.
Haas and Shaffir 1987: 77.
Such identities and professional perceptions are therefore recycled between generations of 
doctors, giving rise to a distinctive and exclusive cognitive identity (Sinclair 1997a).
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Acquiring an identity over a long-term process during which the learner develops the skills 
and knowledge is encapsulated at medical school (Hilton and Slotnick 2005). The exclusive 
nature of the medical culture highlights the difficulties presented to ‘outsiders’, including 
hospital managers and the state, in penetrating this group in order to modify its members’ 
views, working relations and practices. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the 
medical culture is evolving. The profession is now diversifying at extraordinary levels. In 
almost every country doctors come from various cultural, ethnic and economic backgrounds. 
Though this represents an advance in terms of equity and fairness, it makes the transmission 
of common values more difficult (Cruess and Cruess 1997). In time, this trend may fragment 
the universal perceptions which gel members of the profession together.
Professionalism is therefore a multidimensional phenomenon that embraces a number of 
facets (Van de Camp et al. 2004). For the medical profession, each is explicitly linked by 
doctors’ self-regulatory mechanisms which preclude state control (Harrison and Pollitt 1994). 
This has historically demarcated the status of the medical profession from other comparable 
professions in law, the senior ranks of the military and the Church. Its relationship with the 
state and monarch is particularly distinguished (Sinclair 1997b): judges acted in his or her 
name; the military fought his or her battles; and, churchmen maintained his or her spiritual 
authority. There is no comparable link with the medical profession. Rather, the Medical Act 
of 1858 resurrected the Hippocratic Oath which permitted the profession to swear allegiance 
to itself rather than to the Crown.
Autonomy has given doctors, individually and collectively, the clinical freedom to determine 
the standard of professional practice and education, the organisation of medical work, and 
discipline. At the most basic level, self-regulation underpins the concept of this 
conventionally autonomous profession. The two are inextricably linked. The ‘problem’ of the 
EWTD is that it does not conform to these traditional processes. By its very nature, external 
statutory controls conflict with the essence of self-regulation. How will the profession 
respond to the legislation? A degree of opposition is predictable given doctors’ historical 
mode of governance, but will the occupational culture be sufficiently united and organised to 
withstand the law? The next section outlines the inroads paved by the state towards the 
regulation of doctors with primary reference afforded to the control of their work conditions.
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Different modes of regulation
Different modes of regulation have governed the medical profession’s conditions of 
employment from the inception of the BMA and the medical register in the nineteenth 
century, to the present day. There are three modes of regulation: self-regulation, as the mode 
of governance to which doctors have historically been accustomed and has been a defining 
feature of their professional status; the implementation of new public management; and, 
statutory controls, with particular reference to the European Community’s (EC) intervention 
on health policy and doctors’ working conditions in the NHS. For illustrative purposes, there 
is some reference to the recent emphasis on the medical profession’s clinical governance to 
demonstrate the state’s increasing intervention in a labour-market sector that has 
conventionally been self-governed and relatively free from such external scrutiny and control.
Self-Regulation
The ability to undertake one’s work free of state strictures and external regulation has long 
characterised the ‘professional’ (Freidson 1970a, 1970b, 1994). Professional organisations 
are perceived as being equipped with the necessary expertise to deal with the everyday 
regulation of its members, and have largely existed to serve their best interests:
Thus the characteristics of professionalism such as autonomy and self-regulation help 
to produce a situation in which the practice of specific skills can be retained as a 
monopoly within the profession, helping to keep earnings higher, and career prospects 
better...
Harrison and Pollitt 1994: 2-3.
Self-regulation is therefore self-serving not only in terms of the limited strictures on one’s 
professional approach to work, but also for the personal benefits and protections it affords to 
its members. In line with these tendencies, doctors have largely been able to arrange their 
work to suit their own clinical and intellectual preferences without fear of external state 
intervention. Clinical autonomy is a variant of the self-regulatory model which applies almost 
exclusively to the medical profession. In essence, it is a doctor’s capacity to diagnose and 
treat his or her patients free of prescribed clinical guidelines, reviews, audits and 
‘performance indicators’ (Harrison 1990a). Such control over the nature and volume of 
medical work has helped doctors to resist ‘management’ in the industrial sense. BMA surveys
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have consistently found an overwhelming support among UK doctors for such clinical 
independence (Cooke and Hutchinson 2001). One survey of more than 2000 trainee doctors 
and medical students found that external factors such as attaining state and management-led 
targets reduced their autonomy, and many would consider leaving the profession if these 
continued (Kmietowicz 2005). For these sectors of the workforce, there is no incentive to 
accept state regulation, and this view partially explains why a proportion of professionals 
oppose it:
Legislation and administrative guidelines conflict with professional autonomy by 
regulating areas of work or expertise that professional actors consider within their 
exclusive jurisdiction. They thereby seek to defend their professional project from 
what they see as inappropriate legal/government encroachment.
Anleu 2001: 420.
These tensions are able to be understood by reference to the historical mode of self-regulation 
which has traditionally governed the profession’s approach to their training and service. The 
sequential analysis of doctors’ self-regulation is discussed next by reference to their 
institutional self-regulation; their collective self-regulation; and its cost.
Institutional self-regulation
It was not until 1518 that the College of Physicians of London was formed to exercise control 
over the licensing and examination of physicians (surgeons subsequently separated from 
barbers and established the London Company of Surgeons in 1745, eventually becoming the 
College of Surgeons in 1800). Ironically, professional self-regulation in medicine truly took 
form by legislative intervention with the passing of the Medical Act of 1858. It created what 
is known as today’s General Medical Council. It was a body composed of medically qualified 
representatives of the licensing bodies and the universities, with a few nominations by the 
Privy Council, formed to supervise the activities and training of the profession (however its 
composition is very different today). Its purported aim continues to be the protection, 
promotion and maintenance of the public’s health and safety by ensuring the formation and 
implementation of proper standards in medical practice (GMC 2007). The law provides four 
main functions under the Medical Act of 1858 which include keeping up-to-date registers of 
qualified doctors; fostering good medical practice; promoting high standards of medical 
education; and, dealing firmly and fairly with doctors whose fitness to practise is in doubt.
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Where any doctor fails to meet the GMC’s standards, it acts to protect patients from harm -  if 
necessary, by removing the doctor from the register and removing their right to practise 
medicine.
Despite the aims of the legislation, the 1858 Act was also a strategy advocated by the 
profession to address the nineteenth century’s overcrowded medical profession which 
comprised of both unqualified practitioners together with those who had undertaken 
relatively lengthy and expensive training. In addition, it sought to tackle the inadequacy of 
medical education by standardising the necessary qualifications, and it unified the 
practitioners under one regulatory body (Moran and Wood 1993). The existence of a medical 
register meant that market entry into the profession was restricted. The legislation was 
therefore a tool to minimise competition and maximise both opportunities and profits 
between those claiming medical status. Furthermore, the register served to equalise the status 
of practitioners bringing all local and diverse practises under the control of a centralised 
system, and facilitated the unity and exclusivity of an authoritative and powerful medical 
profession by containing most expert medical knowledge to one particular sector in the 
labour market (Stacey 1992). A dominant professional group therefore emerged supported by 
a state-sanctioned system which served the interests of its members, and one that 
monopolised its knowledge and skills to which only an exclusive few could access.
Doctors were therefore immediately and distinctly advantaged if they appeared on the 
Medical register. It would control the supply of medical professionals for one, but more 
importantly it was only those whose names were listed could take up posts within 
government-administered services (Jones 1974). This is significant when considering the 
profession’s influence over debates with the state over the National Health Insurance scheme 
in 1911 and the National Health Service Act 1948. The partnership between the BMA and the 
state afforded the former with cooperation and consideration by the Department of Health, 
while the latter could achieve considerable advantage from the support and technical 
knowledge provided by the Association. As such, the BMA has conventionally enjoyed a 
position of considerable strength within the negotiating committee.
In line with its laissez faire and voluntarist policy, the state “lackfed] interest in controlling 
medicine and health” (Macdonald 1995: 77), which consequently resulted in hospitals falling 
under the control of the doctors (their authority remained as dominant until the latter part of
80
the twentieth century). Its corresponding lack of intervention in medical higher education 
allowed hospital doctors to secure a central position in medical learning, which they retained 
when the teaching hospitals gradually became incorporated into the universities (Freidson 
1983). This control was and continues to be exercised to a significant extent today through 
the Royal Colleges which regulate all post-qualifying exams. The state’s intervention during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century was chiefly in a piecemeal fashion through the 
operation of the Poor Law Board and the Public Health Act of 1872. Its abolition of the 
General Board of Health in 1854 meant that until the establishment of the Ministry of Health 
in 1919 there was no central state agency dealing with health. It is during this time that the 
position of doctors strengthened by their majority presence on the statutory GMC and by their 
domination over the growing number of hospitals (Macdonald 1995).
The 1911 National Insurance Act was one of the state’s first attempts to intervene on the 
delivery of health care in the UK. The legislation was concerned with the provision of general 
practitioner (GP) services, and was an important element in the Liberal government’s 
programme of social policy reform. It provided for free care by GPs for certain groups of 
working people earning under £160 per annum. By conceding to the profession’s demands, 
the legislation was pushed through in spite of considerable opposition by doctors who were 
anxious about the degree of state control encroaching on their work, and of the possible 
financial consequences (Ham 2004). Doctors were persuaded into the scheme when the 
government agreed that payment under the scheme should be based on the number of patients 
on a doctor’s list -  the capitation system -  rather than on a salary, thereby preserving GP’s 
independence, and ensuring their relatively high remuneration.
Up until then, the system of health-care provision in Britain was based entirely on local 
initiatives and private provision. They comprised local practices developed by individual 
doctors (which subsequently became GP services under the NHS after the passage of the 
1911 Act), and a system of local (municipal and ‘voluntary’) hospitals, many of which 
originated from the common workhouses established for the relief of poverty. Local 
authorities were not prevented from organising and providing municipal medical services in 
hospitals, but they mainly saw their role as organising local initiatives and providing some 
subsidy. However, from as early as the middle of the 1920s, medical services had been 
removed from the emerging national insurance system, necessitating subsidies from general 
public funds. This laid the foundations for the NHS, which continues to feature universal
health care provision, free at the point of delivery. The extent of the doctors’ own 
movements, priorities, times and workloads continued to be determined internally by the 
profession (Harrison and Ahmad 2000). The wartime coalition government’s 1944 White 
Paper stated that ‘whatever the organisation, the doctors taking part must remain free to direct 
their clinical knowledge and personal skill for the benefit of their patients in the way which 
they feel to be best’ (Ministry of Health 1944: 26, quoted in Harrison and Ahmad 2000: 131).
During the Second World War, in which there were mass civilian casualties, the government 
took steps to rationalise and control medical services for the duration of the hostilities. This 
arrangement continued after the war, gradually giving the state control of the health care 
system. Spurred also by the financial difficulties of the voluntary hospitals, coupled with the 
medical profession’s hostility to municipal control (Bach 2004), the NHS emerged by the 
passage of the National Health Service Act of 1948, which provided, in effect, for the 
existing hospitals, their premises and other assets, to be nationalised. From that point on, they 
were to be administered by regional hospital boards under the general direction of the 
Minister of Health. The most important source of difficulty at the formation of the NHS was, 
like the circumstances surrounding the 1911 National Insurance legislation, accommodating 
the interests of the doctors, many of whom saw themselves as potentially being made into 
salaried employees of the state and thus under the latter’s control. Hospital consultants were a 
source of particular problems (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). Before 1948, both GPs and hospital 
consultants were mostly self-employed professionals. For them, the formation of the NHS 
represented a further encroachment by the state on their work. While the Act continued the 
responsibility for control over the technical side of medical care with the BMA and other 
professional bodies, the government negotiations paved clear inroads into the control over the 
terms of practice which were subsequently embodied into law to create a national system of 
organising and paying for health services. The Ministry of Health also took over the 
administrative and fiscal structure of health services, and thus the management of doctors’ 
working hours and conditions.
The physicians’ essential clinical autonomy, however, was preserved. They remained free 
under the new regime to prescribe exactly the remedy they considered to be appropriate, 
thereby maintaining clinical autonomy. Moreover, the hospital consultants were allowed to 
continue practising in a private capacity (including the use of NHS hospital beds for this), and 
were paid well for the numbers of patients seen under the auspices of the NHS. In addition,
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there was a system of distinction awards that produced high remuneration for senior 
consultants and the possibility of important roles advising on the organisation of hospitals. 
Hospital specialists were not responsible to hospital management committees, but were 
contracted by regional hospital boards. They were therefore beyond the day-to-day control of 
hospital administrators and even the boards of governors of the hospitals in which they 
worked. Despite this, senior consultants were extensively co-opted onto hospital boards and 
were extremely influential in determining local policies and priorities. Organisationally, 
therefore, the NHS’s original structure was highly centralised and bureaucratic, with political 
accountability at the top but little effective operational control on the delivery of health care. 
Dent (2003) argues that it was the medical professions that gained most from the NHS, 
quoting Eckstein’s words (1958: 3) -  the NHS was in effect ‘a “doctor’s measure” much 
more than a “patient’s measure’” . The need to address this balance by alternatives modes of 
regulation became slowly apparent to the state in the years which ensued.
During the period from 1948-74, although there were clearly both bureaucratic elements in 
the administration (comprised by the ministry, the regional boards and the local 
administrative apparatus in hospitals themselves) and political influences (contributed by 
local elites being prominent in the management committees) professional power was pre­
eminently strong. The clinicians were the dominant occupation, and their ideas and priorities 
overrode other concerns, such the inconsistent delivery of care across the country, the 
advances in medical research and technology, and chiefly the escalating costs of providing 
health care under the existing system (Pollitt 1993).
Collective self-regulation
Doctors have conventionally preserved their clinical autonomy and ability to inform 
healthcare policy without governmental intervention by way of their exclusive medical 
knowledge, closed community, and collective dominance represented by the British Medical 
Association. The BMA is the principal professional association for doctors in the UK. It is 
also a trade union, and negotiates all terms and conditions of service for every different group 
of doctors in the country (though doctors’ pay is determined centrally by the state based upon 
the information supplied to it by an independent pay review body, the Doctors’ and Dentists’ 
Remuneration Body) (Jones 1981). For hospital doctors in training, the BMA’s Junior Doctor 
Committee, which is made up of junior doctor representatives from all the English regions, 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, has sole bargaining rights concerning junior doctors’
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terms and conditions of service in employment in the NHS, including contracts, hours of 
work, and living and working conditions. It contains four main committees, namely the 
General Medical Services (for General Practitioners); Central Consultants and Specialists; 
Community Medicine and Health; and Hospital Junior Staff. Other BMA committees handle 
areas such as the impact of the European Community, medicine in the Armed Forces, 
university doctors, doctors and social work, and private practice (BMA 2007a).
It was formed in 1832 as the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association and only during the 
mid-1850s did it become known as the BMA. Until 1975 it retained a clause in its articles 
which legally restricted its adoption of trade union status. It was finally as a result of the 1974 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act that the Association was obliged to register as an 
independent trade union (Jones 1981). Though synonymous with the medical profession, the 
BMA does not possess any formal closed shop authority. In order to practise as a doctor of 
medicine an individual must be registered with the General medical Council but it is not 
necessary that he or she may be a member of the BMA (the other lesser unions relevant to 
doctors include the Medical Practitioners Union, the General Practitioners Association, the 
Junior Hospital Doctors Association, and the Regional Hospital Consultants and Specialists 
Association).
Specialities within medicine have been established and these are represented by a total of 
fourteen royal colleges. Each aims to further the development and devise the training 
requirements of their speciality. It is therefore quite consistent for doctors to be members of 
both a royal college and the BMA. Together with the Royal College of Nursing (RCN), the 
BMA is the most influential professional union in the NHS. Unlike many other trade unions, 
it does not rely exclusively on collective bargaining but instead attempts to control labour 
supply by limiting membership to registered professionals with an orientation towards the 
defence of job demarcations and long standing pay differentials (Bach 2004).
The self-regulation ideology permeating the medical profession at this time was replicated by 
the broader industrial trends of collective laissez-faire and autonomous collective bargaining. 
The policy, which developed alongside mass production techniques in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, away from the master and servant relationship, implied two structural 
features which came to characterise the relationship between the state and the system of 
industrial relations. Firstly, there was no attempt to lay down a general legal model for
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employee representation. Secondly, the law did not attempt to insert into the employment 
relationship a universal minimum set of standards. There was no general, legislative or 
statutory floor to wages and related terms and conditions. The unions therefore provided the 
representational machinery to ensure that the standards met the satisfaction of the workers 
employed in the relevant industries. The bargaining relationship between employers or 
employers’ associations and trade unions was in this respect autonomous. Very few 
exceptions were made, and those which did come about were restricted to the laws on factory 
labour and the implementation of minimum rates of pay initially through trade boards and 
later by wage councils.
Legal regulation was therefore minimal. As employers were opposed to state intervention to 
underpin collectively agreed rates, the trade unions were similarly hostile to the involvement 
of the regular court system in the collective-bargaining process (Deakin and Wilkinson 
2005). They, too, rejected a standard set of regulations for all trades, which explains why 
most employment legislation at the beginning of the twentieth century was partial and applied 
to a handful of industries (principally engineering, iron and steel, coal, cotton, and 
construction). Defining the British collective laissez-faire system was one comprising partial 
and uneven regulation through collective bargaining and the absence of a comprehensive 
statutory floor of rights to terms and conditions of employment, facilitated by the trade 
unions and employers’ associations which were both highly local in character.
The cost o f  self-regulation
By the time of the Conservative government’s election victory in 1979, there were large 
imbalances in state support given to different regions for the provision of healthcare. The 
proportion of funds allocated geographically reflected historical levels of provision, which in 
turn reflected the existing infrastructure such as the numbers of hospitals and their capacity, 
rather than the needs of the population (Kendall et al. 1996). The clinicians did not address 
such issues and, over time, inequalities of provision in different areas continued. The 
evolution of medical research had brought with it certain pressures on the existing system, 
such as the provision of new and costly medicines, thus expanding the parameters of 
medicine. The expense of developing technologies, in areas such as transplantations, radio­
therapy and radiography, renal dialysis, limb replacements and intensive care, to name a few 
rose in line with the importance attached to medical research (Harrison and Pollitt 1994).
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Such considerations were beyond the clinical ambit from which the medical professions 
undertook their work.
Such trends prompted concerns over the escalating costs not only within the realm of health­
care provision, but along the public sector as a whole (Ham 1992). The economic crisis that 
followed the oil price increases of 1973 compounded the UK’s relatively slow economic 
growth, while, at the same time, its aggregate expenditures slowly mounted across the public 
services, including health care, education, social security and defence. The NHS was 
beginning to feel the financial pinch of having to operate within a society that had increasing 
numbers of elderly people demanding health services (Pollitt 1993). The ‘baby boom’ in the 
1960s had a corresponding effect on state funding in both the education and NHS systems. 
The NHS was therefore treating more patients than ever before (Farnham and Horton 1993). 
At the same time, an increase in (often poorer) one-parent families began to exert pressure on 
income maintenance and social work programmes (Pollitt 1993).
Any continued expansion of the welfare state could only be achieved by increased taxation 
and/or public sector borrowing. This had implications for private savings, investment and 
interest rates, which in turn had inflationary implications for the economy as a whole, thus 
affecting private willingness to save and invest (Farnham and Horton 1996). Staffing the 
various public systems generated large expenditures and with this, a discontent among the 
New Right with excessive bureaucracy. The number of non-industrial civil servants grew 
from 637,000 in 1960 to 698, 000 in 1970, and when Prime Minister Thatcher took office in 
1979 the total stood at 738, 000 (Pollitt 1993). The Conservative Party, elected in 1979, 
argued that the bureaucracy in central and local government and the NHS meant that results 
were not produced in line with the growth in staff, and by 1988 the overall number of civil 
servants was cut to 590,000. Because of the lack of competition it was suggested that many 
public services were inefficient and wasteful, and the professions’ monopoly over the system 
were only seen as serving their own advantage (Foster and Wilding 2000). New Right 
ideologies, on the other hand, favoured economic liberalism, unregulated markets, free 
enterprise and a deregulated economy. The desire to weaken the autonomy and power of the 
welfare professions (Bach 2004) and to make them more accountable for their actions was 
spurred on by professions’ incapability of regulating their own practice (Kirkpatrick et al. 
2005). These shaped the Conservative Party’s approach to policy formation following its 
general election victory in 1979, and once elected it embarked on a number of policies which
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sought better management using private-sector models. It was claimed that these would 
ensure that professional restrictive practices were progressively narrowed in scope and that 
individual professionals would fall more closely in line with overall organisational 
objectives:
Lack of management control over professional service deliverers was a longstanding 
problem in many public services, and the new mood might just afford managers 
opportunities to tighten their grip on the more independent-minded doctors, lecturers, 
teachers and socials workers.
Pollitt 1993: 47.
The private sector was held up as a model of economic efficiency, business competitiveness, 
wealth-generating enterprise and rational approaches to management (Pollitt 1993). Existing 
public services, on the other hand, were inefficient, self-interested and costly monopolies, but 
whose tradition of occupational control had precluded any state reform (Harrison and Pollitt 
1994). Accompanying the state’s economic policy was an emerging shift in political ideology 
about the role of the state and public policy. Regulating doctors and the delivery of health 
care through new public management -  representing a fusion of private and public sector 
management ideas (Ferlie et al. 1996) -  was perceived as one way of addressing the 
limitations of self-regulation.
New public management
Management is an activity that is intimately concerned with directing flows of resources to 
achieve defined objectives. These objectives are defined predominantly in the language of 
socio-economics. For the incoming Conservative government, managers were to address the 
mounting pressures in the NHS and the various limitations of self-regulation:
Managerialism is a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which bums the seldom- 
tested assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide 
range of economic and socials ills.
Pollitt 1993: 1.
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The definition of new public management (NPM) is a source of disagreement owing to its 
evolution over time, but it can be characterised, in the context of the NHS, as encapsulating 
the state’s attempts to govern the medical profession’s delivery of medical care by 
managerial supervision and regulation (Hannigan 1998). In line with Pollitt (1993), Hannigan 
(1998) defines it as a “constellation of characteristics each of which has been a reaction 
against the characteristics of the traditional mode of administration.” It constitutes the second 
mode of regulation to which doctors have been the subject, and is discussed by reference to 
the approaches taken by both the Conservative and New Labour governments, respectively.
New Public Management and the Conservative governments, 1979-1997
In light of the escalating costs of health-care (Farnham and Horton 1993), the Conservative 
government commissioned an inquiry led by Roy Griffiths to evaluate the organisational 
regime of the hospitals in England and Wales (Griffiths 1983). The report specifically 
identified the absence of a clearly defined general management function and a lack of 
accountability as the main weaknesses of the NHS, and recommended that these functions 
should be vested in one person (at each level) who would take personal responsibility for 
securing action:
Absence of this general management support means that there is no driving force 
seeking and accepting direct and personal responsibility for developing management 
plans, securing their implementation and monitoring actual achievement.
Griffiths Report 1983: 12.
The recommended structure would introduce a continual search for change and cost 
improvement, motivate staff and develop a more dynamic management approach. At the 
same time, the report stated that hospital doctors “must accept the management responsibility 
which goes with clinical freedom” (p. 18) and participate fully in decisions about priorities. 
Up until then, the burdens for both and delivering and rationing the healthcare system were 
entrusted with doctors instead of politicians, policymakers, planners or managers. Their 
clinical autonomy underpinned such decisions as to which patients they should accept, how to 
investigate and treat them, whether to admit them to hospital, and how long to keep them 
there. Such choices were conceived as part of their everyday work. It also meant that 
evaluations of the pattern of resource distribution or of the quality, effectiveness and 
efficiency of the service were carried out by themselves.
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Preceding the Conservative’s intervention, managers, or ‘administrators’ as they were then 
more commonly known, helped to provide and organise the facilities and resources for 
medical professionals to get on with their work, and mediated conflicts within the 
organisation. As far as professional autonomy was concerned, the administrators facilitated 
the operation of the NHS without impinging on the everyday clinical activities undertaken by 
doctors. Despite the widespread inconsistencies in the delivery of health care and its lack of 
rationalisation under the self-regulatory approach, the system ‘worked’ owing to the 
agreement between parties to work: there was a very effective division of labour between 
doctors and nurses and, at the organisation level, little controversy about the way health care 
should be organised (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). However, the apparent limitations detailed 
above in relation to NHS expenditure, together with a new-right ideology shaped by business 
and competitive models, meant that workplace relations would have to change.
The recommendations of the Griffiths Report paved significant inroads into the system of 
healthcare provision and its regulation. In spite of the BMA’s opposition, which centred 
around the state’s challenge to clinical autonomy (Kendall et al. 1996), the government 
endorsed the recommendations (Ham 1992) and appointed general managers at regional, 
district and unit levels of organisation by the end of 1985. The posts were open to NHS 
managers of all disciplines, to doctors, and to persons from outside the Service. More than 60 
per cent of posts in the first round were allocated internally to former administrators and 
treasurers; only 12 percent went to NHS ‘outsiders’ (Harrison and Pollitt 1994). Many of 
those appointed were clinicians who undertook a part-time management role at unit level. 
The initial changes were therefore minimal, and the impact on curbing professional autonomy 
was not as marked as originally anticipated (Ham 1992; Flynn 1993; Ham 2004).
Clinical directors usually comprised consultant medical staff who continued to undertake 
part-time clinical work, were also appointed as members of the management board to 
determine unit plans, budget plans and priorities. They thus constituted two roles comprising 
a bureaucratic mode whilst also leading their medical colleagues. The dual expertise that was 
required paradoxically fuelled their authority by bridging the gap between both clinical and 
corporate decision-making processes, thereby challenging managerial authority (Thome 
2002). The vast majority, however, had no (and continue to be deprived of) management 
training (Buchanan et al. 1997; Newman et al. 1996), and were not particularly interested in
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administrative issues, such as setting priorities and rationing health-care resources. This was 
perceived as being at odds with their historically professional prerogatives of discretion, 
judgment and expert medical knowledge (Hunter 1994; Buchanan et al. 1997; Beardwood 
1999; Flynn 1999). Others, such as Swick (2001) and Thome (2002), take the view that in the 
present health system, the boundaries between business and professional values are, at the 
best, blurred.
Managerialism is perceived as a direct attempt to limit self-regulation and to extend central 
government control over the profession (Hoggett 1996), which has consequently impinged on 
doctors’ discretion and capacity to control the terms of their work (Freidson 1994). Some 
commentators argue that doctors’ participation in hospital management as clinical and 
medical directors was (and remains) an attempt to shape the implementation of managerial 
strategies according to the interests of their profession (Gorissen et al. 2005; Hoggett 1996) 
in light of their challenged autonomy (Exworthy and Halford 1999). Applying for posts 
combining both managerial and clinical facets therefore prevents an erosion of discretion by 
managers (Hunter 1992) and retains doctors’ professional identity:
clinical directors can challenge managerial domination by combining material and 
medical expertise to extend their jurisdiction beyond the clinical domain into the 
newly defined corporate organisation. Their strategy is both a defensive device to 
challenge management’s legitimacy for control over the organisation and part of a 
longer-term strategy to contest managerial organisation through new forms of 
workplace organisation.
Thorpe 2002: 67.
Conversely, collaboration between managers and professionals was (and also arguably 
remains) a way for the former to keep checks and balances on the work carried out by doctors 
(Gorissen et al. 2005; Harrison 1999a; Thorne 2002). The outcome is a ‘scientific- 
bureaucratic medicine’. It is ‘scientific’ in the sense that its prescriptions for treatment are 
drawn from an externally-generated body of research knowledge, and ‘bureaucratic’ in the 
sense that it is implemented through bureaucratic rules (albeit of a very specialised kind), 
namely clinical and non-clinical guidelines (Harrison and Ahmad 2000). Whereas doctors are 
seen as contributing a valuable clinical-scientific perspective (Buchanan et al. 1997), the 
overall medico-managerial relationship is one comprising both tension and co-operation.
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In line with other public sectors such as the civil service, local education authorities, the 
police and local government, the ascendancy of managerialism in the NHS progressed with 
the first national set of performance indicators in 1983, which encouraged health authorities 
to experiment with managing budgets. The initial 70 indicators permitted health authorities to 
compare their performance, which related mainly to the use of clinical facilities within broad 
speciality groups, rather than to the outcomes of treatment. They consisted primarily of 
efficiency measures such as average length of hospital stay, throughput of patients per bed, 
and the intervals between cases occupying a bed, all of which represented the government’s 
attempt to rationalise the NHS as part of its broader ideology of applying a business-like 
approach to the delivery of health care:
The job for many general managers has been essentially to get more patients through 
fewer beds at lower unit costs, not to improve the quality of medicine or to track 
down those in need who may not be receiving adequate treatment.
Pollitt 1993: 68-69.
In addition to the curtailing of doctors’ discretion by making the delivery of health care more 
transparent, the ambiguities of certain performance indicators together with their doubted 
accuracy attracted criticisms from the professionals whose work was scrutinised (Harrison 
and Pollitt 1994; Fortser et al. 1986). They were subsequently revised in 1985, accompanied 
by more user-friendly packages, though this did not allay professional opposition who saw 
auditing practices as an attempt to gain control over their work (Thome 2002).
Modelled on the state’s ideology to replicate private models in the NHS as a means of 
reducing costs and raising revenues (Kendall et al. 1996), other key post-Griffiths 
management changes introduced in the NHS included mandatory competitive tendering for 
cleaning, laundry and catering services from outside contractors for English and Welsh health 
authorities. It was estimated that the first round of competitive tendering achieved annual 
savings of £110 million, with most deriving from contracts won in-house by health authority 
staff (Ham 2004). In 1984, the Department of Health and Social Services required every 
district health authority to include a cost-improvement programme within its short-term plan. 
Annual performance reviews were introduced in 1986, and individual performance reviews 
and performance-related pay for general managers in 1987.
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A variety of factors in the latter period of the 1980s prompted the state to consider alternative 
emphases on its approach to new public management. Such factors included the health 
workforce’s widespread criticism of the government in the wake of its reduced job security 
among certain sectors, pay and conditions, and the evolving business-like culture permeating 
the NHS (Kendall et al. 1996; Ham 2004). Matters were not improved by the government’s 
stance against public service unions during major strike actions (Harrison and Pollitt 1994) 
and legislation that progressively restricted the freedoms hitherto enjoyed by trade unions 
(Smith and Morton 2001b). Set against this backdrop was a management culture exercising 
increased control over staff, their work and costs. Amid such criticisms voiced by both the 
public and the media surrounding the resource shortages in various parts of the NHS and long 
waiting lists, the Prime Minister announced a review of the Service in January 1988. This 
was conducted confidentially by a small group of ministers and chaired by Margaret Thatcher 
herself.
Its publication a year later, Working for Patients (1989) included proposals to allow NHS 
Trusts to apply to the Secretary of State for self-governing status. If granted it would enable a 
hospital to own its estate and manage its own budgets, in addition to regulating the pay and 
conditions of its staff, including doctors. Each medical consultant, for example, would 
receive a more detailed, locally-negotiated job description than had been customary in the 
past. Doctors would therefore be more accountable for their performance, their supervision 
increased and working autonomy diminished (Ham 1992; Foster and Wilding 2000) in 
exchange for increased managerial influence:
It is unacceptable for local management to have little authority or influence over those 
who are in practice responsible for committing most of the hospital service’s 
resources. The key to local management of consultants’ contracts is that every 
consultant should have a fuller job description than is commonly the case at present. 
These job descriptions will be reviewed annually
Department of Health 1989: 42.
While only 57 NHS Trusts came into operation on 1 April 1991, by 1996 over 450 provider 
units had Trust status -  representing almost 100 per cent of the NHS’s activities -  over four 
phased waves of applications (Kendall et al. 1996). The hospitals which did not immediately
receive self-governing status had to compete for patients by separating their ‘providing’ role 
from the ‘purchasing’ role of health authorities. The latter would let contracts for specific 
volumes of particular services, and hospitals would make priced bids for these. Similarly, 
GPs were offered the possibility to become fund-holders, thereby controlling the budget they 
had to purchase elective surgery, outpatient consultations, community care and pathology.
Working for Patients also proposed the extension of arrangements for medical and value-for- 
money audit as a routine part of clinical work in both general practice and hospitals, and the 
further involvement of doctors and nurses in management through an extension of the 
resource-management initiative. The Department of Health put aside £3 million to fund some 
360 senior hospital consultants on regional management-development programmes, which 
included attendance at business school, to remedy their paucity of management training. 
There remains little training available for those pursuing a managerial post today (Buchanan, 
et al. 1997), despite a keenness among junior doctors to apply for such posts in their more 
senior years (Newman et al. 1996). The only managerial aspects of their work were limited to 
leading medical firms (Dawson et al. 1995). It has therefore been argued that doctors lack 
essential management skills (Hadley and Forster 1995).
More consultant appointments were to be made available in order to reduce waiting times and 
improve appointment systems, and new procedures were introduced for hospital doctors to 
enable disciplinary matters to be dealt with expeditiously. The paper also recommended the 
creation of two new centralised bodies: a policy board to determine strategy, objectives and 
finances of the NHS, and a management executive to deal with all operational matters, 
including monitoring, and thereby strengthening management arrangements. In line with this 
trend, the ascendancy of new public management has led many authors to conclude that 
medical dominance has reduced in line with their autonomy and self-regulation (Williams 
2001; Harrison and Ahmad 2000; Hoggett 1996):
The corollary is that the power of even the most well-placed pressure groups may not 
always be sufficient to defeat proposals put forward by ministers. This lesson emerges 
from the failure of the BMA and other groups to stop the government proceeding with 
the implementation of Working fo r Patients
Ham 2004: 49.
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The state’s challenge to professional autonomy was not only demonstrated by its decision to 
implement the recommendations in the face of such opposition (not least from the BMA 
which argued against the introduction of market principles in health care (Ham 1994)), but 
also by the Conservative’s departure from the established consultative process by excluding 
such pressure groups as the BMA (Harrison and Wood 1999a).
The end result was the NHS Community Care Act 1990. Responsibility for overseeing the 
implementation of the reforms was vested in the NHS management executive working on 
behalf of ministers. The cornerstone of the legislation was its concept of the internal market, 
constructed to ensure competition based on valid information and minimal transaction costs 
(Dent 2003). It involved the separation of NHS functions into both ‘purchasers’ (District 
Health Authorities and those general practices with practice budgets) and ‘providers’ 
(hospitals, clinics, community services, etc.). Previously, Health Authorities assumed the 
responsibilities of both purchasing and providing health services. The purchasing agencies 
introduced by the legislation were responsible for holding a budget to ensure the health of a 
defined population, of identifying health needs, for planning ways to satisfy them and 
ensuring the quality of the service, and for developing contracts with providers. They would, 
in turn, invoice the purchaser for the care provided. The internal market was designed that 
money would follow the patient and that there would be an incentive for providers to attract 
customers, to increase productivity and standards, and to look for ways of ensuring that they 
won and maintained better value contracts.
As with the content and implementation of the Griffiths Report (1983) the BMA was again 
marginalised in the preparation, consultation and delivery of Working for Patients. Its role 
presented a stark contrast to the professional-state co-operation in the formation of the NHS 
in 1948 and the earlier 1911 National Insurance legislation. Such trends reflected the broader 
declining relationship between the state and trade unions as the Thatcher government 
departed from the corporatist tendencies of previous administrations and reasserted the role of 
government itself in policy-making (Ham 2004) and, in so doing, unsettled established 
relationships between the Department of Health and organisations such as the BMA. 
Together with the twin creations of the internal market and self-governing NHS Trusts by the 
1990 NHS and Community Care Act, the legislation’s attempt to decentralise the onus of 
‘employing’, and hence determining pay and the other working conditions, of NHS staff to 
managers of the individual trusts fuelled union hostility:
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The attempt to move to local pay and the continuing uncertainty over the locus of 
determination of NHS workers’ terms and conditions represents one of the most 
swingeing changes since the service was established in 1948, and constitutes an 
ongoing and immediate challenge to employee representative organisations.
Thomley 1998: 418.
Trade unions in the NHS have traditionally endeavoured to maximise their influence on 
industrial relations at the national level as this was the locus of power and influence. The 
centralised nature of the Service is characterised by the extent to which policy-making 
authority is concentrated at national level rather than regional or local levels (Bach 2004) 
(though regional devolution has had an impact). Pay and conditions were previously 
determined by centralised pay bargaining with little involvement by local management or 
employees. With the exception of medical and nursing staff and those working in the related 
professions, the pay and conditions of NHS staff were dealt with through a series of national 
negotiating bodies known as the Whitley system. ‘Whitleyism’ represents a highly formalised 
system of bargaining, consultation and dispute resolution, based on codified procedural 
arrangements and a formally constituted, hierarchical machinery, which became 
characteristic of the public sector (see Clay 1929). The first Whitley Councils were aimed at 
making and considering suggestions for securing permanent improvement in relations 
between employers and workers. Before them, public sector pay was determined by inquiries 
and commissions (Prowse and Prowse 2007). Whitley Councils were established as 
consultative mechanisms for joint industrial councils, civil service staff associations and 
managers at national level. They were devolved from ministerial and departmental level, to 
regional and local level, and their principles were extended across the public services, 
including health in 1949. Employers were encouraged to recognise trade union membership 
and it made the state accountable to the public for decisions on management, recruitment and 
rewarding staff. In this respect, public sector industrial relations were, at the time, more 
regulated than their voluntarist private sector counterparts (Prowse and Prowse 2007).
Medical and nursing staff and those in the related professions had their pay determined by the 
government after the recommendations of national pay review bodies (their other terms and 
conditions were determined by centralised collective bargaining in the Whitley machinery). 
The medical profession’s remuneration was, and continues to be, centrally determined by the
Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ Remuneration (DDRB). Its role is to make 
recommendations to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Health, the Secretary of 
State for Scotland and the Secretary of State for Wales on the remuneration of doctors and 
dentists taking any part in the National Health Service (DDRB 2006). Its impartiality is 
consistent with the principles of the NHS for doctors to be distributed evenly both 
geographically and by specialty. The independent nature of the DDRB is seen as ensuring 
that doctors’ pay is not vulnerable to government economic policy (BMA 2004a). Any 
significant move towards local pay determination has been rejected as potentially 
undermining this important benefit to patient care. Junior doctors’ pay, after the 1990 Act, 
continues to be determined in such fashion. For these reasons, all the professional 
organisations apart from the BMA and the Royal College of Nursing have been squeezed out 
at the level of local determination. The BMA and RCN have therefore been well-placed to 
have a powerful influence on industrial relations in NHS trusts (Bryson et al. 1995).
The 1990 Act’s shift from national to local bargaining challenged trade unions by creating a 
system of pay determination at Trust level, with or without union involvement and 
irrespective of NHS national agreements. Famham and Horton (1996) argue that such 
changes in public sector management during the 1980s and the adoption of private sector 
management techniques have transformed the public sector. New local management 
arrangements represented a “deliberate attempt to reduce the personal discretion which 
individual clinicians have by exerting budgetary controls on them”, all of which had a knock- 
on effect on staff morale and “debilitating reorganisation exhaustion” (Bradshaw 2001: 311). 
This fitted with the Conservative government’s overall industrial relations objective 
throughout the public sector. These were to decentralise pay determination from the multi­
employer, national level to the single employer at a local level so that labour-market 
conditions could be better reflected; to empower local managers so that they could become 
operators rather than administrators; to devolve decision-making to levels where the public 
sector unions traditionally had been weaker; and to change organisational culture so that 
greater priority was given to the needs of customers rather than producers (Corby 1992).
The arrival of the Conservative administration in 1979 and its perception of collective 
laissez-faire marked a fundamental change in the philosophical underpinnings of industrial 
relations policy and the direction of legislative change. Collective bargaining was now 
viewed sceptically by the state, as a potential impediment to the efficient allocation of labour
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and a contributing factor in high inflation. The neoliberal economic arguments all pointed to 
the same direction. They called for a change in the law so as to limit the power and influence 
of trade unions, at the same time as removing what the government called ‘obstacles’ to the 
creation of jobs in the form of statutory regulation of terms and conditions of employment 
(Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). Deregulation was seen as removing regulatory rigidities, and 
would free up the labour market to operate in such a way as to maximise efficiency and 
preserve effective competition. Among other things, trade dispute immunities were cut back, 
thereby inviting the courts back into the control of industrial disputes; new statutory 
procedures were put in place to govern the conduct of strikes and legal support for the closed 
shop was removed (Smith and Morton 2001b). The end result was an individualism paralleled 
with the form of regulation which characterised the pre-nineteenth century master-and- 
servant relationship. Decentralisation and the absence of minimum legislative standards 
threatened the long-term viability of collective bargaining.
Conservative policy was one influential factor which has been associated with the reduction 
in the influence of multi-employer, sector bargaining, and a fall in the coverage of collective 
agreements and other forms of wage determination. Paradoxically, the employment contract 
became more standardised at enterprise level despite the decentralisation and privatisation of 
services (Deakin 1999). In both unionised and deunionised firms, the contractual terms of the 
employment relationship took shape as a standard form agreement largely set by employers.
Deakin and Wilkinson (2005) argue that labour regulation raises issues surrounding its 
capacity to deliver solutions which are compatible with the preservation of market order. 
Deregulation and market order are necessary conditions for the freedom of individual 
members to pursue their work in such a way which precludes the imposition of purposeful 
and monolithic ‘public laws’ -  such as equality clauses contained in the equal pay, 
discrimination, minimum wage and even working time legislation -  that are superimposed on 
the contract of employment. They cite arguments which claim that social legislation is 
contrary to both efficiency and justice, and produce conceptual confusions as a result. The 
contract of employment is separated out from the general law of contract, with the aim of 
subjecting it to special rules whose principal purposes include the protection of employees. 
However, such regulatory legislation, despite its tension with the historical forms of 
governance under which British industrial relations have developed, provides a means of
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addressing employers’ attempts at evading protective ideals shaped by welfarist legislation 
(Deakin 2000).
In August 1994, the government gave further impetus to local pay determination and, with 
the support of the chief executive of the NHS, requested all trusts to prepare action plans by 
October 1994 in order to have local pay machinery set up by February 1995. Union response 
was again exceptional and hostile (Thomley 1998). The RCN voted to allow limited 
industrial action by amending its 79-year old rule forbidding it. The BMA, although 
unaffected by the proposition, lent its support to the campaign for the retention (and 
improvement) of national machinery. The dispute was narrowly avoided by a framework 
agreement providing for a protective uprating mechanism, whereby minimum pay rates 
would be guaranteed even in those trusts where local pay agreements or impositions had been 
below the national average. Any Trust that had awarded less than a nationally agreed amount 
had to make it up in the next year’s increase.
How did both unions and NHS management respond to the devolved powers under the 1990 
Act? The problem with investigating many areas of the public service sector, including the 
NHS, is that traditionally few decisions have been made locally, and therefore it is difficult to 
assess the changing influence of trade unions over managerial decision-making (Lloyd 1997). 
Studies, however, have generally depicted that early progress towards local pay arrangements 
and union recognition was slow and inconsistent (Carr 1999; Thornley 1998; Lloyd 1997; 
Bryson et al. 1995; Corby 1992). This variation was reflected within the wider labour market 
(Deakin 1999). Trade union recognition is a crucial issue for Trusts intending to introduce 
local pay bargaining. Some studies reported delays and a lack of provision of basic 
information by managers to all negotiating parties; and that decentralising collective 
bargaining in the NHS had increased the potential for conflict between unions and NHS 
management (Thomley 1998). Not all staff organisations were permitted at the main 
bargaining table (Corby 1992). Such initiatives as new job-evaluated pay structures were 
introduced among some Trusts together with single pay spines and performance-related pay. 
These broke down job demarcations in the interests of flexibility, and harmonisation of 
conditions. Skill mixing or reprofiling the workforce offered management a tool to 
substantially reduce staff costs and to escape the rigidities of job and grading structures. The 
new contracts of employment were vague about pay and reserved considerable discretion to 
employers (Deakin 1999). There was also a move towards revised grievance and discipline
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procedures, some of which were stricter than the existing arrangements. Changes in non-pay 
terms were driven by management goals of rationalisation and harmonisation, all of which 
diminished the union role of joint regulation. There was simply less opportunity for the 
unions to get involved:
These moves have weakened the ability of unions to help members in both individual 
and collective matters, by enabling local managers to the final arbiters and by 
removing access to impartial justice.
Bryson et al. 1995: 128.
Such developments could be achieved independent of union action. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that the trade unions, particularly those affiliated to the TUC, were hostile to the 
establishment of both trusts and local bargaining which -
Served to shift the balance of power away from the unions and underline the message 
that the unions could not count on playing a part in determining pay.
Corby 1992: 39.
By contrast, Carr (1999), Lloyd (1997) and Bryson et al. (1995) found that the majority -  but 
not all -  of the Trusts in their samples had agreed to recognition procedures, which were 
matched by an overall increase in both bargaining and consultation. Managers had also 
reported that they were providing more financial and operational information to staff than in 
the past, and that the process of local talks had increased the flow of information. There was 
no evidence of the information being used to undermine unions and the main objective was to 
draw attention to what was affordable in negotiations. A proportion of managers were seen as 
giving a strong commitment to working with unions. In pragmatic terms, constructive 
industrial relations were seen as a key factor in securing early union recognition and 
employee management during a period of immense organisational change. Trust status had, at 
times, provided the impetus for more workplace activity and improved inter-union 
organisation (Lloyd 1997). Hutchinson (1994) similarly found that new recognition 
agreements with trade unions had been reached by 60 percent of Trusts, though in most cases 
Trusts had simply continued to recognise all those unions they previously dealt with.
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Amid the more fragmented NHS that resulted from the establishment of separate Trusts, Bach 
(2004) argues that the state retained a tight grip on the Service by ensuring that the Secretary 
of State for Health remained responsible for the policies and administration of the NHS 
overall. More auditing of outcomes was also instigated, thus making certain that formal 
devolution of managerial authority to Trusts did not weaken political control. Consequently 
the establishment of performance indicators, broadening the remit of the Audit Commission 
to include the NHS and other audit processes, such as medical audit, proliferated under 
successive Conservative governments.
New Public Management and New Labour
The election of New Labour in 1997 signified a different agenda with increased investment in 
the public sector, union recognition and partnerships, although the government did not 
reverse any privatisation policies, except for the rail industry (Prowse and Prowse 2007). The 
government endorsed labour-management cooperation and ‘partnership’ as an effective 
approach for improving economic performance:
In paving the way for the new NHS the Government is committed to building on what 
has worked but discarding what has failed. There will be no return to the old 
centralised common and control system of the 1970s. But nor will there be a 
continuation of the divisive internal market system of the 1990s. Instead there will be 
a ‘third way’ of running the NHS -  a system based on partnership and driven by 
performance.
The New NHS \991: 10.
Policy under New Labour shifted towards voluntary understanding and cooperation whilst 
considering the prosperity of both the employer and employee. A major shift in legal policy 
occurred with the enactment, as part of the Employment Relations Act 1999, of a statutory 
procedure under which an independent trade union may establish a legal right to recognition 
for the purposes of collective bargaining. Parliament also passed the National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) Act 1998 and implemented the European Working Time Directive 1998, 
although in relation to the latter “it is unclear whether the relevant steps would have been 
taken had it not been for pressure from the European Community” (Deakin and Wilkinson 
2005: 339; Smith and Morton 2001a).
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Neither of these measures, however, represents a complete departure from the deregulatory 
policy of the preceding Conservative government. For example, the Directive has been 
implemented in such a way that takes full advantage of the legislation’s derogations, which 
severely dilutes the Regulations’ overall impact. Its minimal effect is indicated by the little it 
has done to discourage the systematic use of overtime working (Arrowsmith 2002). Nor has it 
been used, as it might have been, to promote more effective employee representation. Some 
of the Regulations’ provisions can be varied by collective agreement at sector level or by 
agreement between the employer and trade unions or enterprise committees at workplace or 
company level, however there is little evidence of these collective channels being utilised 
(Barnard et al. 2003). Collective bargaining and social legislation are still seen as separate 
forms of labour-market regulation, rather than as being potentially complementary.
In the English NHS, primary care Trusts were established in 1999 and they were given full 
responsibility for primary care and community health services, and services for people with 
mental illness and learning disabilities. New inspection and audit regimes have been 
introduced, and New Labour has extended Conservative policy by the proliferation of new 
targets and performance indicators (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Prowse and Prowse 2007). 
During its term in opposition, New Labour accepted the value of the separation of purchaser 
and provider responsibilities, but has, since assuming office, discouraged competition 
between Trusts in favour of more co-operative agreements. Its approach was to foster 
competition among hospitals to achieve better quality than for funding purposes. Despite the 
continuity between the two governments’ agenda of bolstering centralised systems of 
performance management, then, the ideology underpinning that agenda differed significantly 
(Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Bach 2002). Whereas the rationale underlying Conservative policy 
was to structure the NHS on a business-like model that aimed to promote efficiency and 
competition, New Labour based its organisation of health care as a means of ensuring that 
providers were held to account for their performance {Renewing the NHS Labour Party 1995). 
Among the NHS’s structural reorganisation, health authority purchasers were replaced by 
primary care groups, and primary care Trusts were established. Health authorities were 
reduced in number, and general priority was afforded to primary care and general practice 
over secondary care, with the intention of enhancing the Service’s responsiveness to patients’ 
needs {The New NHS: Modem  -  Dependable 1999). These changes introduced a notion of 
subsidiarity into the system with decisions being made at a local level, though the reforms 
themselves were centrally directed rather than a response to local demands (Dent 2003).
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Its report, Delivering the NHS Plan, issued in April 2002 at the same time as the budget, 
described a new emphasis on patient choice and the commitment to develop greater plurality 
of provision. As part of the strategy to attain these aims, it included commitments to 
maximise the use of spare capacity in private hospitals, bring in overseas clinical teams to 
establish services for the NHS, and to develop new public-private partnerships to support the 
rapid development of diagnostic and treatment centres. The NHS, however, firmly remains a 
public sector entity, with only 13% of orthodox medical treatments being supplied by the 
private sector (Fox 2007).
Proposals to establish NHS Foundation Trusts were consistent with the policy of developing 
greater plurality of provision. Top-performing hospital trusts could now apply for foundation 
status and function as independent bodies in which local public accountability replaces 
central state control. They have increased freedom to retain operating surpluses and to access 
a wider range of options for capital funding to invest in the delivery of new services. Each 
Trust is able to raise and expend funds in accordance with the priorities of governing bodies 
comprised of health service providers and residents of the area it serves. They recruit and 
employ their own staff and, although they must deliver on national targets and standards like 
the rest of the NHS, they are free to decide on strategies to achieve this, and are not subject to 
direction by the Department of Health. Foundation Trusts, however, have come under severe 
criticism for their possibility of creating a two-tier health system (Klein 2002), particularly as 
the budgets and performance of those hospitals that do not ‘earn’ foundation are more tightly 
scrutinised by the Department of Health.
Taken together, the policies set out in Delivering the NHS Plan are therefore similar in a 
number of respects to those that regulated the internal market under the Conservatives. This 
was particularly apparent in the emphasis placed on patient choice, the system of payment by 
results in which money would follow patients to providers, and the commitment to establish 
NHS Foundation Trusts (Ham 2004). As in the 1990s, these policies were intended to create 
stronger incentives to improve performance and to ensure that the NHS really did work for 
patients. A further similarity between the two governments has been the willingness to use 
the private sector to develop new forms of public-private partnerships. The approach in 
Delivering the NHS Plan in this area signalled a marked departure from New Labour’s early
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period in office when the NHS was actively discouraged from working with the private 
sector.
Devolution and the NHS
The policies outlined above have not been adopted consistently among the other three 
nations, particularly in the wake of political devolution in 1998. The financial arrangements 
for the UK NHS continue to be determined by the UK Treasury. UK government spending 
reviews, which take place every two years and cover a three-year cycle, determine the 
amount of public expenditure available for Wales, and the devolved governments then decide 
how this sum should be allocated among its departments. However, the separate 
administrative structures in the four nations have accentuated some of the different health 
policies and processes in Britain. Each nation has attempted to create a service that is 
sustainable within the current funding infrastructure. The consistency between the various 
systems are further complicated by the nationalist-unionist debates particularly in Scotland 
and Wales which need to show that they are “not blindly obeying London, and avoiding 
policies labelled English” (Greer 2005c: 100). This marks a difference from the close ties 
between the Welsh Office and Whitehall before devolution.
England is clearly adopting a competition model which entails increased involvement of the 
independent healthcare sector, and using market style incentives to create a self improving 
system, thus echoing the Griffiths reforms of 1983 and the internal market formulated and 
implemented by the previous Conservative government in 1991 (Ham 2004). The English 
policy aims to expose the NHS to patient pressure by forcing providers to compete for 
referrals, based on the view that a more responsive, ‘patient centred’ service will result. 
Policy priorities now include developing more points of treatment and better information to 
judge services, which will both aid consumer-style choice, including the government’s effort 
to address waiting times. On the one hand, the English health policy community is unique in 
nurturing many more pro-market, pro-management ideas than any other in the UK (BMA 
2007b). On the other, the devolved nations are largely addressing problems through service 
redesign and rationalisation as opposed to using market-based models.
Regulatory agencies ensure that competition does not produce problems. The Healthcare 
Commission, for example, regulates quality, a special regulator for the finances of the
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foundation hospitals demands that they balance their budgets, and NICE evaluates 
technologies. The Government is also introducing Payment by Results (PbR) as an 
accounting device by fixing a tariff for each procedure, with the intention of identifying costs 
and inefficiencies (Greer 2005c).
The NHS Reform (Scotland) Act 2004 gave Scotland a legislative framework to implement 
its professionally led single system working through Community Health Partnerships, 
focusing on networked clinical management. Policymaking including rationing and resource 
allocation is now led by medical and professional elites, with a noticeably phased reduction 
of managerial layers which were implemented in light of the internal market. It has 
regionalised its organisational environment through the creation of fifteen health boards 
working also with local authorities. It has sought to centralise the most complex high-end 
services, but has generally moved care out into the community to community treatment 
centres and the primary care sector. The ‘single system’ replaces purchaser-provider split, 
and trusts have been dissolved. On a smaller scale to England, Scotland has used private 
sector capacity to improve facilities, but this is not a significant policy drive. Rather, in 
Scotland the focus is currently on the use of networks and professional partnerships to deliver 
the service. Whereas in England the focus is on market forces and associated financial 
incentives to provide efficient services through competition and a separation of 
commissioning and provision. Scotland, on the other hand, is forging united health systems 
breaking down these structural barriers.
The elections in May 1999 led to the creation of a 60-member Assembly in Wales. While the 
Westminster Parliament retained power over the constitution, defence, the economy and other 
major areas, devolution gave Welsh government control over areas such as health and social 
care. Wales was also given a new political figurehead for its NHS; prior to devolution, the 
Secretary for State for Wales assumed the role, but after 1999 responsibility shifted to the 
Minister for Health and Social Services in the Welsh Assembly Government (Sullivan 2007). 
The role is supported by the Director of NHS Wales and is held to account by the Health and 
Social Services Committee of the Assembly.
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The Welsh government produced its own version of The NHS Plan -  NHS Wales: Putting 
Patients First (1998). It proposed the establishment of local health groups instead of primary 
care groups as was recommended in England. These were set up in 1999 on a conterminous 
basis with local authorities and as subcommittees of health authorities, bringing together GPs, 
other primary care contractors, health professionals such as nurses and other local interests. It 
also abolished GP fundholding in Wales.
NHS Wales has continued to operate on a similar basis as it did pre-devolution however there 
is no longer a reliance on political direction from the centre. Power is now concentrated into 
twenty-two local health boards (LHBs) in each of the local authority areas, which replace 
Local Health Groups, and focus on local issues (there are 14 NHS Trusts in Wales and they 
manage about a hundred and thirty-five hospitals), reporting to the National Assembly of 
Wales. With technical advice from the centre and three regional offices, the LHBs 
commission services from trusts in line with local priorities and demands.
As a result, there is a considerable emphasis on local NHS bodies and local authorities 
working together to meet local needs. This has in some respects resulted in less capacity to 
make all-Wales decisions (Sullivan 2005). The fragmented nature of localism has also limited 
the power of health boards to shape large and powerful acute trusts. The Wanless report 
(2003) found that there was an unacceptable variance in performance between NHS Trusts 
and primary care and that there has been repeated overspends in the NHS in Wales.
Wales has less input from the private sector than other devolved nations, and there are no 
clear organisational plans to implement this using professional elites, which distinctly 
contrasts with England’s and Scotland’s policies. Like Scotland, the public health agenda in 
Wales is predominantly focused on reducing inequalities and preventing ill health (Wanless
2003). Policymakers have adjusted the way resources are allocated in the NHS to take 
account of the needs of disadvantaged areas and created an ‘inequalities in health fund’. The 
NHS therefore serves to improve the population health rather than the concern in England to 
implement targets for individual patient care. Furthermore, the latter approach emphasises the
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individual as a consumer in a market-orientated system, as opposed to Wales’ focus on the 
individual as citizen (Sullivan 2005.)
There are, however, some similarities between the way that the NHS operates in both 
England and Wales. Perhaps most importantly, they include the principle of universal access 
and equality of care across the Principality, in a patient-centred Health Service. Just as in 
England, the NHS in Wales has national targets that it must achieve, including shorter 
waiting lists for GPs, dental treatment and Accident and Emergency admission, better health 
promotion strategy, and improved access to clinics dealing with sexually transmitted diseases 
and contraception, cancer services and services for the elderly and young {Designed for Life 
2005a). It has also implemented transparent corporate and clinical governance throughout the 
organisation.
Furthermore, there are also a number of shared organisations between England and Wales. 
These include the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE), The Commission for 
Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI) and the NHS Executive. The Minister for Health 
and Social Care also sits on the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), alongside the Health 
Ministers for England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Regulation of the healthcare 
profession is also UK-wide with professionals in each nation adhering to the same 
framework.
In light of the differences which exist between the devolved authorities, Greer (2005c) argues 
that two factors pose significant threats to the system which could further lead to tensions. 
The first relates to the political context. Thus far, the presence of a majority of Labour 
representation in each devolved government has been able to minimise conflict. It is unclear 
how the system will be affected with shifts in power between political parties, the most recent 
being the success of the SNP in the Scottish elections. The second threat comes from Europe. 
EU policy-making does not take into account the views held by devolved governments; such 
governments are not invited to EU councils, and cannot vote. The EWTD is a good an 
example of this, illustrating the lack of autonomy and authority of devolved nations over such 
supranational policy. This forms the basis of discussion in the next section.
Before considering the impact of statutory control and the impact of European policymaking 
on national governments, it is important to discuss another aspect of NPM; that is, the attempt
106
by policymakers in the UK to deliver a better quality of care in the NHS. This does not fall 
within the ambit of employment relations which forms a core theme of the present study, 
though a brief discussion is critical in our understanding of the state’s continued attempt to 
regulate the medical profession with little consultation (Som 2005), and the latter’s response 
to its adjusting clinical autonomy. In so doing, it highlights the objectives which the 
managerial reforms failed to achieve during the years preceding the New Labour government.
Debates bringing together standards of quality with performance management revolve around 
the concept of clinical governance -  a “corporate accountability for clinical practice” (Taylor 
2002: 65). These principles, among others, were documented in The New NHS (1997). New 
Labour explicitly recognised continuity between both government policies, but a new 
emphasis on clinical governance by cooperation was to be the strategy for attaining its goal. 
Calls for medical regulation also stemmed from the consumerist patients who nowadays are 
more likely to question a doctor’s judgement and seek remedies as a result of clinical errors 
(Forlin 2003), some of which have recently been highly publicised in the media. While the 
profession continues to enjoy a generally high social standing (Lupton 1997), in terms of 
professionalism these experiences have cast doubt on medical profession’s ability to uphold 
its values of integrity and patient interests (Stacey 1992; Nettleton and Harding 1994; Davies 
2000). The state has, in some instances, acted on these concerns by pursuing a regulatory 
policy for the profession, such as clinical governance and the more recent recommendations 
by the Chief Medical Officer in England to reform the GMC (Good Doctors, Safer Patients, 
2006a):
A regulatory body needs to command the support of both the public and the 
professions and it is government concern with repeated allegations of malpractice and 
its fear of loss of public confidence, which has led developments to date.
Davies 2004: 58.
This process of clinical governance was facilitated by the reorganisation of the NHS in 1999, 
and the establishment of primary care groups. Among other changes, the number of NHS 
Trusts was reduced and chief executives were given statutory responsibility over clinical 
governance. There was a return to greater emphasis on reducing variations in performance 
through the development of national service frameworks and the creation of agencies such as 
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). The latter’s emphases on prescribing
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standard guidelines, clinical audit and cost-effective treatment distinctly echo the attempts by 
managers during the 1980s’ reorganisation of the Service but on a far broader scale, and 
supported by an ideology concerned with performance rather than rationalisation.
Other agencies and regulatory bodies, spanning both England and Wales, buttressing the 
work of NICE, include the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) which monitors the 
delivery of care; the Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Excellence (CRHE), the 
Modernisation Agency, the National Patient Safety Agency, and the National Clinical 
Assessment Authority (Wales also boasts its Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, launched in 
2004, to monitor, review, and investigate standards in Welsh NHS bodies) . Such “layers of 
bureaucracy over already difficult, cumbersome and sometimes lengthy procedures” (Jolly 
2001: 1095) are in addition to the existing NHS regulators, including the Audit Commission, 
National Audit Office, the Health and Safety Executive, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, the Data Protection Registrar, the Mental Health Commission and the Health 
Service Commission, resulting in a highly fragmented “mosaic of regulatory arrangements” 
(Walshe 2002: 968). The managerial presence continues to dominate discussions surrounding 
the reorganisation of health care provision in Britain. The perpetual regulation -  albeit a mix 
of both clinical and administrative form -  has served to further scrutinise the work of doctors, 
and to put pressure on them to change their activities in ways that managers themselves 
cannot undertake, through such initiatives as audit and league tables (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). 
As such, these debates acknowledge the inadequacy of the latter’s authority which explains to 
a good degree the incorporation of clinical professionals in managerial jurisdictions.
The significance of these initiatives lays in recognition that self-regulation by the health 
professions was no longer sufficient to ensure consistently high standards, and that new 
mechanisms were needed to promote quality within the NHS (Ham 2004). It also suggests 
that the new public management programme has not succeeded to achieve the aims it initially 
purported to address. New Labour’s attempts to continue on the quest of regulating doctors 
represent the broader effort of standardising the medical professions’ working relations, 
where previous administrations -  as far back as the passing of the National Insurance Act 
1911 and the National Health Service legislation in 1948 -  have failed. This has led to the 
prospect of a third mode of regulation, namely statutory control. To this extent, there is a 
degree of overlap between NPM and legislative action insofar as some of the former’s
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initiatives entailing the reorganisation of the NHS and the establishment of regulatory bodies, 
such as the CRHE, have been implemented by Parliamentary statutes.
Statutory control
Governments and policymakers often view legal regulation as the most appropriate, 
independent and publicly accountable way of controlling certain aspects of professional 
work. For example, the legislation surrounding medically assisted reproduction and 
experimentation on human embryo fertilisation is perceived as an instrument that is able to 
incorporate the varying concerns of religious organisations, feminist groups, right-to-life 
movements, the medical profession, and the patients (Anleu 2001). It can constitute and 
define the boundaries of medicine, and draw up the limits on clinical autonomy.
By convention, the state has largely “steered clear of changes to [medical] regulatory 
legislation, whether for fear of respect for the profession or because of more pressing issues 
of legislating directly for services” (Davies 2004: 56). Baldwin et al. (1998) suggest that both 
public expectations and the governments’ obligation to protect the public’s best interests have 
driven the state’s recent interventionist trends. Initiated by the Conservatives, New Labour 
has progressively intervened in its approach to both clinical and financial regulation on the 
medical profession because the latter has failed to strike a balance between the demand for, 
and supply of, health-care, nor has it delivered care to a standard the policymakers regard as 
acceptable (Hood et al. 2000; Williams 2001; Salter 2002). It is therefore the profession’s 
own failures which have led to the circumstances that have steered the state’s regulatory 
vehicle (Freidson 1988).
While many of the institutions of the welfare state, including collective bargaining, have been 
weakened by virtue of ‘flexibility’ or the application of ‘market forces’, a new form of social 
rights has arisen to guarantee the effective conditions for the functioning of the modem 
labour market. These are social rights of the type which have been articulated in the context 
of the European Community which, according to the European Court of Justice, do not yield 
to the economic policy goal of an integrated market (Pollack 2003) Such arguments are 
played out in the context of the EWTD’s application to the medical profession discussed in 
the next chapter. In this light, the European market arguably incorporates a set of core social 
rights that create a balance of power in the workplace as well as in the wider society. They 
legitimise and promote the role of trade union and collective bargaining on the one hand, and
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establish legally binding minimum terms and conditions of employment, the provision of 
health care, education and social support, and full employment as a primary policy objective 
on the other (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005).
The EC presence has always featured in the UK health services and has influenced the 
individual worker’s contract of employment by way of stipulating requirements relating to 
general issues as safety, labour, and non-discrimination, to the more sector-specific 
regulations such as medical devices and pharmaceuticals. The political challenge from the 
point of view of most health professions has been to maintain ‘sectoral’ intervention: 
“professions assumed that not only will general regulation respond to their individual 
problems but will also destabilise their presumably acceptable existing regulatory forms” 
(Greer 2006: 9).
More recent EC regulatory intervention, however, has impinged on the way in which both the 
NHS and the medical profession are organised. This stems from the overall impression taken 
by the European institutions -  and the ECJ in particular -  that such systems are essentially 
economic activities. They operate within capitalist economies, adjacent to markets in goods, 
services, and labour, and those markets are the constitutional and practical core of the 
Common Market (Greer 2005a), and are therefore subject to internal market legislation. The 
Single European Act 1986, discussed in chapter 3, established the EC’s authority to legislate 
on issues of health policy connected with the internal market.
Some of the more controversial, yet unintended, outcomes of European single market 
legislation manifested in the EC health systems and their respective medical professions have 
involved the European Working Time Directive, the regulation of medical qualifications, and 
the recent ECJ rulings concerning patient mobility across different health systems. Because 
the EC has consistently left health services as a matter for national governments, the recent 
statutory controls have taken the profession by surprise:
Few health professionals anticipated how the medical landscape would be changed by 
EU legislation enshrining the right of free movement of good, services, and people. 
Fewer stills saw the massive revolution that the ’48-hour’ European Working Time 
Directive would trigger.
Richards 2007: 185.
110
The Directive represents an encroachment on the working relations of doctors, and which 
does not conform in either nature or form to the self-regulatory mode that has historically 
governed their profession. It goes beyond the parameters of new public management by 
unilaterally imposing standardised employment conditions that are supported by both civil 
and criminal sanctions, and without professional consultation at local levels. Outside the 
scope of health, the Directive represents a form of European social integration, pushed 
through by the EC institutions (Pollack 2003) upon an area of employment in the UK which 
had, up until then, no statutory restrictions on working time. The legislation embodies a third 
mode of regulation that is highly centralised, moving away from internal governance and 
national regulation to a European form of control. It follows in the wake of a general 
campaign by various EC bodies to regulate the working time of the European Community’s 
workforce. Trade union movements in the UK have attempted to achieve similar entitlements 
through collective bargaining (chapter 3). The EWTD does not, however, address the 
arguments voiced within these national and professional boundaries.
In terms of industrial relations, the situation is not wholly bleak. Proposals to amend the 
existing EWTD provisions are designed to provide a significant regulatory stimulus for 
collective negotiations over innovation in working-time arrangements, pay and productivity. 
Collective agreements and consultation underpin certain provisions relating to the 
legislation’s derogations. The Directive therefore demonstrates how dialogue and negotiation 
of employment policy and regulation can occur within the parameters of a generic piece of 
legislation. This could be a significant dynamic in the context of UK industrial relations 
given the general lack of structures promoting social dialogue in the past (Hobbs and Njoya 
2005).
On a broader scale, the EC regulatory drive has enhanced the role of industrial relations 
actors. The implementation of recent regulations under the European Employment 
Framework Directive (EFD) -  which addresses fuller participation in the labour market by 
precluding restrictions on age, religion or belief, sexual orientation or disability, and an 
extension of the existing sex and race discrimination provisions -  promotes the role of 
representative bodies and unions in ensuring collective rather than individual enforcement of 
the right to equality. Critics of such laws argue that it should not purport to change attitudes 
and behaviour because attempts to do so impose unacceptable restrictions on the freedom of
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contract and the inherent ability of the market to correct any inefficiencies caused by 
discrimination without legal intervention (Epstein 2002). Deakin (2002) argues that the 
reality is that market failures prevent such spontaneous adjustment from working, and 
therefore requires the intervention of anti-discrimination law. This is particularly the case 
with instances such as the removal of collective bargaining that occurred under the 
Conservative years and consequently gave rise to alternative sources of governance, 
including managerial prerogative (Deakin 1999). Others claim that such intervention can take 
a reflexive approach (Hobbs and Njoya 2005), not by attempting to compel people to 
abandon deeply ingrained prejudices, but by enforcing procedural safeguards against 
discriminatory treatment. In the long term, this would raise standards, encourage the 
development of equality norms, and enhance the creation of a fairer working environment.
One of the other relevant key freedoms enshrined in the EC is labour mobility, encapsulating 
freedom of movement and establishment. Such policies have as their goal make Europe one 
labour market, with no impediments to the rights of citizens, workers and professionals of the 
different countries to move back and forth to work (Greer 2005a). Directive 93/16/EEC 
facilitates the mutual recognition of medical qualifications across Europe, thus relinquishing 
some of the powers over training and licensing hitherto confined to the individual states’ self- 
governing medical professions. The latter are consequently losing considerable control over 
their ability to shape their workforce (in addition to making entry into the profession more 
accessible (Fox 2007)).
Cross-border patient mobility has also been legitimised by the ECJ. The decisions of Kohll 
and Decker permitted citizens of Luxembourg to use a health service provided by another EU 
country, and then to seek reimbursement in Luxembourg (for details see Richards 2007). The 
Court ruled that this was a right under EC law. More recently, Yvonne Watts from Bedford in 
England had a hip replacement done in France after initially being told by the NHS that she 
would have to wait a year for an operation. Having asked the NHS to pay for her costs, she 
was refused. The ECJ ruled in her favour, deeming that a year’s wait for surgery was 
“medically unacceptable” (Richards 2006). The rulings have underscored the right to free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and people, which overrides the clause (paragraph 5 of 
article 152) in the Treaty of Amsterdam that stipulates that the organisation and financing of 
health services is a national prerogative. Such decisions challenge the rationing mechanism of 
health policies in most countries, and have created a degree of legal uncertainty in this area
112
(in addition to others, such as the EWTD, for as long as the ECJ continues to exercise 
“piecemeal judicial health policymaking” (Greer 2006: 14).
European policy therefore poses risks for the dominant stakeholders in health policy. Health 
politics in the UK is usually about the contests between a few groups -  the BMA, the RCN, 
other unions, other Royal Colleges, the NHS Confederation, and above all, the Department of 
Health and central government departments. The EC further complicates the picture with its 
proliferation of diverse lobbies and interests groups, but of particular concern to the UK 
representatives is their degree of influence in Europe. Unlike the historical professional/state 
relationship, crafted by the dominance of the former and monopolised to attain distinct 
advantages in the UK labour market, doctors in Britain lack such comparable deep-rooted ties 
with the European legislature. The BMA (since 1995) and other major health services unions 
have only held a presence in Brussels with full-time officers engaged in information 
gathering and lobbying for a relatively short period. The other Royal Colleges have invested 
much less. These have inevitable ramifications for their influence over policymaking. The 
professionals must also overcome other ingrained problems. For one, professions are so 
different across Europe that they have difficulty acting in unison, and most professions are so 
strongly tied to their governments that they enter EU politics reluctantly, badly and late 
(Greenwood 2003).
The ‘Europeanisation’ of UK health systems may also affect devolved states, such as Wales, 
which are in danger of losing some considerable part of their recently acquired health powers 
(Greer 2005b). The EC can take away or seriously dilute such regional competencies. The 
EWTD is the prime example of this, where ECJ rulings are impinging on the delivery of 
medical care and the structuring of health care systems. The complex multi-level governance 
is reducing the autonomy of regional governments and their ability to be accountable to their 
populations for what happens, and adds an extra administrative complexity. Inter-state 
consistency may also be jeopardised in the UK. Devolved or centrally-made decisions might 
satisfy some but not others, which might make foregoing a common view more difficult. 
Wales, however, does benefit from longstanding European connections of its health 
policymakers. In the mid-1980s, when health policymakers in the UK were still largely 
parochial, the Welsh NHS began to develop its international links and profile through 
connections with the EC and the creation of a cadre of officials who engaged with EC and 
international circles, particularly about health issues (Greer 2006).
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Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the modes of regulation that have sought to govern the 
workplace relations in the medical profession in an attempt to illustrate three trends. First, it 
shows key interaction which links doctors’ historical forms of control to the concept of 
professionalism. Secondly, it has documented the evolving nature of state intervention on a 
profession hitherto regulated by its own internal mechanisms, and the reasons for doing so. 
These have been contextualised by discussions on the broader trends in employment 
relations. Thirdly, it has demonstrated the profession’s response towards its three central 
modes of regulation, all of which retain a simultaneous relevance to a varying extent.
Attempts to address the failure(s) associated with each mode of regulation have, with time, 
led to tighter and more centralised forms of control, and an encroachment on clinical 
autonomy and professional discretion. The existing limitations, illustrated by the state’s 
historical (and ongoing) approach to regulation, reinforce the wider problem of controlling 
the profession in the first place. On the one hand, the state failed to regulate doctors once and 
for all at both the turn of the twentieth century and midway through at the inception of the 
NHS. This has continued to haunt successive governments’ attempts to modify the delivery 
of Britain’s health care provision. On the other hand, the medical profession’s historical 
modes of regulation through self-govemance, professional autonomy and minimal state 
intervention have helped to foster opposition to the current EC law among sectors within the 
health occupations. Ideologically, the Directive represents a centrally imposed legal control 
negotiated by politico-legal bargaining which is beyond the bargaining jurisdiction of UK 
doctors. Accompanying these trends are the cultural forces which buttress the medical 
profession’s power. But, here is the puzzle: while the European Directive represents a mode 
of external regulation like none of the kind hitherto faced by the profession, it is intended to 
benefit doctors by way of improving their personal health and safety through imposing 
maximum hours at work. Will the profession adjust to the strictures of this new supranational 
legislation in the same way as it did vis-a-vis the modes of regulation implemented by the 
Conservative and New Labour governments? The Directive is not a domestic measure nor is 
it the outcome of sector-specific negotiations by the profession. Will this make a difference 
as to how doctors will respond to the legislation?
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This chapter sets the scene as part of the study’s attempt to explore this apparent tension 
between a conventional ideological standpoint on the issue of regulation, and the application 
of a beneficial, welfarist law to the work of a professional culture whose membership (and 
possibly ideas) is quickly evolving. It provides a background to the informants’ responses to 
the EWTD in the latter chapters of the thesis.
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Chapter 5
Regulating working time in the medical profession
Introduction
Drawing upon the analysis above of the attempts at regulating both the labour market and the 
medical profession, the discussions in this chapter address the sector-specific debates on the 
regulation of working time in the UK junior medical profession. The first part provides a 
detailed overview of the two co-existing forms of control which currently govern doctors’ 
working hours, namely the New Deal and the EWTD. The intervention of the ECJ is assessed 
in some detail, which sets the scene for the second part of the chapter that reviews research 
on the impact of the legislation. The regulatory effects include doctors’ health, work-life 
balance and salary, medical training, and medical staffing and services. The profession’s 
responses, particularly if supported by the study’s findings reported in the next three chapters, 
may help to explain the levels of EWTD compliance among junior doctors in the NHS.
By exploring such themes, the study attempts to provide a context within which it is possible 
to assess the impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of junior doctors. The 
debates covered by this chapter thus correspond to the third research objective and provide an 
important context for exploring the viewpoints of the study’s informants reported in the next 
chapters.
The New Deal and EWTD
Agreed in 1991 between representatives of the medical profession, NHS Management and the 
government, the New Deal is a package of measures designed to improve the conditions 
under which junior doctors work (NHS Management Executive 1991). One of its key features 
is the limit it imposes on the working hours of junior doctors, and the working arrangements 
introduced to facilitate this. By 31 December 1996, junior doctor were not permitted to work 
beyond 72 hours per week for on-call rotas, 64 hours a week for partial shifts and 56 hours a 
week for full shifts. Under a partial shift system, a doctor would work a ‘normal’ day on most 
weekdays but, at intervals (depending on the number of doctors in the rota), would work a 
different pattern, such as evening or night shifts for a fixed period of time. At times, they 
could be expected to work substantial periods out of hours. A full shift pattern, on the other
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hand, divides the working week into definitive time blocks, with doctors rotating through the 
shift pattern. These different working arrangements, including full and partial shifts to 
accompany the previous on-call rota system, were implemented in light of the New Deal 
package, with work patterns and workload intensity being critical determinants of whether 
alternative flexible working arrangements were appropriate. Limits were also set on 
maximum continuous duty hours, minimum periods off duty and between duty periods.
The New Deal was re-addressed in 1999 under the New Labour government which addressed 
shift patterns and rest requirements, together with a new pay structure in December 2000 
aimed at restoring the impetus to achieve regulatory compliance. The latter was agreed in a 
context within which junior doctors had voted to strike if the issue was not adequately 
addressed. The final agreement between the Department of Health and the BMA replaced the 
system of additional duty hours (overtime for which most junior doctors received 50% of the 
standard hourly rate of pay) with a pay-banding system for different posts, reflecting such 
criteria as the amount of working hours, work intensity and the extent of anti-social hours. 
Under the new scheme, junior doctors are entitled to a basic salary and an additional 
supplement from their employers if they work longer than the amount stipulated in their pay 
band. Failure to maintain working hours within the limits permitted by the New Deal 
therefore allows juniors to be re-banded, leaving trusts with a heavier bill, and juniors a 
substantial pay supplement worth between 20 and 100 per cent of basic pay, depending on the 
amount and intensity of the out-of-hours work they do. In total, these features became a 
contractual requirement for each hospital trust to fulfil. From 1 August 2001, it became 
unlawful for PRHOs to be working more than 56 actual hours a week, or without sufficient 
rest. The same limit has applied for all other doctors since August 2003.
Financial penalties can be imposed if NHS trusts do not comply with these requirements and 
if they fail to monitor junior doctors’ working hours. Progress, however, has been slow and 
many NHS trusts have been reluctant to face their obligations to introduce the necessary 
changes (Beecham 1999). A reciprocal duty is placed on the doctors to comply with the 
monitoring procedures. However, research carried out by the BMA (2003a) has identified 
resistance among junior doctors towards their obligations to comply with Trusts’ monitoring 
exercises. The reasons underlying their actions varied, with some arguing that the obligation 
was not contained in their contract. Others were concerned about the managers’ uses and 
aims of monitoring. Moreover, both junior doctors and Trust staff felt that monitoring was
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not an accurate reflection of their working hours. It did not, for example, account for the 
circumstances in the different specialities, nor did it consider work intensity and the quality 
of working life. In separate instances, the BMA (2003d) has also found that many doctors do 
not believe that their hours are being monitored accurately, with some being pressurised to 
under-report their working time in order to portray the impression that their work patterns are 
compliant with the Regulations. The situation has led Northop and Hearn (1998) to argue 
that monitoring time will be a particular problem in the NHS, not least because of the 
complicated shift and working arrangements that characterise the working lives of doctors.
The available research therefore suggests that both Trusts and individual junior doctors are 
not fully participating in the UK regulatory process. This has been confirmed by a series of 
surveys. In 2002, only 2% of trusts in England and Wales reported that all training posts were 
New Deal compliant, with statistical variations among different parts of the country and 
medical specialties. Wales had the poorest rates of compliance, with only 20% of junior 
doctors’ work arrangements conforming to the New Deal limits (BMA 2002). Recent 
statistical information from the Department of Health shows little improvement. Depending 
on which part of the UK, in May 2006 between 14 and 40 percent of all junior doctors were 
working more than 56 hours a week, or without adequate rest (BMA 2006a). Some of these 
figures are broken down below:
Table 1
New Deal Compliance
England 
(Sept 03)
Wales 
(Nov 03)
Northern Ireland 
(Nov 03)
Scotland 
(Aug 02)*
PRHO 92% 100% 94% 81%
SHO 85% 61% 68% 41%
SpR 80% 40% 50% 41%
Total 84% 60% 72% 50%
*Total New Deal compliance in Scotland for August 2003 was 73%; figures by grade were not 
available.
(Source: BMA 2006a)
These statistics show a corresponding analogy between New Deal compliance and the junior 
doctors’ level of seniority. It reports the PRHO group of this specific sector of the medical 
profession as the most compliant with the Regulations’ provisions, particularly in Wales. For
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all four countries, specialist registrars (SpRs) were found to be the least compliant. Wales 
was again highlighted, but this time for reporting the poorest compliance rates, which 
reduced its overall New Deal compliance below the reported levels of Scotland (its general 
compliance totalled 73% in August 2003, but figures by grade were not available), Northern 
Ireland and England. These figures suggest that while attempts to bring the work of the most 
junior members of the profession in line with the New Deal limits are generally successful, 
the conditions under which senior house officers (SHOs) and SpRs raise questions as to why 
these more senior ranks of junior doctors are unable to meet the regulatory requirements. The 
report does not allude to any reasons underpinning these trends and this study focuses on 
PRHOs, nonetheless the report is important insofar as it shows that compliance with the 
EWTD among junior doctors may be significant, given that the New Deal work-time 
requirements were stricter than the provisions contained in the Directive’s initial 
implementation phase (discussed below).
PRHOs are employees of the NHS and have historically been a mainstay of service provision 
particularly at night and weekends. These have usually been manifested through long hours at 
work (Evans et al. 2004). An EC-wide survey (COM 2003) found that doctors in training 
exceed 55 hours per week on average in the majority of Member States, although recent 
studies show that these hours are gradually falling (Scallan 2003).
Junior doctors are also subject to the working-time limits imposed by the EWTD, following 
the implementation of the Horizontal Amending Directive 2003 (HAD). The latter provides 
for an average 48-hour weekly limit for doctors in training which is to be phased in over a 
period ending on 31 July 2009. The interim periods impose a 58-hour week and a 56-hour 
week in the Augusts of 2004 and 2007, respectively. They are limited to a shift of no more 
than 13 hours, followed by a break of at least 11 hours. In comparison with the EWTD, the 
terms contained in the New Deal were stricter initially. Both stipulate a maximum of 56 hours 
per week by August 2007, and after which point the Directive’s 48-hour week will supersede 
the limits imposed by the New Deal.
Like that envisaged by the New Deal, the original intention of the European Commission was 
that working time, for the purposes of the Directive, would not include time spent resting or 
sleeping at the hospital. As the Commission noted in its implementation report, inactive time 
on-call or on standby was usually designated by Member States as falling into an
intermediate category where the employee is not carrying out work, but has to be ready to 
work if necessary (COM 2000). On this basis, such periods would not be included in the 
calculation of the maximum weekly working time and could be designated as a rest period of 
a rest break. Medical professionals believed that, as late as 1998, working time encompassed 
only activities actually carried out and excluded time spent on-call (Northrop and Hearn
1998).
The European Court of Justice has subsequently interpreted the concept differently in the 
2002 case of SIMAP4, classifying all time spent at the health centre as constituting working 
time. Thus whenever doctors are obliged to be present and available at the workplace with a 
view to providing their professional services, they are, for the purposes of the Directive, 
carrying out their duties and in fact working. The ECJ felt that any other interpretation would 
be inconsistent with the legislative requirements and the overriding health and safety 
objective of the EWTD (Para. 49):
a doctor who is required to keep himself available to his employer at the place 
determined by him for the whole duration for periods of on-call duty is subject to 
appreciably greater constraints since he has to remain apart from his family and social 
environment and has less freedom to manage the time during which his professional 
services are not required.
SIMAP. Para 65.
The decision was subsequently confirmed in the Jaegar case.5 Giving his opinion in the latter 
case, the then ECJ Advocate General, Ruiz-Jarabo stated that on-call working should be 
considered in its entirety to be working time, even where the doctor in question is permitted 
to rest and sleep during periods of inactivity. The ECJ is not bound to follow the Advocate 
General’s opinion, but it often does and did so in this case. The BMA (2004b) has welcomed 
the Court’s approach that takes account of the perspective of the individual doctor who, 
according to the Advocate General, “is separated from his family, and cannot pursue his own 
interests since he has to remain in the health centre” (Opinion, para. 37).
4 SIMAP v Conselleria de Sanidad v Consumo de La Generalidad Valenciana C-303/98.
5 Landeshaup Kiel v Jaegar C -151/02 f20031 ECR
120
These ECJ rulings therefore extend beyond the New Deal requirements in addition to what 
was anticipated from the EWTD. As a result, the BMA calculated that from August 2004, 
there would be a loss of 213, 000 working hours a week, which would be the equivalent of 
3,700 junior doctors (EIRO 2004b). In 2009, when the 48-hour week comes into force, it 
estimates that the total loss could be as high as 476, 638 hours a week or the equivalent to 9, 
900 junior doctors. The rulings had a direct effect on other countries such as France, Austria, 
Poland, Slovenia and Hungary, which traditionally did not calculate all periods of on-call 
towards the working week (Watson 2007).
The Directive’s interpretation therefore imposes a mammoth task on Member States to 
address the time spent by doctors undertaking resident on-call duties. Counter-arguments 
relating to the cost and extra difficulties of training and recruiting large numbers of doctors to 
guarantee the same level of care in order to comply with the EWTD were dismissed by the 
Court. It held that the Directive cannot be called into question by objections based on 
economic and organisational consequences because, referring to the preamble, the objective 
of improving workers’ safety and health at work is one “which should not be subordinated to 
purely economic considerations” (Para 66-67).
The Welsh Assembly government produced a report, Designed to Comply (2005b) which 
evaluated the current position in Wales with regard to its levels of compliance with the 
EWTD, following the ECJ rulings. As of September 2005, 95.5% of NHS Trusts in Wales 
had achieved compliance with the 58-hour limit imposed by the EWTD, and approximately 
29% compliance with the maximum 48-hour week to be implemented by 2009. Among its 
recommendations for improvement were the better structuring of rotas and out-of-hours care 
provision by a multi-disciplinary team, through such initiatives as the Hospital at Night; 
remodelling the medical workforce; and reconfiguring both local and national services. These 
are discussed between other proposals in the next section, which explores the perceived 
impact of the EWTD on the medical profession.
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Impact of the European Working Time Directive
The EWTD has been embraced as a package of measures which extends beyond the health 
and safety objective upon which the EWTD was passed, and is aimed at introducing broader 
changes and modernisation to the National Health Service:
The EWTD has provided an impetus for change and gives rise to the opportunity to 
redesign service delivery and improve the work/life balance for NHS staff.
North West Wales NHS Trust 2002: 22.
These themes, together with other perceived regulatory impacts, form the second part of this 
chapter. Of particular concern to the medical profession has been the primary strategy 
adopted to implement and comply with the Directive’s provisions, namely the systematic use 
of shift systems among juniors. This strategy has reduced doctors’ working hours (Scallan 
2003; Kapur and House 1998) but their discontent with these arrangements is common within 
what they claim are the knock-on effects of the legislation.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the themes most frequently voiced in the literature 
concerning the perceived impact of the EWTD. They include doctors’ health as the legislative 
basis upon which the Directive rests; the effect of working-time regulation on medical 
training; and the broader changes to medical staffing and services. These debates address the 
study’s objective to analyse the impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of 
junior doctors.
Doctors’ health
Chapter 3 discussed the health and safety rationale underpinning the EWTD, in addition to 
research that both supported and questioned the health/hours relationship. On both 
humanitarian and patient-safety grounds, the regulation of working time is arguably long 
overdue (Davies 2003; Delamonte 1990; Spurgeon and Harrington 1989). The long working 
hours associated with the medical profession often portrays the vocation as “constituting a 
lifestyle rather than an occupation” (Bates 1982: 30). Findings have shown that the majority 
of staff working in the NHS (CHI 2004), and PRHOs in particular (Evans et al. 2004) enjoy 
their jobs, and their satisfaction derives from the perception that their work is important 
insofar as it involves caring for people (Bates 1992). This is arguably one factor explaining
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the reasons why 75% of all healthcare staff work beyond their contracted working time (CHI
2004).
Various studies on the health of the medical profession (Evans et al. 2004; Hardy et al. 1997; 
Caplan 1994; and, for other NHS staff, see CHI 2004) have illustrated the damaging effects 
of working long hours. They have found higher levels of fatigue and stress among doctors in 
comparison with the general population. Furthermore, doctors have been recorded as having 
experienced more instances of psychiatric care, depression, drug dependency and alcoholism 
than members of the same socio-economic group (Cartwright et al. 2002; Moss et al. 1996; 
Firth-Cozens 1987; Firth 1986). Among these doctors, numerous studies have shown that it is 
PRHOs who, as the most junior members of the profession, report the highest levels of 
mental and physical ill health (Kapur et al. 1999; Grainger and Harries 1995; Dillner 1993; 
Reuben 1992; Hale and Hudson 1992; Morrice 1984; Valko and Clayton 1975). These 
findings accord with studies on doctors which argue that job-related pressures decrease with 
age (Kirkaldy et al. 2002; Burke and Richardsen 1990; Linn et al. 1985); however Ahmed- 
Little (2007) points to the detrimental impact of shift work on senior doctors. Firth-Cozens 
(1987), for example, argues that the negative impacts of medical work diminish with age, 
seniority and experience, and the first postgraduate year remains the riskiest one of all.
Similar to those general studies reported in chapter 3, the working environment also has 
moderating effects in the complex working hours and health relationship. The type of work 
undertaken by doctors is of a challenging nature, often requiring social, physical and highly 
cognitive skills. Junior doctors are on a very demanding learning curve, are required to 
establish effective working relationships with both patients and colleagues, and must deal 
with the complexity of the modem hospital administration from an early vocational stage 
(Kirkaldy et al. 2002; McKee and Black 1992; Bates 1982). Burke and Richardsen (1990) 
correlated high workload, economic problems and family concerns with poor health among 
young doctors. Such factors fall outside the European Directive’s ambit, and give rise to the 
argument that its impact will be, to a certain extent, diluted until the extra work conditions are 
addressed. The responsibility for addressing this environment falls with the Member State, 
the profession and hospital managers rather than with the EC.
Despite the high reporting of adverse health conditions among doctors, evidence points to 
their reluctance to consult an occupational health service or a similar independent medical
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practitioner (Forsythe et al. 1999; Baldwin et al. 1991b', McKee and Black 1992). This 
phenomenon is arguably a result of the traditional ‘culture’ within which doctors work, that 
assumes they are ‘immune’ to poor health (Cassidy and Griffiths 2004). By virtue of the 
Article under which it was passed, the EWTD explicitly attempts to address such poor health 
within the EC labour market by reducing working hours. However, doctors’ continued long 
hours, illustrated by their non-compliance with the New Deal, gives rise to three paradoxical 
situations. The first relates to the way in which professionals dispensing with medical 
services are themselves experiencing poor health (Firth-Cozens 1987). Secondly, while shift 
work has reduced the working time of many doctors in line with the EWTD’s requirement, it 
has, for some, intensified the existing workload by insisting that the same amount of work 
must still be completed within a shorter period (Ahmed-Little 2007). The implementation of 
shift systems in light of a health and safety directive has therefore led to increased stress 
(Barton and Folkard 1995; Cole et al. 1990), fatigue and poor performance (Ahmed-Little 
2007), and psychological morbidity among house officers (Kapur and House 1997). The third 
paradox relates to the health and safety of the patients treated by these doctors. Some findings 
have strongly correlated intense shift patterns with medical errors (Shabbir et al. 2005; 
Mather and Pounder 2004; Paice and Reid 2004; Dula et al. 2001; Petersen et al. 1994), 
particularly among house officers (Houston and Allt 1997).
As a result, we are faced with a European Directive that attempts to address the health and 
safety of both doctors and their patients on the one hand, and the widespread implementation 
of shift systems to achieve regulatory compliance which is posing a health risk, on the other. 
Errors are not confined to doctors alone either. In one major recent survey, 47% of NHS staff 
reported having seen at least one error that could have hurt either staff or patients in the 
previous month (CHI 2004). Caution should be taken in interpreting these findings as the 
relationship between shifts and errors is not conclusive (Harrington 1994; Rosa et al. 1989; 
Butterfield 1988; Poulton et al. 1978; Wilkinson et al. 1975). Other factors also play a role, 
such as fewer doctors being on duty at any given time and the potential problems of accessing 
specialist expertise in the event of an unanticipated emergency. Discussions surrounding 
medical staffing are discussed below.
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Doctors’ work-life balance and salary
The wide implementation of shift work among junior doctors has afforded more doctors with 
a greater opportunity to apply for flexible, part-time and family-friendly working 
arrangements (Scallan 2003; Vassallo et al. 1992; Nasmyth et al. 1991; Wilkinson et al. 
1975). Other studies, however, have found that shift work has not necessarily improved 
doctors’ quality of life (Allen 2005). For example, night work has been seen as particularly 
disruptive on home and social life (Sim et al. 2004; Paice and Reid 2004; Mather 2002a; 
Baldwin et al. 1997c). The effects are being realised now with research identifying low job 
satisfaction and high staff turnover at a time critical to achieve EWTD compliance (CHI
2004). From a sample of 1, 326 of junior doctors, 48% said they would either leave the UK or 
medicine altogether (Moss et al. 2004). The BMA has also been promoting a ‘retainer and 
returner’ scheme that assists those doctors who might otherwise leave medicine altogether 
because of family or other commitments. One such policy is the assistance provided to NHS 
students who must bear childcare costs during their studies (TUC 2004b). In a bid to recruit 
and retain professionals who have extra commitments, mature students, single parents and 
those with partners on a low wage, the £17 million fund is anticipated to benefit 
approximately 6,000 students a year which will cover up to 85% of their childcare costs.
Resistance to the Directive may have been fuelled by some doctors’ concerns over the effect 
of shorter working hours under the shift system on their salaries. The prospect of flexible 
training and obtaining a better work-life balance is not conceived as a priority for all (Allen 
1994). Reasonable reductions in pay are generally lawful to take account of the diminution in 
working hours (DTI 1996). As discussed above, junior doctors’ out-of-hours work was 
conventionally remunerated according to a banding scheme based on the expected intensity 
of their workload during ‘additional duty hours’ (ADHs). The busiest posts (allocated to class 
one) were remunerated at the normal hourly rate of pay, while the majority of PRHO posts 
were categorised as class three and paid at 50% of the basic rate (BMA 1999).
The revised pay structure was agreed in a context within which junior doctors had voted to 
strike if the issue was not adequately addressed. The final agreement between the Department 
of Health and the BMA replaced the system of additional duty hours (overtime for which 
most junior doctors received 50% of the standard hourly rate of pay) with a pay-banding 
system for different posts reflecting such criteria as the amount of working hours, work
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intensity and the extent of anti-social hours (BMA 2002). Under the scheme, junior doctors 
are entitled to a basic salary and an additional supplement of up to twice the basic rate from 
their employers if they work longer than the amount stipulated in their pay band. Failure to 
maintain working hours within the limits permitted by the New Deal therefore allows juniors 
to be re-banded, and penalising Trusts with a heavier financial burden, and juniors obtaining 
a substantial pay supplement worth between 20 and 100 per cent of basic pay, depending on 
the amount and intensity of the out-of-hours work they do.
A monitoring exercise in 2003 indicated that up to 30% of junior doctors contracts in the 
surgery speciality attracted the full pay supplement because they were working above the 56- 
hour weekly limit (EIRO 2004b). Moreover, this limit did not include the estimated 32 hours 
of time that junior doctors were resident at hospitals while on-call, which is now calculated as 
part of the working week under the EWTD’s interpretation. Professional opposition to the 
regulation may therefore be shaped by a degree of self-interest in the form of a reduced salary 
in line with fewer working hours.
Medical training
The career progression from medical school to consultant grade currently takes between 12V^  
and 18 years. At the time of writing, the table below shows the typical structure in hospital- 
based medical careers:
Table 2
Medical training programme
Steps Time period Options Requirements
Medical school 
entrant
A Levels and 
places
Medical school 
graduate
5-6 years School drop out, or 
exam failure, or 
choose another 
career, or progress 
to PRHO
Formal education, 
practical work and 
adequate degree
PRHO Post 1 year A degree and a
‘College’
acceptance
SHO 2-5 years Non-medical work 
or progress to SpR
Approval by a 
‘College Dean’, 
mentoring, 
direction, training, 
clinical experience
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and research
Specialist Registrar 
(SpR)
Staff doctor, other 
medical work or 
progress
An appropriate CV
Obtain 
qualification 
(Certificate of 
Completion of 
Specialist Training, 
CCST)
4.5 -  6 years
Consultant Total 12.5-18 years Non-consultant 
career grade or GP
A CCST and a post
(Source: Compiled by author, 2007)
The PRHO programme, which is a local application process, mostly paper-based, with 
regional variations, has now been replaced by the first year of the Foundation Programme. 
This is a national application process, mostly electronic, with all foundation schools and 
deaneries adhering to a set timeline, common scoring guidelines, and national personal 
specification. Upon successful completion of Foundation Year 1, doctors will then generally 
progress into Foundation Year 2 (or the equivalent SHO year under the older process).
The 1950 Medical Act introduced a system whereby every qualified doctor must spend a 
period known as the pre-registration year as a resident house officer in an approved hospital 
before being fully registered with the General Medical Council. The year aims to enable them 
to apply the key skills and knowledge gained during their undergraduate training and, on 
completing the necessary clinical training, to demonstrate their readiness to accept 
responsibilities of a fully registered doctor and to begin specialist training (GMC 1997). It is 
spent gaining basic experience in hospital specialties and, since 1998, time in general practice 
(GMC 1998). The PRHO year therefore encompasses a mix of both service and training, 
though in reality the two are inextricably linked.
The EWTD’s reduction in working time means that the existing system of medical training 
must be addressed. For many, as a result of the apprenticeship-like method of medical 
training, less time spent at hospital translates into reduced clinical exposure and fewer 
opportunities to experience procedures (Williams and Cantillon 2000; Sim et al. 2004). The 
Directive is therefore perceived by some as a measure depriving medical graduates of their 
opportunity to spend more time at the hospital (Alkhulaifi et al. 1995). Some doctors 
consequently claim that regulation is lengthening their period of training (Gillard et al. 1993)
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while others express concern as to the EWTD’s long-term impact, in terms of reduced 
clinical exposure on their confidence to practice (Devey 2005) and subsequent career 
progression (Kapur and House 1998), giving rise to the claim that trainee doctors will need to 
gain relevant experience more efficiently or spend a longer period training (Marron et al.
2005). Such arguments are supported by the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS), which has 
calculated that, by convention, junior doctors require some 30,000 hours’ exposure at work 
before achieving consultant grade (Phillip et al. 2003). With the new changes to the system 
this figure is set to fall to between 6000 and 8000 (Godlee et al. 2005). It is from this point of 
view that some of the literature predicts greater clinical inexperience among those at 
consultant grade in the future:
Nothing will account for the experience gained from high exposure to a wide variety 
of different conditions. In medicine, not all cases are straightforward, and the ability 
to deal with unusual and often unpredictable situations are best enhanced with time.
Shabbir et a l  2005:728.
The substitution of monolithic shift patterns for the previous on-call arrangements has 
therefore been perceived as damaging junior doctors’ experience and clinical exposure, by 
rigidly confining their working time to prescribed periods of the day. This has been viewed as 
negatively affecting their training (Baldwin et al. 1997; McKee and Black 1992). Estimates 
of the decrease in training hours are as high as 79% in the case of trainee surgeons (Chesser 
et al. 2002). Even preceding the Directive, the surgical trainee struggled to obtain adequate 
operative experience (Williams and Cantillon 2000). The reduction in hours is therefore 
viewed by some as exacerbating an already unsatisfactory situation:
The reduction in junior doctors’ hours does not satisfy trainee surgeons’ need for 
operative experience and abolishes the continuity of care many other professionals 
work long hours. It is time that the senate of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons said no 
to Europe’s directives.
Scott-Coombes 2002: 736.
The commentary therefore suggests that the issue is better dealt with at a sector-specific 
level. Resistance towards the EC regulation echoes the profession’s recent discontent with the 
increased managerial and statutory regulation discussed in chapter 4. Self-regulation
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therefore continues to be voiced as the most appropriate medium for addressing such 
fundamental employment terms as working time, despite evidence of non-compliance with 
the New Deal as negotiated by doctors’ representatives.
The literature extensively documents concerns by both junior and senior doctors vis-a-vis the 
reduced training time under the EWTD regime, but their claims have been fuelled by the 
assumption that the amount of exposure equates to the quantity and quality of medical 
training (Scallan 2003). Lending credence to such anxieties is the expectation among some 
medical specialities, such as surgery, that juniors must carry out a minimum caseload. 
Aspects of their medical competence are therefore judged by a quantitative caseload. Some 
research has found that trainees are, for the first time, failing to achieve the currently 
recommended case numbers, and this pattern has been attributable to the implementation of 
the EWTD (White et al. 2005).
The longstanding tension between junior doctors’ training and service (that is, the work for 
which they are employed by the Trusts to do) is exacerbating the situation. The literature 
acknowledges the conflict between the two aspects of the juniors’ work, and largely concurs 
with the view that more often than not the former takes priority over the latter (Scallan 2003; 
North West Wales NHS Trust 2002; Paice 1998; Panayiotou and Fotherby 1996; Gillard et 
al. 1993; Leslie et al. 1990; Dally et al. 1984). Furthermore, evidence shows that the time 
spent actually undertaking ‘service’ is not effectively utilised. Many of the tasks assigned to 
junior doctors are still perceived as having very little or no educational value. These would 
include significant amounts of time (as much as one-fifth of PRHO time according to Bogg et 
al. 2001) engaged in inappropriate clerical activities such as filing, dealing with forms and 
finding beds (Lambert et al. 2000; Wilton 1995; McKee and Black 1992; Leslie et al. 1990). 
Of the junior doctors in their study, Lambert et al. (2000) found that 80% felt they were 
performing routine work that did not require a medical qualification. In 1995, the Audit 
Commission reported that while routine tasks were a necessary part of the job, it was 
inappropriate for trainees to spend a considerable proportion of time undertaking them (Audit 
Commission 1995). Evidence suggests that this impinges on juniors’ health and job 
satisfaction (Scallan 2003; Gillard et al. 1993; Spurgeon and Harrington 1989), and Goldacre 
et al. (1999) found that 9% (out of 2,926 respondents) were considering leaving medicine as 
a result of these trends.
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Concerns over medical training and service have therefore prompted calls for a better 
structured working environment within which junior doctors work (Schuwirth and van der 
Vleuten 2006). These approaches may, in turn, offset the impact of their reduced hours 
(Marron et al. 2005; White et al. 2005). While there is a shift away from a quantifiable 
assessment criterion towards a competence-based model, some specialities, and surgery in 
particular, continue to demand an element of case numbers (Sim et al. 2004). Teaching 
methods should be adapted to include the use of simulators (for example, latex models of 
organs), anaesthetised animals (for laparoscopic and endovascular procures), or computer 
generated virtual reality (for example, laparoscopy, endoscopy). Undertaking more work 
outside the typical working day, obtaining supervision and detailed feedback, and carrying 
out tasks which are clinically suitable for their service/training are ways of elevating both 
training opportunities and quality. Suggestions like these, however, can only be accompanied 
by changes in cultural attitudes:
A move to shift working without a change in the culture of training and the instigation
of innovative working patterns is likely to have a negative impact on training.
Paice and Reid 2004: 336.
The medical profession must therefore adapt in line with the environment created by the 
regulatory requirements. This will extend beyond a mere change in their teaching methods 
and assessment criteria to a broader outlook on how training should be delivered and the role 
of service played under the new regime.
Another challenge to the longstanding rigidity of full-time medical training is being brought 
about by the increasing number of junior doctors choosing to train on a less than full-time 
basis, under which they are required to work a minimum 50% of the equivalent full-time 
training programme over a two-year period (Williams and Cantillon 2000; Goldacre et al.
1999). The literature commonly refers to this programme as flexible training (BMA 2004e). 
Its demand has increased in line with the number of female medical graduates (Schofield
2005) and female doctors who now account for 35% of the medical workforce (Department 
of Health 2004). Given the broader trends in the UK labour market (Millard and Machin 
2007; and see chapter 3), it is likely that many women will want to both work and train part- 
time (Fox 2007). In the UK, however, only some doctors are considered eligible for flexible 
or part-time training. They include those with a disability, those with childcare
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responsibilities, and responsibilities for a disabled relative (Goldberg and Maingay 1997). 
However, there are very few opportunities to train part-time, and findings show that junior 
doctors are consequently abandoning the profession as a result of this inflexibility (BMA 
2004c). The CHI (2004) similarly found that 34% of all health-care workers often thought 
about leaving the NHS as a result of the way in which working time was organised.
However, research shows that flexible training is negatively perceived by many within the 
profession (Allen 2005; Allen 1994). Many of the juniors claim that the two-year period is 
too lengthy, less interesting and detrimental to the quality of training and career progression. 
It is also thought that certain specialities are unsuitable for part-time training. In spite of these 
findings, half the UK’s 39,000 junior doctors would like to work part-time, many of whom 
are men (Schofield and Schofield 2005; TUC 2003b; Grant et al. 1990), although a number 
of NHS trusts are reluctant to fund them (EOR 2003; BMA 2001). This phenomenon is 
fuelling a concern particularly as the number of female medical undergraduates and doctors is 
rising (Goldberg and Buckley 2000). Given their family aspirations, together with an 
increased demand among men for flexible working (Goldberg and Buckley 1998), the 
organisation of working time in medicine is likely to be addressed sooner rather than later 
(Allen 2005). For example, research shows that the speciality of surgery does not appeal to 
many women given its tradition of long working hours and consequent incompatibility with 
family life (William and Cantillon 2000).
Medical staffing and services
Discussions surrounding the impact of the EWTD have highlighted the additional pressure it 
will exert on a national health system that already faces existing difficult questions on 
medical staffing and services. The issue of staffing numbers is considered first, with a second 
section later focusing on reallocating of both clinical and non-clinical work.
S ta ff numbers
The number of all doctors employed by the NHS has steadily risen from 80, 064 in 1995, to 
114, 470 in 2005 (NHS Workforce Statistics 2006b). Of these, the number of doctors in 
training has increased from 16, 523 to 25, 981 in the same period. The challenge posed by the 
EWTD’s maximum working-time provisions, as of August 2004, is that there will be a loss of 
some 123,000 working hours in the medial profession, which equates to 3,700 junior doctors
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(BMA 2004d). Progression towards the stricter 48-hour limit is estimated to cause a further 
loss in junior doctor cover of between 208,296 and 476,638 hours, which is the equivalent to 
between 4,300 and 9,900 junior doctors. The permanent working group has calculated that an 
extra 6727 doctors are required -  an increase of 21% - if compliance with the Directive’s 
maximum weekly hours is a realistic prospect (CPC 2003; Hellawell et al. 2005; Molloy 
2003; Hunter 1991).
The reduction in hours therefore dramatically reduces the availability of doctors, and has 
sparked debates about staff recruitment and retention (Pickersgill 2001). In the long term, an 
expansion in the number of medical students, an increase in training of these numbers, and 
the recruitment of more consultants would facilitate the implementation of the EWTD, while 
maintaining care at the appropriate standard. The short-term strategies have been to identify 
how the work carried out by junior doctors can be properly redistributed among other 
healthcare staff in tandem with the universal introduction of shift patterns (Morran et al. 
2005).
The allocation of extra places at medical schools across the UK provided an additional 500 
doctors in training in 2005 and this number is set to increase to between a further 500 and 
1000 per annum up to 2009 (Guardian, 18/03/2004). Although this strategy was to initially 
increase the number of doctors working in the NHS, its effect will be largely absorbed by the 
EWTD requirements (CPC 2003). Despite the ongoing recruitment, the NHS faces other 
difficulties owing to its structure of healthcare and medical provision. As a consultant-led 
service, 50% of all clinical services are provided by consultants and the remaining 50% by 
doctors in training. In addition to their clinical services, consultants are required to supervise 
junior doctors, and many also undertake teaching responsibilities at medical school. Current 
trends show that the proportion of time that they allocate to providing clinical services has 
declined, and this is scheduled to continue with the recruitment of more junior doctors who 
themselves demand the time of their seniors (Pickersgill 2001; Baldwin 1997a).
Over the past decade, the number of consultants per junior doctor has risen from 0.65 to 0.7 
(CPC 2003). It is uncertain what impact the EWTD will have on this ratio but it is clear that 
the recruitment of junior doctors alone is inadequate. New Labour has sought to expand the 
number of consultants currently working in the NHS (Department of Health 2003a), but the 
system continues to be under pressure (Frauenfelder 2006; DDRB 2006). Alongside the issue
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of medical recruitment, one should not lose sight of the importance regarding the recruitment 
and retention of existing healthcare staff who support doctors. This is a matter discussed 
below.
Among other difficulties facing the regulation of NHS doctors is the funding of this service. 
It is effectively 100 per cent public sector, and providing substantial alternative private care is 
not easily achievable. Medical schools also currently operate at full capacity so that 
throughput of graduates cannot be increased without expansion. Overall, the ‘home’ 
recruitment of more doctors may not therefore be the best solution (MacDonald 2003; Thorpe
2002). This has fuelled the debate on employing European and overseas doctors to alleviate 
some of the more immediate staffing problems in the NHS resulting from the juniors’ 
reduced hours (Fox 2007). For policymakers, the use of the overseas doctors also has the key 
advantage of avoiding the perverse incentive of ‘rewarding’ consultants for undertaking 
private sector ‘initiative lists’ on NHS patients with long waiting times (Rosen 2002). 
Recruiting foreign doctors also offers a quick solution to increasing the number of senior 
clinicians while addressing patient waiting times.
Implementation, however, is slow, and this is partly attributable to professional opposition 
among doctors in the UK. Some of these concerns stem from the consultants’ desires to 
protect private practice (Rogers and Carr-Brown 2002). Fox (2007) argues that the GMC and 
the Royal Colleges try to insulate the UK labour market from the external market, and 
immigration law is used to control entry from overseas (that is, non-European), thereby 
controlling the supply of medical providers. The state plays a similar role by funding only a 
certain number of university medical places. He argues for the need to recruit them to address 
the short- and medium-term demand but acknowledges the ethical dilemma in draining poor 
countries in Africa of their trained staff. There is some trepidation over the training standards 
of migrant doctors who have failed to be employed elsewhere, and who may have gained 
their only experience through free practice (Bearley 1991). Some overseas medical graduates 
have consequently failed to gain access to some aspects of hospital medicine (Hale and 
Hudson 1992). There is also evidence to suggest that foreign doctors are themselves reluctant 
to practice in the UK owing to their comparatively poorer pay and conditions in the NHS 
(Miles et al. 2002).
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In response to the staffing issues, proposals have encompassed the combination of split sites 
with the consequential closure of smaller units to provide a centralised cover for out-of-hours 
services (Hellawell et al. 2005; North West Wales NHS Trust 2002). This prospect is 
particularly the case for smaller and rural Trusts where the EWTD requirements require that 
staff are spread thinly, sometimes across larger geographical areas. The strains posed by 
regulation on such areas are reflected in the compliance statistics. In 2002, one study reported 
that UK compliance with the New Deal was at its lowest in rural Wales with only 20% 
meeting the Regulation’s demands (Gould 2002). As a result, investment has gone into more 
innovative ways of providing care from ‘centralised hospital points’. These methods include 
the use of IT and technology, such as telemedicine, which reduces the need for doctors to be 
physically available at peripheral sites or smaller units. Video conferencing for some 
meetings and even training sessions are equally being utilised to reduce doctors’ travelling 
time across long distances in the more rural trusts (North West Wales Trust 2002). These 
developments, however, do not accord with the New Labour’s commitment to the local 
provision of NHS Services (Sim et al. 2004).
The reduction in doctors’ hours and consequent services has, according to the Royal College 
of Physicians, meant that one in five hospitals will be hard-pressed to provide adequate 
emergency services (Edwards 2003; Economist 2003b). A 22% decrease in the number of 
patient cases and a 14% decrease in the number of weekly operating lists were found among 
senior house officers in anaesthetics (Sim et al. 2004). Since the implementation of the 
EWTD, the mean number of operating lists has decreased for certain specialities by as much 
as 13% (White et al. 2005). Sim et al. (2004) and Tomlinson (2005) similarly found a 17% 
and 20% decrease, respectively. The impacts are greater in hospitals with fewer trainees who 
work a more frequent rota. There is considerable variation, too, among specialities. Figures 
for operating experience among surgical trainees, for example, show a 20%-70% decrease 
after the introduction of new working patterns (Chikwe et al. 2004; Newman 2005).
Reallocation of tasks
Other approaches towards performing the work junior doctors are unable to do during their 
time at the hospital have looked towards the re-assignment and delegation of tasks to the 
existing health workforce. In addition to the variable views among juniors regarding their 
service requirements (Scallan 2003), the BMA has recommended in the light of both the 
EWTD weekly working hours and current medical staffing levels the better use of
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experienced nurse to perform those tasks hitherto confined to the medical profession (BMA
2003).
The provision of care by non-medical professionals has been the subject of much research in 
light of the EWTD’s maximum working week for junior doctors. In August 2005 the NHS 
National Workforce Projects (NWP) was awarded the contract to support the NHS in 
developing and implementing practical solutions to achieve compliance with the Directive’s 
requirements. It aims to support NHS organisations achieve their workforce objectives and 
focus on particular needs and challenges that the NHS has identified to ensure practical 
implementation of the Regulations. Working alongside a range of organisations including the 
Department of Health and NHS representatives, the Medical and Nursing Royal Colleges, 
Junior Doctors, unions, National Patient Safety Agency, Modernizing Medical Careers, NHS 
Trusts, the GMC and NHS Employers, the NWP among other strategies explores ways in 
which current roles can be adapted through various projects (NWP 2005). It follows the work 
of the government’s Modernisation Agency. Established in 2001, the Agency has conducted 
various pilots across a spread of NHS Trusts and medical specialities to seek the most 
feasible and appropriate means of implementing the EWTD. The pilots focused on a variety 
of work arrangements, including the use of existing and new non-medical staff (such as 
pharmacy technicians and physicians’ assistants) and the extension of healthcare roles to 
conduct responsibilities hitherto confined to medical doctors. The government provided 
£46m to assist Trusts to implement the EWTD, and more than £5m was allocated to the 19 
pilot sites (Department of Health 2003b).
Recent case studies carried out by NWP include looking at ways to reduce the need for junior 
doctors’ presence. They have explored the role of IT to improve handover procedures 
between medical teams, the introduction of new roles, such as Health Care Professionals, and 
the reduction in the number of overnight rotas during which junior doctors are expected to 
reside at the hospital. As such time spent resting and sleeping falls within the ambit of what 
constitutes working time according to the ECJ rulings, this is an attempt to moderate the 
number of doctors present at the hospital at the quieter times of the day. Time has been spent 
looking at the possibility of merging different tiers of doctors to determine whether using 
more than one grade of doctor on a rota is enough to provide the necessary levels of care 
(Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 2004; Department of Health 2003d). Cross-cover 
arrangements have been developed, integrating several rotas, so that doctors may cover one
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specialty in the day, one or two in the evenings and weekends, and several at night. Doctors 
will therefore become generic medical staff at night practicing general skills, but will carry 
out work specific to their specialty in the daytime (Department of Health 2004). This is 
designed to give non-medical practitioners responsibilities hitherto confined to doctors in 
training. Doctors in training may still need to provide out-of-hours cover to meet their 
training needs, but could do so alongside other practitioners.
One significant concept is the Hospital at Night initiative (HAN). It was not designed to deal 
with the EWTD, but is clearly relevant to the current discussions. It aims to redefine how 
medical cover is provided in hospitals during the out-of-hours period. The programme entails 
a move from cover requirements defined by professional demarcation and grade, to that 
defined by both competency and which is most appropriate to the service demands. Tasks 
could therefore be done by more suitable staff as part of a multi-disciplinary team, thus fully 
utilising junior doctors in what is claimed is an appropriate manner (Department of Health
2004). The initiative will change work practices insofar as it will release significant amounts 
of medical staff time. Doctors will also work as part of a multidisciplinary team comprising 
other professionals in healthcare during the night periods. Some specialities, notably 
anaesthetics, obstetrics and paediatrics, require medical skills which can not readily be 
provided by other staff, and for them other arrangements have to be made. In many of NWP’s 
cases, this involved dispensing with the services of relatively unskilled PRHOs at night, thus 
ensuring compatibility with the EWTD, while increasing the number of experienced junior 
doctors. The BMA has confirmed the effectiveness of the HAN model in reducing the need 
for such employing high numbers of doctors during these periods (NWP 2005).
The HAN is similar to the concept of the Out-of-Hours Medical Team (OoHMT) (Academy 
of Medical Royal Colleges 2004). Like HAN, the OoHMT aims to provide the necessary 
quality of care while optimising the efficient use of medical staff. The multidisciplinary team 
would attend and assess patients with acute deterioration of health at night. This represents a 
further move to team-working and flexibility across various specialities, utilising sufficiently 
competent staff. The development of multi-professionalism, building on the gradual 
expansion of senior medical and allied health professional numbers, has commenced 
alongside a vision to modernise working practices in line with the EWTD (Department of 
Health 2003c). Consideration has also been given to the configuration and rationalisation of 
health services in light of the EWTD’s implementation (Academy of Royal Medical Colleges
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2004). Practical solutions involve hospitals within a locality effectively collaborating to 
provide suitable out-of-hours medical cover between different sites. In secondary care, for 
example, nurses have already taken on the responsibility for coordinating a range of services 
that include outpatients’ clinics, minor injury services, and cardiology day care (Lissauer 
2002).
Such an integrated approach towards providing medical and healthcare has therefore seen the 
gradual disintegration of the conventional consultants’ medical team or ‘firm’ (which 
comprised a consultant, middle grade support, one or more SHOs and a PRHO). Pre- 
Registration House officers arguably no longer feel part of a team because they can work at 
times for up to ten consultants (Vassallo et al. 1992):
Junior doctors now operate a shift system, and leave hospital as promptly as any 
bureaucrat leaves his office, in mid-crisis if the clock so dictates. The aim of each 
shift is now to keep the patient alive until the next shift takes over, when he ceases to 
be the departing doctor’s responsibility.
Dalrymple 2003: 15.
Representing the profession’s concerns, Mather (2002b) argues that shift systems have 
infused a ‘clock-watching mentality, lack of ownership and responsibility and a short-term 
attitude to patient care, coupled with a lack of team spirit, which is affecting doctors’ overall 
morale and job satisfaction. As a consequence of this perception, the recruitment of junior 
doctors in certain specialities has been adversely affected (Hellawell et al. 2005) and some 
hospitals have received fewer applications for training posts after their implementation of 
shift systems (Kapur and House 1998). It seems, however, that evidence of widespread 
resistance to shift patterns depends on the training grade and medical speciality (Aitken and 
Paice 2003).
Compliance with the EWTD will necessitate the need to move further away from the ‘firm’ 
as it is no longer feasible to depend on the prolonged presence of junior doctors at the 
hospital. A shift towards multi-professional teams nevertheless goes some way in addressing 
this. It also promotes inclusive working practices which utilise the skills of all staff (North 
West Wales NHS Trust 2002), while ensuring reduced hours for junior doctors (Dash and 
Jones 1995). The ‘healthcare team’ arguably turns previous “confrontation between doctors
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and nurses into a more fruitful dialogue about shared care” (Devadas 2001: 939). Some 
members of the medical profession, however, have voiced their anxieties about adopting this 
strategy (Doyal and Cameron 2000). Implementing it will require careful planning:
Doctors and nurses have separate roles in a team, and for very good reasons. Nurses 
and doctors are not synonymous, and increasing skill mix does not mean that we can 
just appoint ‘consultant nurses’ and the European Working Time Directive will 
magically work. Skill mix means finding the best way to use your team resources in 
delivering care -  not just giving tasks currently done by junior doctors to nurses.
Thorpe 2002: 67.
Delegating and redistributing tasks is a sensitive issue, and one that can provoke tensions 
between the different professionals in the NHS. Kneebone and Darzi (2005) found that some 
junior doctors feared a diminution in training opportunities as a result, and perceived the 
changes as a threat to established lines of clinical responsibility. The University of London’s 
report (1991), for example, identified some offence caused towards nurses who were 
requested to assume the menial tasks that doctors perceived as being a waste of their valuable 
time. Shabbir et al. (2005) also found instances of professional opposition to the extension of 
roles hitherto confined to medically-qualified personnel:
The problem is the middle of the night you have to have someone to make the 
decisions, and that is what you’ve trained doctors for. You need people with the skills 
to take in a lot of complex information and make diagnoses.
Edwards 2003: 24.
Implementing such a strategy will require the collaboration of all professions to ensure that 
staff competency and training is readily available. It should not, however, be discarded 
merely based on the idea that because it is by convention a ‘medical’ task, then it should not 
be re-distributed to another worker. While there is a perceived need to accelerate the skill mix 
of staff, it is nevertheless important to define what is both appropriate and adequate according 
to each individual role (Davies 2003). In particular, tasks should only be undertaken by 
individuals competent and trained to perform them with clear protocols and guidelines in 
place for how and when decisions are to be made within the scope of defined professional 
practice (North West Wales NHS Trust 2002). Extended roles therefore require significant
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investment, but this approach is hoped to improve patient care in the long term (Shabbir et a l
2005) through an integrated approach to the delivery of care (Devadas 2001).
In addition to the development of existing staff roles, the NHS has created new roles to ease 
the pressures on the current medical and healthcare professions. The use of non-medical 
anaesthetists (Sim et al. 2004) together with advanced nurse practitioners (Hellawell et al.
2005) and physician assistants have helped to achieve a reduction of junior doctors’ time and 
work intensity. This policy has by and large helped to secure New Deal compliance (North 
West Wales NHS Trust 2002). Phlebotomists have been introduced into the NHS to take 
patient blood samples while radiographers have undertaken extended roles in X-Ray, such as 
ultrasound, appendicular trauma reporting and IV injections for specific procedures in 
scanning. These are again tasks hitherto restricted to medical doctors. Trusts are seeing the 
benefit of adopting a broader view in assessing whether tasks and roles such as these can be 
done by someone else other than junior doctors (North West Wales NHS Trust 2002). The 
emphasis is placed on maximising clinical time corresponding with the removal of 
administrative tasks from both nursing and junior medical staff. Non-clinical and 
administrative duties should be dealt with by other personnel more appropriately suited to 
those responsibilities particularly as such tasks do not contribute to the junior doctor’s 
training (University of London 1991; Leslie et al. 1990).
Conclusion
Given the nature of their professional roles, the long hours associated with their work, and the 
underlying rationale of the Directive, one would assume that doctors would welcome 
regulation on working hours. After all, the maximum working week is intended for their 
benefit by way of promoting better health and quality of life. The importance it attaches to 
the protection of NHS users by ensuring that they are not treated by exhausted doctors also 
conforms to the professional ethos of serving the patients’ best interests. Why, then, is the 
regulation so controversial? The chapter has attempted to set out this puzzle by looking at its 
different facets to acquire an understanding of the outlook from which doctors argue for and 
against the legislation’s form and content. Debates in the previous chapter surrounding the 
profession’s ideological opposition to the EC legislation -  on the basis that the Directive 
represents a highly centralised mode of regulation which is beyond the conventionally 
confined bargaining jurisdiction of doctors -  is matched in these discussions with an equal
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resistance to the application of the EWTD, for its perceived failure to take account of the 
unique working demands of medical practice, such as training, staffing and service provision.
The questions which remain to be answered are whether such views are supported by this 
study’s findings. How are the political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of 
working time explored this far manifested in the medical, political and judicial spheres? How 
has the EWTD been implemented and enforced in practice, and has this shaped resistance or 
support for the regulation? And, are the issued raised in this chapter about the Directive’s 
impact echoed among junior doctors currently undertaking their training?
In line with the broad aim to analyse the process and impact of legal regulation on working 
conditions in UK labour markets, with specific reference to the EWTD and its impact on the 
junior medical profession, the next three chapters report the study’s findings. In turn, they 
analyse the views of elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates surrounding the 
regulation of working time. They then examine critically the ways in which the EWTD has 
been implemented and enforced in practice. These themes, once further developed, will 
explore the sources of support and resistance to such processes. Finally, I analyse the 
apparent impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of junior doctors.
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Chapter 6 
The Debate about Regulation
Introduction
This chapter is the first of three which present the research findings. It explores the 
perceptions of elite groups on the issue of working-time regulation, with specific reference to 
the EWTD, drawing upon qualitative data gathered from interviews with policymakers, 
medical service providers, and the judiciary. It draws upon the literature in chapter 4 by 
highlighting the problem of regulating doctors in light of their historical modes of regulation. 
In particular, this chapter addresses the tensions associated with state intervention and the 
medical profession’s longstanding mode of self-regulation (Freidson 1970a), within which 
the work of doctors has been characterised by clinical autonomy (Harrison 1990a). These 
traditions have subsequently fostered opposition to the legislation among elite members of 
the medical profession. This ideology was applied in chapter 5 by referring to the perceived 
impact of the legislation on individual facets of junior doctors’ work and personal experience, 
such as their health and work-life, medical training, and medical services.
However, these earlier chapters also showed how all three of these modes of regulation -  
self-regulation, new public management and statutory control -  are, to varying extents, now 
simultaneously visible in the way that junior doctors’ hours are being organised. The position 
is therefore far from clear cut, and the distinctions between self-regulation and external 
regulation are blurred. The state’s deliberate ‘fudging’ of the regulation and the ECJ’s 
intervention has broadened the demarcation between those elite informants who welcome the 
legislation and argue for its continuance, and those who resist it in preference for other modes 
of regulation that resemble self-governance models. The majority of senior doctors 
interviewed made it clear that they fall within the latter category and, whilst supporting the 
broad principles of the EC legislation, they reject the reality of its operation. The fundamental 
paradox in the views of elite stakeholders lays a foundation upon which the EWTD’s 
implementation and compliance can be assessed in chapter 7 and its perceived impact in 
chapter 8.
This chapter builds upon the earlier reviews documented in the literature in an attempt to 
understand the claims made by elite informants in this study which both embrace and oppose
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the regulation of PRHOs’ working time. It addresses the study’s objective to analyse the 
views of elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates surrounding the regulation of 
working time. The first section explores informants’ views about the various modes of 
regulation and the strengths and limitations of each model. It explains why many informants 
initially embraced a Directive that represents a form of centralised control, and which 
contrasts significantly with their historical forms of self-governance. The second section 
explores the intervention of the ECJ which has subsequently led to elite figures being critical 
of the legislation. This has given rise to the paradoxical situation in which doctors, as 
participants in a health-based profession, vehemently criticise a measure interpreted by the 
judiciary in such a way that explicitly prioritises their health. The discussions conclude with 
an overall assessment of the findings reported in this chapter.
The principle of EC regulation
In light of doctors’ tradition of working long hours, the principle of enacting EC regulation to 
set a maximum working week attracted general support among the elite informants. It was 
suggested that establishing supranational legislation to regulate these work conditions would 
be a preferable alternative to a domestic measure for two principal reasons. First, the 
conditions under which the medical profession’s working time was previously governed had 
neither reduced doctors’ long hours nor had they improved their personal health. Secondly, 
the EWTD was designed with both these concerns in mind by stipulating a maximum 
working week underlined explicitly by health and safety objectives. This section maps out the 
respondents’ views about the various modes of doctors’ regulation in an attempt to 
understand the context and reasoning relating to the elite informants’ prima facie support of 
EC regulation in principle.
Clinical autonomy, a fundamental characteristic associated with self-regulatory arrangements 
in the medical profession, has historically meant that doctors have not been subject to the 
same degree of state intervention in the ‘industrial’ sense as other workers in the UK labour 
market (Freidson 1970a). The literature reviews in Chapter 4 have already highlighted the 
links between clinical autonomy and self-regulation. Doctors were permitted to arrange their 
work to suit their own clinical and intellectual preferences, and the autonomy allowed them 
to diagnose and treat patients free of prescribed clinical guidelines, audits and ‘performance 
indicators’ (Harrison 1990a). Fuelling the medical profession’s self-regulation and its general
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dominance over health administration and policymaking was an exclusive knowledge to 
which only doctors could gain access (Stacey 1992). This has been complemented by the 
historical minimalist approach to work regulation by the state (Salter 2002) and the 
voluntarist nature of employment relations operating in the wider labour market (chapter 3). 
A small number of informants in this study continued to celebrate the values of voluntarism, 
and therefore opposed supranational legislation on this basis. For one MEP, domestic self­
regulation using doctors’ specialist knowledge and experience to arrange their own work 
conditions was preferable than more intrusive forms of governance represented by the EC:
It should be regulated and negotiated between the UK Parliament and the BMA. Each 
country has a different culture and different work practices, and the BMA are the 
specialist body who can do this for Britain.
MEP, Conservative.
These principles generally accord with the way in which the medical profession and 
employment relations have been conventionally organised. However, in line with his 
Conservative beliefs, this informant’s approach to regulating the labour market was 
predictable given the wide deregulation policies initiated by his party during the 1980s. His 
views were even more unsurprising when considering the response by the Thatcher and 
Major governments to the process of European social regulation and the EWTD in particular 
(see chapter 3). A senior EC Commissioner in Brussels responsible for producing and 
enforcing EC legislation represented the opposite view and, having regard to the UK’s 
historical voluntarist arrangements, explained the significance of the Directive in Britain:
We have to distinguish two different situations: in much of Europe there were already 
laws on working time with limits lower than the Directive...in the UK there was no 
such statutory limit, and there the Directive could have much more impact.
EC Commissioner.
The differences between the regulation of European and UK labour markets therefore 
underscored the value of the EWTD for workers in Britain whose employment conditions and 
general long working hours had hitherto been determined by collective bargaining and 
minimum state intervention. Like the Conservative MEP, the EC Commissioner’s response 
was not surprising given his position within the EC’s central legislative body. The other
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policymakers and medical service-providers (the medical profession and their 
representatives) tended to share this perspective rather than that proposed by the MEP, but for 
reasons other than political beliefs. They approached the issue in a more pragmatic way by 
reference to the failed attempts to tackle doctors’ long working hours by previous 
professional/domestic modes of regulation. Both the Paediatrics consultant and the Deputy 
Chair of the BMA’s Junior Doctor Committee (JDC) concurred that that the most appropriate 
way to address these working conditions was to use centralised and statutory forms of 
control:
There have been plenty of opportunities through gentleman’s agreements in the past 
unless you legislate things won’t change. Our Health Department and trusts were 
reluctant to change until they were forced to.
Deputy Chair JDC, BMA.
Self-regulation and clinical autonomy within the broader voluntarist context seemingly came 
at too high a price, and penalised junior doctors in the form of long working hours, which 
consequently risked their health and safety. These concerns laid a platform upon which calls 
for a degree of regulation were voiced. The perceived limitations of self-regulation ultimately 
meant that an alternative mode of regulation was put forward by the state. This intervention 
came in the form of the New Deal (NHS Management Executive 1991).
The New Deal represented an arrangement between the state and the medical profession to 
address a set of concerns, each relating to the working time of junior doctors (chapter 5). For 
the profession, the long hours’ culture was an occupational feature that was adversely 
affecting doctors’ welfare, and the implications of a sick workforce was an anxiety the 
government wished to address. The agreement heralded a move towards a ‘hybrid’ regulation 
confined to the profession alone, in line with Britain’s patchwork history of sector-specific 
measures (Mclvor 1987). The New Deal attempts to regulate junior doctors’ working time, 
among other conditions, in such a way that complements their medical training and service 
requirements. It is a mode of regulation by the profession which seeks to protect its members 
from the long hours of work associated with self-regulation while also keeping state 
intervention at a minimal level. However, the Agreement’s non-statutory basis and civil 
sanctions have diluted its impact. Non-compliance had, according to the senior policy advisor
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at the Royal College of Surgeons and a Medical Director, come about as a result of the 
Regulation’s lack of statutory rigour:
The New Deal was not adequate. That’s why the legislation was brought in. If a 
decision has to be made to reduce hours of work, consensus doesn’t seem to have 
produced that [then EC legislation] is fine.
Medical Director.
Having both practised medicine in the past, these two clinicians believed that the civil 
sanctions for non-compliance, underscored by the poor rates of regulatory compliance (BMA 
2006a), were seen as fundamental weaknesses in the existing system. The perceived failure to 
regulate working hours in the medical profession through the New Deal was therefore a 
sufficiently compelling reason for the elite stakeholders to support alternative European 
modes of regulation which would provide the necessary form of sanctions if the provisions 
were not observed. This was explicitly outlined by both policymakers and medical service 
providers alike, including the Deputy Chair o f the BMA’s JDC, the Assistant Junior Doctor 
Coordinator at the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG), and a Dean and Director for 
Postgraduate and Medical Education whose responsibilities included the welfare and training 
of junior doctors practising throughout Wales:
I don’t think that without the move towards the EWTD and the change in European 
law, [the employers] wouldn’t have taken much action...
Dean and Director for Postgraduate and Medical Education, Wales.
The School of Postgraduate Medical and Dental Education manages the delivery of training 
programmes delivered by fourteen NHS Trusts and dental and general practices across 
Wales. Its Director believed that the new pay structure concluded in 2000 (chapter 5) had 
exerted more pressure on NHS trusts to reduce juniors’ time spent at hospital, but the absence 
of criminal sanctions followed-up by external enforcement agencies had resulted in the 
continuation of long working hours and instances of poor health among the doctors training 
under his deanery.
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A significant proportion of the elite informants therefore expressed support not only for a 
statutory base to progress the juniors’ labour conditions, but also a highly centralised measure 
external to both the UK and professional jurisdictions. This view highlights a significant 
departure from the longstanding modes of regulation which have hitherto governed the UK 
medical profession’s labour conditions. The concept of a European regulation also reflects 
doctors’ discontent with their profession’s previous attempts at dealing with the working 
environment effectively. Unsatisfactory commitment to New Deal compliance has 
underscored the paradoxical failure of a health-based profession to protect the welfare of its 
own members. Furthermore, the inadequacy characterising attempts by both the state and the 
profession to address doctors’ work hours has contravened their broader interests of ensuring 
patient welfare, by potentially subjecting their treatment to fatigued and ill doctors.
The EWTD incorporated two features, the lack of which, according to the elite stakeholders, 
rendered ineffective the previous modes of regulation. They included the statutory nature of 
the Directive accompanied by both criminal and civil sanctions, and the explicit promotion of 
doctors’ health and safety. The EWTD prescribes a phased approach between 2004 and 2009 
to reduce the time spent by all medical professionals, both senior and junior, to 48 hours per 
week (chapter 3). Its legal status and sanctions were perceived as predominantly 
distinguishing this form of regulation from the New Deal. The legislation therefore carries a 
far heavier weight than a contractual agreement; in addition to its civil penalties, like those 
contained in the New Deal, its potential to imprison hospital chief executives gave the 
measure, in the view of the study’s elites, considerably more impact. As pointed out by the 
Director of NHS Employers and the Assistant Junior Doctor Coordinator at WAG, the 
EWTD’s ability to both fine and imprison employers for non-compliance with the European 
regulation had sparked anxieties among hospital managers. It had been a factor driving them 
to implement measures which reduced junior doctors’ long working hours (these measures 
are discussed in chapter 7):
Factors that have contributed to the decline in PRHO working hours have largely been 
associated with the trusts’ awareness of the need to comply with the Directive -  the 
obligations imposed on them and the anxieties resulting from the potential criminal 
sanctions for non-compliance.
Assistant Junior Doctor Coordinator, Welsh Assembly Government.
146
The work of the Junior Doctor Coordinator at WAG meant that she was well placed to 
provide detailed insights about the political policies and compliance issues vis-a-vis the 
EWTD and junior doctors. Her position routinely brought her into contact with NHS Trusts 
in Wales which in turn provided her with a familiarity with concerns and feedback voiced by 
medical staffing managers in relation to the Directive’s obligations. Among others, a Plaid 
Cymru Assembly member concurred with her views. His experience as both a GP and a 
politician permitted him to present matters from a politico-clinical viewpoint. He concluded 
that statutory measures supported by enforceable criminal sanctions afforded his profession 
with the best opportunity to change the ways in which the working time of doctors was 
regulated. The perceived differences in how Trusts had treated the issue of junior doctors’ 
working hours before and after the EWTD reinforced and legitimised the informants’ 
dissatisfaction with the working environment under the self-regulatory arrangements and the 
New Deal.
The principle of European regulation was also embraced positively by reference towards its 
aim for improving the health of doctors and patients. The long working hours associated with 
the self-regulatory regime meant that little priority was afforded to the welfare of doctors. By 
contrast, the EWTD is a measure introduced under Article 118a of the EC Treaty, and thus 
legally serves as a health and safety legislation. In addition to limiting working hours, the 
New Deal did stipulate some measures to improve the working environment for junior 
doctors, namely their provision of accommodation and catering facilities, but there was no 
explicit link to the effect of working time on health and safety. It was for these reasons that 
the Dean and Director for Postgraduate and Medical Education promoted the EWTD:
I am completely behind the health and safety issues that have driven the legislation. 
The [work] intensity has increased so much that one has to be careful about these 
things, the way the job works, the work-life balance, and so on.
Dean and Director for Postgraduate and Medical Education, Wales.
Drawing from her personal experiences, a Consultant in Palliative Care (who was also an 
elected member of the BMA ethics committee and a member of the House of Lords) also 
supported the emphasis on the importance of doctors’ health and safety. She also welcomed 
its concern for patient welfare, having almost performed what she saw was a serious medical 
error years ago as a result of working excessive hours. The informants were divided,
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however, in relation to the Directive’s potential impact on the health of doctors. Given that 
the Commission was responsible for passing the legislation under the relevant Article, a 
European spokesperson predictably supported an “evident link” between long working hours 
and poor health. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that “there are not many studies focusing 
specifically on 48 hours”, and that previous research had been concentrated on individual 
countries and labour market sectors. This lack of conclusive evidence, as pointed out by a 
senior policy advisor at the Health and Safety Executive, was sufficient for many informants 
to question the straightforwardness of the hours/health link. The literature similarly provides 
an unconvincing answer to the relationship (Trimpop et a l  2000; Spurgeon et a l  1997; 
Baldwin et a l  1997a; 1997&; Cooper 1996; Harrington 1994). An industrial officer at the 
Royal College of Nursing and a Dean of Medicine, among others argued, that the stressful 
nature of the work inherent in the NHS compounded by staff shortages impinged more 
directly on occupational health and safety as opposed to the quantity of working hours per se:
I’m not sure whether you can directly correlate [ill health] to working hours. I think a 
lot of it is due to the fact that being a junior doctor is a stressful job. At the end of the 
day, you have peoples’ lives in your hands. When you’re young and inexperienced, 
that ‘is’ stressful.
Dean of Medicine.
In spite of the informants’ inconclusive view on the Directive’s health and safety impact, the 
principle of EC regulation and the EWTD specifically was supported for its potential 
influence on challenging the long hours’ culture which had traditionally permeated medicine. 
Previous attempts to regulate the environment within which this culture worked had not been 
perceived as effective instruments in limiting the working week. A Consultant Anaesthetist 
partially agreed with the principle of regulation as its absence may, in turn, lead to people 
being “abused”. Some groups, according to him, would “stand up for themselves, others 
won’t”. Of particular concern was the symbolic safety net provided by EC regulation, which 
was seen as protecting junior doctors from being encouraged to work the long hours 
experienced by their senior counterparts. Making the illustration was a Consultant Surgeon 
whose teaching responsibilities included both undergraduate and postgraduate medical 
students:
They are far more protected and far more supported than what they used to be.
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Consultant Surgeon.
The difference between what used to be the norm (that is, the situation determined by self­
regulation and the New Deal) and what is now the standard to which doctors and their 
employers must comply under the EWTD, illustrates the transition between the medical 
profession’s various modes of regulation. In return for a reduced clinical autonomy, which 
was a primary facet of self-regulation, the junior doctors and their seniors expressed a desire 
for more protection and support. This reinforces the argument developed above which 
ironically shows how a profession charged with medical responsibilities was unable to protect 
the health of its own members under previous modes of regulation. As a result, doctors have 
sought support from a continental legislature which is completely external to the profession. 
The safety of patients has similarly been elevated by their protection from being treated by 
doctors who are more susceptible to poor health and fatigue as a result of working long hours. 
The degree to which these broader principles translate into practice is assessed in Chapter 8.
Looking at professional self-regulation and the New Deal has highlighted a series of 
criticisms which have cumulatively allowed a certain approach to work to materialise. This 
approach has entailed long working hours and poor health as a result, though the correlation 
between the two is debatable owing to their complex interaction including social, 
environmental, occupational and personal factors. In the views of this study’s respondents, 
this materialised because neither previous mode of regulation had been supported by criminal 
sanctions; this deficiency ultimately meant that trusts were not sufficiently motivated to 
strictly observe the relevant requirements. The European Directive -  at least in general terms 
-  had been embraced by the elite informants on the basis of these principles, despite it 
representing a form of regulation far from which doctors have traditionally been accustomed. 
However, both medical service providers and policymakers were disappointed with the shape 
that the EWTD had taken in practice following judicial intervention in Europe. This forms 
the discussion of the next section.
Interpreting working time
Anticipation among the elite informants for a supranational regulation which addressed the 
shortcomings of the New Deal and the self-regulatory arrangements in the medical profession 
was illustrated by their initial support for EC regulation of working hours. Poor rates of
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compliance with the domestic regulations concurrently matched by long hours of work and 
poor health underpinned the perceived need for the EWTD. This enthusiasm, however, 
appeared to have dissipated quickly following the European judiciary’s interpretation of the 
law, thereby reinforcing the paradoxical situation in which doctors, as participants in a 
health-based profession, vehemently criticised a measure interpreted by a Court in such a way 
that explicitly prioritised their health. This section spells out these contradictions, and 
explains why EC law disappointed the senior stakeholders, particularly in the medical 
profession, to the extent that a European measure was now resisted implicitly in favour of 
deregulation or a pre-EWTD arrangement resembling the New Deal. Thus certain informants 
ironically reverted to supporting forms of regulation whose failures led to calls for the 
Directive in the first place. These complex and contradictory arguments raised a collage of 
different forms of working- time regulation none of which individually satisfied doctors and 
other senior stakeholders owing to the perceived inadequacies inherent in them all.
Until the ECJ rulings on the EWTD, elite groups were content with an EC regulation in 
principle which, on health and safety grounds, prescribed a statutory maximum of working 
hours. Tensions had subsequently arisen as a result of the definition of working time applied 
by the Court. The SIMAP ruling in October 2002 interpreted working time as including any 
physical time spent by the doctors at the health centre or hospital for the purpose of providing 
his or her professional services (Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the judgments and their practical 
ramifications in further depth). The subsequent case of Jaegar confirmed the definition, 
explicitly stating that on-call working should be considered in its entirety to be working time, 
even where the doctor was permitted to rest and sleep during periods of inactivity. 
Representing the welfare and work-life balance of junior doctors, the Deputy Chairman of the 
BMA’s Junior Doctor Committee welcomed the rulings insofar as they “recognised that 
being on-call at the hospital is not the same as being [on-call] at home”. Officials at the 
Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) supported this argument, as did a New Labour MEP 
whose party oversaw the implementation of the Directive:
To not constitute this as working time may only be a short-sighted solution to long
working hours and may defeat what has progressed over the years, under the New
Deal agreement and the EWTD.
Assistant Junior Doctor Coordinator, WAG.
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For these informants, ensuring higher standards of health and safety necessitated less time at 
the workplace. Their responses, however, were also shaped by their party’s political policy. 
By covering complete time spent at work within the definition of working time, the ECJ had 
interpreted the EWTD in such a way that explicitly dealt with the perceived inadequacies of 
the medical profession’s previous regulatory attempts to regulate its members’ excessive 
working hours and consequential poor health. The UK judge who presided at the ECJ in the 
case of SIMAP argued that he, along with his colleagues, merely gave effect to the legal 
philosophies of the legislation:
The ECJ was not asked to say whether the policy of the Directive was sound or what 
would be its practical impact on the health services of the Member States the Court 
can only go by what is found in the preamble.
Ex-ECJ UK Judge.
The preamble of the EWTD unequivocally sets out the basis of health and safety upon which 
the legislation rests, and the need to restrict time spent at the workplace for that reason. 
Including ‘all’ time spent at the workplace, irrespective of whether the doctor was ‘resting’ or 
‘working’ was an attempt by the ECJ to restrain employers from insisting that doctors spend 
long amounts of time at the hospital by justification of applying a narrow definition of 
working time. While such an approach directly benefits doctors, the majority of informants in 
the senior medical profession paradoxically preferred the far narrower definition of working 
time they had assumed the Court would adopt, which would consequently expose them to the 
possibility of longer working hours and poorer health. For them, working time was 
anticipated as excluding time spent resting or sleeping at the hospital while on-call. This 
assumption derived from the stated intention o f the European Commission as legislature not 
to include periods of rest, standby or inactive time on-call within the definition of working 
time (COM 2007). Coincidentally, this was also the basis upon which the New Deal had 
defined its working time (NHS Management Executive 1991). The EWTD therefore 
represented a conflict of intentions between the ECJ’s actual interpretation of the law on the 
one hand, and what the profession and legislature had anticipated on the other:
I am going to be frank and say it was a surprise. The Commission has always assumed 
that the definition of working time has been straightforward this was not the intention 
of the legislature.
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EC Commissioner.
The confusion between the different stakeholders’ intentions had resulted in an outcome 
which policymakers and professionals alike deemed unsatisfactory. From an operational 
viewpoint, the Director of NHS Employers argued that “the Court rulings had caused 
problems” to the general operation of the Health Service by restricting the hours and 
consequent presence of doctors at the hospital at any given time, thereby exerting demands 
on the existing staff shortages (Fox 2007; Hellawell et al. 2005; Edwards 2003). From a 
clinical perspective, the Senior Policy Advisor at the Royal College of Surgeons argued that 
the rulings adversely affected medical training by reducing junior doctors’ presence and 
subsequent exposure to medical procedures (Williams and Cantillon 2000; Sim et al. 2004). 
Overall discontentment with the ECJ’s unanticipated intervention therefore related to the 
judiciary’s failure to consider the demands on national health systems and the specificity of 
medical training. A substantial cohort of elite informants argued that the European regulation 
was insensitive to these specific occupational concerns of the profession.
The SIMAP and Jaegar rulings were perceived as imposing a common standard that did not 
account for professional autonomy; the effect, discussed by a number of informants, was 
summarised by a Professor and Head of Anaesthetics and Intensive Care Medicine, who also 
held the positions of Non-Executive Director in a NHS Trust and the President Elect of the 
Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland:
The problem with any regulation or rule is that they are written in such a way as to 
absorb everybody. There is a world of difference, for example, between being on-call 
in anaesthesia and being on-call for dermatology. You cannot put them in the same 
basket and say that on-call for one equals on-call to another.
Consultant Anaesthetist.
The Consultant Anaesthetist, among others, was particularly critical of the monolithic nature 
of the Directive’s interpretation and its attempt to enforce a one-size-fits-all regulation. This 
line of reasoning stemmed beyond debates confined to the individual application of the 
EWTD to a broader critique of EC law. A number of elite informants who initially agreed 
with the principle of European regulation therefore expressed different views at a later stage 
of the interview when asked about their views on the Court’s interpretation of the law. On
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discussing their opposition to the judicial interpretation of the EWTD, it became apparent that 
some informants were basing their views on what they saw as the Directive’s effect of 
standardising workers’ conditions across the European labour market, irrespective of their 
professional status and perceived work demands:
Doctors [are being turned] from professionals into people that come in to do their job; 
they clock-in, they clock-out
Consultant Anaesthetist.
By nature, medicine was differentiated from other occupations on the basis of its continual 
need for training and exposure to the clinical environment. This in itself inevitably involved 
longer working hours:
Surgery is not something where at eight o ’ clock you can drop your tools and walk 
out. If something is going pear shaped on the ward, and they are my patients, then I 
stay until things are sorted
BMA Junior Doctors Representative for Wales.
Many senior members of the medical profession agreed with this view, which derived from 
their conventional approach to external intervention. A significant proportion of them 
criticised the application of a monolithic form of regulation for its perceived failure to take 
account of the unique concerns voiced by profession, including medical training as noted by 
the RCS above; patient services, according to the BMA representative; and medical and 
health staffing which was highlighted by the Director of NHS Employers. These views 
corresponded to a broader ideological critique of the Directive as a centrally imposed legal 
control negotiated by politico-legal bargaining which was beyond the bargaining jurisdiction 
of UK doctors. Its failure to conform to an arrangement which was the product of internal and 
sector-specific discussions had led to an occupational resistance within the higher ranks of 
the medical profession. The historical modes of regulation through self-governance, 
professional autonomy and minimal state intervention had helped to foster opposition to the 
current EC law among many senior doctors. This outlook can also be understood by 
considering the state-medico relationship in the UK, and the longstanding influence of the 
profession over successive governments’ policymaking (Macdonald 1995). Within the 
European arena, doctors in Britain lack comparable historical ties with the Commission, as
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legislature (Greenwood 2003). The profession’s concerns are afforded no more priority than 
those voiced other lobbyists and interest groups.
The ECJ’s intervention had given rise to a perceived crisis of legitimacy between the EC state 
legislature and judiciary. Its definition of working time had left health systems across Europe 
ironically facing a measure introduced under the rubric of health and safety which had made 
the operation of national health services inoperable:
It is now clear that we are in a situation after the Court rulings that almost all Member 
States are now in breach of the Directive at least 22 of the 25.
EC Commissioner.
These unanticipated judgments had led to a state of non-compliance across European health 
systems that echoed the UK’s position under the New Deal, and which led to calls for the 
EWTD in the first place. It is from this perspective that one is able to understand the 
magnitude of the judiciary’s intervention, and the anxieties surrounding the perceived need to 
preserve a narrower and more exclusive definition of working time. Officials of the European 
Court of Justice, both past and present, were afforded the opportunity to respond to such 
criticisms. Accepting the present state of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and widespread non- 
compliance were issues for which the judges were not prepared to accept responsibility. The 
current Advocate General of the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg argued that the 
Court was concerned to ensure that its judgements could be complied with. The UK Judge 
presiding at the ECJ in the cases of SIMAP and Jaegar maintained, however, that contentious 
judgments such as the EWTD rulings frequently generated blame aimed towards the Court. 
They maintained that unanticipated and sometimes unpopular decisions by the judiciary were 
rooted in the legislature’s failure to write unambiguous legislation:
I’m afraid it is common nowadays for governments and the Commission to write 
unclear texts and then complain when they are interpreted in a way they did not 
expect. Even worse is the tendency to produce legislation that amounts, in practice, to 
little more than a politically correct wish-list, the effect of which, if taken literally, is 
to make as is alleged in the present context, to make the hospitals unworkable because 
there aren’t enough junior doctors on-call. The remedy is not to blame the courts but
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for the political institutions to decide what they want to achieve in practice, to write 
legislation that means what they want it to mean, and to exercise some self-restraint in 
proclaiming programmes they can’t (or don’t want to) live up to.
Ex-ECJ UK Judge.
The ex-ECJ judge argued that the primary onus rested with the EC Commission and Member 
States to produce more explicit legislation in order to preclude the potential for subsequent 
judicial interpretations that may not accord with the intention of the legislature. He was aware 
that many of the Member States would have preferred a particular result that would have 
excluded time spent resting at the hospital from the definition of working time, but these 
views could “not be a determining factor for a court of law”. The Court was simply asked to 
interpret the Directive in the context of fact situations specific to SIMAP and Jaegar. The 
practical implications of the judgments were not within the judiciary’s remit of deliberation. 
This was a matter explicitly reserved for the legislature. The current Advocate General sitting 
at the European Court in Luxembourg concurred with his colleague arguing that much of the 
blame for differences between anticipated and unanticipated results was attributable to the 
Member States:
You very often have a number of Member States agreeing on a form of words simply 
because it is ambiguous. They know it’s going to be interpreted differently among 
Member States. They also know that if this caught the intention of the Court, then one 
interpretation would be held to be correct and the other would not.
Advocate General, European Court of Justice, Luxembourg.
For these senior members of the British and European judiciary, the judgments gave effect to 
the health and safety objectives of the Directive as spelt out in its preamble, and in the 
absence of any other definition to the contrary. Their claims, however, were not shaped by a 
critique of the states’ inability to write clearer legislation. Rather, both judges referred to the 
legislature’s deliberate attempts to implement an ambiguously worded regulation. It is 
arguable that the fundamental terms -  the definition of working time -  of the EWTD were 
framed in such a vague manner in order to provide the space to limit its practical impact of 
the regulation, and to reduce the constraints and difficulties it might cause for particular 
sectors.
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The informants in the present study chose not to follow this line of argument. If blame was to 
be allocated, then the Court and not the state/legislature was to constitute the primary target. 
Why was this so? Members of the medical profession and their representatives concurred 
with existing state policy that working time should not include inactive time while on-call. As 
discussed above, this intention was made explicit by both the Conservative Government and 
New Labour’s continued approach to the matter under the New Deal provisions. Furthermore, 
the EC Commission had echoed its similar intentions in its legislative proposals. On this 
occasion, the state and the profession collectively agreed on the policy, but it was the Court 
which disrupted the status quo. Directing blame at the ECJ has therefore deflected from the 
state (and the profession to a lesser extent) of its responsibility for clarifying the matter 
within the legislation itself.
The prospect of altering the judicial rulings was unlikely, which exacerbated tensions 
between the judiciary and other stakeholders:
The Court is very, very rarely willing to reverse its previous case law, especially if it’s 
very recent case law. They are not formally regarded as precedents, but they are.
Advocate General, European Court of Justice, Luxembourg.
Revising the definition of working time was therefore doubtful. A decline in support for the 
EWTD among key stakeholders had subsequently emerged from this realisation, together 
with poor compliance across Europe with the present definition of work time, and the 
legislation’s failure to accommodate the specific concerns voiced by the medical profession. 
Using such bases for opposing the nature of the Directive represented a wider argument 
against the principle of EC legislation in general to regulate workplace issues. This line of 
argument leaves few alternative options available, among which include domestic 
arrangements such as self-regulation and/or the New Deal, both of which catered for the 
medical profession by endorsing a less inclusive definition of working time.
Assessment
It is inevitable that tensions will emerge from the implementation of external intervention on 
a professional sector of workers whose historical form of governance has been through self­
regulation (Stacey 1992). The debates in chapter 4 show how the clinical autonomy of
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doctors has been gradually restrained over time through the ascendancy of both 
managerialism and statutory control by the state (Harrison and Ahmad 2000). The medical 
profession’s response in the past to the changes in their delivery of care under a national 
system and under new public management have illustrated the doctors’ struggles to retain a 
degree of independence from external control which mirrors their historical form of self­
regulation (Freidson 1994). In the present context, the study’s findings show that that the 
profession departed from some of its longstanding outlooks on work regulation by calling for 
a degree of state intervention in the form of a centralised statutory base. Such calls were 
motivated by poor health of junior doctors in light of their long working hours which had 
developed in the general absence of regulation, even though the validity of the relationship 
between the two variables was the subject of contention (Beswick and White 2003). 
Furthermore, the sanctions for non-compliance with the New Deal provisions were perceived 
as being ineffective in limiting the juniors’ work hours, which also failed to improve their 
health.
For a number of the study’s elite informants, these factors laid a foundation upon which they 
could argue for a different albeit a narrow mode of regulation -  the EWTD. The third party 
intervention of the ECJ and its redefinition of the Direction’s ambit had, however, led the 
senior members of the medical profession to consider the previously criticised regulatory 
arrangements that were in place preceding the EC law. The implication arising from this 
approach suggests that the profession was satisfied with the regulation until the judicial 
intervention. As a result, the informants reverted to support the New Deal arrangements. This 
comes as no surprise given that the latter’s principles and scope are far broader and more 
flexible in nature than the ECJ’s narrow and specific definition of working time. Such 
principles correspond with their historical autonomy to work free from external restrictions. 
Two significant points emerge from these views. The first relates to the reversion among the 
study’s elite informants to a form of regulation which jeopardises the individual interests of 
doctors. Secondly and partly related to the latter point, it highlights the policymakers’ 
deliberate attempt to ‘fudge’ the regulation.
First, the rejection of the ECJ’s intervention in favour of a more loosely defined form of 
working-time regulation associated with long working hours and poor health highlights a 
paradox in the elite informants’ views. They criticised the interpretation of a measure which 
aimed to improve the health of a profession charged with providing medical care.
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Furthermore, they reverted to a measure actually knowing from experience about its 
implications for poor health in practice. In doing so, the senior members of the medical 
profession were also blurring the modes of regulation, creating overlaps between self­
regulation and intervention. This supports the claim made in chapter 4 which shows how 
different modes of regulation are all, to varying extents, simultaneously visible in the way 
that junior doctors’ hours are being organised. This complexity was reflected in the general 
inconsistency of their views.
Secondly, the current situation has been exacerbated by the state’s deliberate ‘fudging’ of the 
regulation. Two senior judges referred to policymakers’ calculated attempts to draw up 
legislation of such an ambiguous nature, thus leaving room for judicial intervention. This is in 
line with the UK’s historical minimalist approach to workplace regulation (Bishop and Mayer 
1995; Dawson et al. 1988) and is stimulated by concerns voiced by both industry and 
governments which prioritise the benefits of market competition and flexibility within the 
economy (Mclvor 1987; Hart 1987). By ambiguously framing the fundamental terms of the 
EWTD, the legislature shaped this particular law with reference to the state’s longstanding 
concern to ensure that the UK labour market operated with as few restrictions as possible, and 
that the essence of competition was not constrained by regulation (Hutter 1997). The vague 
nature of the Directive provided the space to limit its practical impact and to reduce the 
constraints and difficulties it might cause for particular sectors in the labour market, such as 
the medical profession, who have been accustomed to a high degree of working autonomy 
(Edelman 1992).
Considering the broad nature of the legislation and the available room for interpretation, it 
comes as no surprise that compliance between Member States’ national health systems, 
following the ECJ rulings, was inconsistent. Nor is it surprising that many of the medical elite 
oppose the Directive in its present form. In addition to its effect on their autonomy to 
interpret the regulation as they see fit, their criticisms of the ECJ’s intervention for its 
insensitivity to the specificity of medical work and the particular concerns voiced by the 
profession support the claims contained in the medical literature reviewed in chapter 5 about 
the perceived impact of the EWTD. However, the findings in this chapter suggest that those 
concerns, internally held by the profession, are contradictory, which thus raises questions as 
to what criteria must be satisfied for the doctors to accept any particular form of regulation. 
Parts of the profession are obviously concerned over the health and welfare of their junior
158
members, hence the call for EC law. There is also another outlook which argues against the 
imposition of a rigid legislative standard for other reasons, such as medical training, staffing 
and services. However, the absence of such a standard jeopardises junior doctors’ health. One 
of the few ways to accommodate these conflicting concerns is the implementation of an 
ambiguous standard which can be flexibly defined to meet the various priorities.
This may explain why many of the elite medical informants initially embraced the principle 
of EC regulation. Their support was a symbolic statement which approved of a measure 
protecting junior doctors’ individual welfare. This contrasts with their rejection of the reality 
of the law in operation, which was seen as adversely impacting on other aspects of junior 
doctors’ work. The law therefore has both an expressive function -  sending out a strong 
message about what is acceptable and what is not acceptable -  and an instrumental one -  to 
actively impose controls on particular kinds of behaviour (Yaegar 1991; Kuhn 1961). 
Discussions discerning the potentially symbolic and realistic impact of the law are further 
developed in chapter 7 by focusing on the enforcement of the Directive. Its authority, 
resourcing and other sources of support are explored to assess whether the policing 
mechanisms put into place will be able to control one above any other of the profession’s 
contrasting concerns. The present state of ambiguity also lays a foundation upon which the 
EWTD’s implementation and compliance can be assessed in the next chapter.
The differences between the symbolical and operational aspects of the regulation also 
illustrated a paradox by the medical profession’s reluctance to alleviate some of the more 
pronounced difficulties regarding the perceived impact of the regulation, by an absence of 
lobbying for further medical staffing and resourcing, and initiating internal changes. In spite 
of the conflicting concerns referenced in this chapter, which are reviewed in more detail in 
chapter 5, doctors have not argued to increase their numbers to accommodate the EWTD’s 
implementation. They have not abandoned their profession’s social closure or attempted to 
make its restricted entry more accessible (Fox 2007). This experience is arguably shaped by 
the profession’s historical roots (Larson 1977) and longstanding mode of self-regulation, 
which have conventionally addressed work issues in a manner suited to the members of the 
particular sector, and particularly those that are in a position to define the organisation and 
operation of the sector.
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The exclusive nature of the profession and its close socialisation processes facilitate the 
transmissions of ideas and a unified approach to issues such as workplace regulation (Stacey 
1992). It is not therefore in the interests of the doctors to increase medical staffing as 
widening their vocational access would jeopardise their occupational unity and the unanimity 
in some of the longstanding ideologies permeating the profession. These views are the key 
reference points within which junior doctors operate. The next chapters explore this 
contextual paradigm to assess whether the strong views of the senior doctors identified in this 
chapter are supported by the juniors, in the discussions on EWTD implementation and 
impact.
Conclusion
These findings show that a significant proportion of elite informants who initially welcomed 
EC law in principle subsequently opposed the form it took in practice because of its 
perceived failure to accommodate the concerns surrounding medical training, patient services 
and staffing pressures. This has given rise to a puzzling situation in which leading voices in 
the profession are consequently arguing for the implementation of modes of regulation which 
resemble the arrangements that were in place before the EWTD. These criticisms that were 
levelled towards the individual models, however, led them to call for European regulation in 
the first place. The position therefore leaves the elite stakeholders facing a variety of policy 
options, none of which are satisfactory owing to the perceived inadequacies in them all.
Opposition to the EWTD after the ECJ’s intervention has given rise to a paradoxical situation 
in which doctors, as participants in a health-based profession, strongly criticise a measure that 
explicitly prioritises their health. Discussions on this issue therefore show the profession’s 
ongoing inadequate response to the concern and welfare of its members, in line with the 
general discontent voiced towards working time arrangements under the self-regulatory and 
New Deal regimes. Debates on the role of the Court also support a more general argument 
about the state’s deliberate attempts to limit the impact of the regulation through ambiguously 
framing the terms of the legislation. This issue is discussed in further details in the study’s 
conclusions.
The views of the elite stakeholders have been far from consistent. Initially accepting the 
principle of EC law only to subsequently oppose it underscores the ideological tensions
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which are influenced by the medical profession’s historical modes of regulation on the one 
hand, and the need to address junior doctors’ health through controlling their working hours 
on the other. The state’s failure to regulate the profession once and for all, as highlighted in 
the conclusions of chapter 4, thus continues to pose difficulties in the modem context. The 
findings raise certain questions on how these tensions and apparent contradictions are played 
out in practice when the regulations are implemented at the hospital trust level. These issues 
are explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7 
Attempts to Manage the Directive
Introduction
This chapter bridges the broader arguments about the regulation of the medical profession 
made in chapter 6, with the actual experiences of doctors and their managers at the hospital 
level. In line with the study’s objectives, it aims to examine critically the ways in which the 
EWTD has been implemented and enforced in practice in relation to junior doctors, and the 
sources of support and resistance to such processes. The first section looks at the roles played 
by the state and managers in the implementation of the Directive, and explores how the 
process has shaped regulatory compliance with the current limits, and what implications this 
has for the stricter provisions in 2009. In so doing, it draws on the literature in chapter 3 
which discusses the tensions between the Department of Health’s ongoing commitment to the 
voluntarist tradition of managing employer-employee relations in the UK underscored by the 
previous Conservative governments, with the new legal commitment to statutory limits on 
working hours (Exworthy and Halford 1999; Dawson et al. 1988).
In light of the senior doctors’ general opposition to statutory controls discussed in chapter 6, 
shaped both by their historical tradition of self-regulation (see chapter 4) and perceptions 
about adverse regulatory impacts (see chapter 5), the second part of this chapter assesses the 
monitoring and enforcement regimes that operate alongside attempts to apply EWTD- 
compliant work strategies. It also explores the key features of the policing mechanisms to 
determine whether the EWTD represents a primarily symbolic measure, as argued in chapter 
6, or whether the legislation is realistically enforceable. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the PRHOs’ working hours reported in the study’s survey to assess the 
Regulations’ effect at hospital level. Drawing on the literature that explores the cultural 
aspects of the medical profession (Freidson 1970a, 1970b, 1994; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977) 
they compare the views of junior and senior doctors and their managers to analyse how each 
directly support and resist the processes of implementing and complying with the Directive. 
These contextualised tensions reflect the wider debates on the doctors’ increased regulation 
and the consequent limits on their clinical autonomy (Harrison and Ahmad 2000; Exworthy 
and Halford 1999; Flynn 1999; Famham and Horton 1996).
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Implementing the European Working Time Directive
Achieving compliance with the EWTD is perceived as part of the larger objective of 
modernising the NHS (Department of Health 2004). In the absence of state intervention, 
individual Trusts and their respective managers have been given the main responsibility for 
implementing the regulations. The lack of centralised involvement in the process raised 
questions about the ability to apply consistently the EWTD provisions on a broad scale:
An official circular and that was it. We have not as yet interpreted [the legislation] on 
a regional basis on how the Directive is going to be applied. There are no consistent 
approaches.
Medical staffing manager.
State intervention was confined to the funding of a series of case studies and pilot schemes 
carried out by the Department of Health’s Modernising Agency and the NHS National 
Workforce Projects (chapter 5). Some of the study’s informants perceived these strategies, 
which sought to explore innovative and realistic ways of implementing the regulations, in a 
negative light:
The thing that strikes me about the EWTD is how badly it has been managed. The 
notion of the EWTD was introduced in 1993. We are in 2004 and we are only now 
getting grips with it. At the best, we are eleven years’ behind.
Operating Department Practitioner.
The lack of central guidance, which had led to this apparent discontent, partly resulted from 
New Labour’s rushed passing of the EWTD after what the Deputy Chairman of the BMA’s 
Junior Doctor Committee described as the Conservative government’s “stalling process”, and 
its attempt to annul the Directive at the European Court (Chapter 3) with the “hope that the 
law may be changed or revoked”. The minimal intervention by the Department of Health 
therefore presents a practical ongoing commitment continuing the voluntarist tradition of 
managing employer-employee relations in the UK underscored by the previous Conservative 
government, with a legal commitment to statutory limits on working hours (Exworthy and 
Halford 1999; Dawson et al. 1988). However, against the historical backdrop of doctors’ self­
regulation and the broader laissez-faire approach to market regulation, paradoxically the
163
study found support among employers and senior members of the medical profession for 
more state intervention and guidance.
Given the general dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs, the informants were asked 
about the implementation of the EW TD’s stricter limits imposed in 2007 and 2009. The 58- 
hour working week was perceived by the Senior EWTD policy advisor at the Royal College 
of Surgeons as an “enormous hurdle to jum p” and the Director of NHS Employers was of the 
opinion that “2009 is a real challenge”. Some informants argued that the unanticipated ECJ 
rulings (chapter 5) had played a part in disrupting the implementation strategies:
It was SIMAP and Jaesar that moved the goal posts quite late in the day that made the 
NHS realise that solutions had to be had.
Acting Director, NHS Modernisation Agency.
A senior EC Commissioner in Brussels predicted that some Member States would make use 
of the Directive’s provision to extend the implementation period beyond 2009. However, the 
Deputy Chairman of the BMA’s JDC believed that this would lead to a “fairly dim view 
[being] taken wholly on the idea that ‘we couldn’t do it’”. Furthermore, he did not foresee the 
failure of NHS planning as an adequate reason to take advantage of the extension clause. The 
focus upon the role of the state in the planning and implementation of the EWTD continues in 
the next section which discusses the mechanisms to both monitor and enforce the legislative 
provisions.
Monitoring and enforcement
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is charged with the task of ensuring EWTD’s weekly 
limits are observed (chapter 3). Its potential ability to enforce the regulation effectively, 
however, is compromised by the general absence of a centralised auditing systems to gather 
data on working time. This task falls to managers within individual Trusts, who are required 
to monitor the working hours of the junior doctors they employ. This raises a number of 
questions on how the HSE enforces the Directive’s provisions.
The position differs in England and Wales. The results of working-time monitoring in Wales’ 
NHS Trusts are reported to a central source, namely the Welsh Assembly Government
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(WAG). The latter currently provides Trusts with computerised templates prescribing 
different forms of work rotas that allow managers to assess whether or not the way in which 
they organise doctors’ working time is compliant with the EC regulations. Managers have the 
option to implement these model rotas, and the majority do so. The compliance figures 
(reported below) routinely published by WAG reflect the rotas at the time of monitoring 
periods. As a result, compliance or non-compliance is judged by reference to the rotas 
adopted by managers. The most recent figures, compiled in September 2006, are presented 
below:
Table 3
EWTD Compliance in Wales ’ NHS Trust _________
Trust
FI 
Number 
In Post
FI
Number
Compliant
F2 
Number 
In Post
F2
Number
Compliant
Flexi 
Number 
In Post
Flexi
Number
Compliant
Bro
Morgannwg 23 23 26 26 13 13
Cardiff & 
Vale 59 59 65 65 32 32
Carmarthen 25 25 30 30 2 2
Ceredigion 9 9 12 12 1 1
Conwy & 
Denbigh 18 18 18 18 2 2
Gwent 39 39 48 44 18 18
NEWT 18 18 0 0 4 4
North Glam 14 14 15 15 0 0
North West 
Wales 15 15 17 17 2 2
Pembroke 9 9 9 9 16 16
Pontyrpidd & 
Rhondda 18 18 10 10 6 6
Powys 0 0 0 0 0 0
Swansea 32 32 33 33 14 14
Velindre 0 0 0 0 7 7
TOTALS 279 279 283 279 117 117
(Source: Junior Doctor Coordinator, Welsh Assembly Government)
This table provides an overview of EWTD compliance within Wales’ NHS Trusts between 
the most junior ranks in the medical profession. ‘F I ’ refers to the first year of the Foundation 
programme, and ‘F2’ refers to the second year. This scheme replaces PRHO and SHO 
programmes that were in place at the latter stages of writing-up this thesis. ‘Flexi’ applies to 
those doctors training on a flexible -  a less than full-time -  basis (BMA 2004e). The statistics
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show only four PRHOs (from the F2 cohort) working in excess of the Regulations’ limits, 
and all are confined to the Gwent NHS Trust. They correspond with the findings of a BMA 
report discussed in chapter 4 which found a corresponding analogy between New Deal 
compliance and the junior doctors’ level of seniority (BMA 2006a). More importantly in this 
context, both the BMA survey and the WAG statistics reported overall compliance with the 
Directive among PRHOs in Wales.
The WAG figures, however, should be interpreted with caution as I was told by the Junior 
Doctor Coordinator at WAG that they do not necessarily reflect the number of hours actually 
worked by doctors. Rather, the table reflects the doctors’ working hours that are prescribed in 
the rotas adopted by their managers. The focus of the monitoring system on reported hours, 
which are drawn from the rotas, rather than on actual hours may therefore be concealing non- 
compliance with the Directive. The ultimate penalties in respect of the latter include a 
minimum six month’s prison sentence for the chief executive, minimum fines of £5000 per 
transgression per week, in addition to the HSE sanctions. However, the Junior Doctor 
Coordinator explained that it was not policy to conduct further inquiries into juniors’ hours 
beyond the figures reported by managers to WAG, as the issue of general work conditions 
was essentially an employer/employee matter.
Unlike Wales, at the time of the study there was no central source at all documenting the 
working hours of doctors in any of the English NHS Trusts. The same was apparent in 
Europe. The HSE’s senior policy advisor confirmed that individual Member States generally 
were not required to provide statistical information to a central enforcement agency, and that 
there was no liaison between the European Commission and the Member States on the issue. 
The state of affairs was therefore characterised by either a lack of centralised data, or systems 
that potentially did not accurately reflect work time practices:
Because [the EWTD] is not a policy decision, the NHS does not need to report 
internally. This would be a matter between the individual trusts and the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). There was some monitoring held prior to August [2004] to 
ensure compliance, but this is not ongoing.
Acting Director, NHS Modernisation Agency.
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The lack of a central agency auditing doctors’ work hours therefore calls into question the 
effectiveness of the current EWTD enforcement strategy. The absence of a single source of 
accurate data limits the HSE to essentially a reactive role which largely depends on official 
complaints from junior doctors themselves. Between 1 February 2005 and 28 February 2006 
the HSE had received thirteen phone calls vis-a-vis the hours worked by junior doctors, 
though the confidentiality of this service meant that this figure may only represent a small 
fraction of actual queries as the enquirers were not obliged to provide any information about 
themselves or their occupation. The Junior Doctor Coordinator at WAG also suggested that 
general ignorance about the EWTD among doctors could be attributable to the very few 
complaints put to the HSE. A senior policy advisor at the HSE commented that the majority 
of notices it issued under the Working Time Regulations were in relation to unacceptable 
monitoring processes and poor record-keeping. He had found that NHS Trusts on the whole 
were supportive of HSE investigations “though some had been less cooperative than others”.
This has resulted in a bizarre situation which involves serious potential sanctions for laws 
which are almost unenforceable. The study’s elite informants in chapter 6 initially welcomed 
the EWTD for its criminal penalties, however the policing resources invested in by the state 
has significantly diluted the legislation’s potential to punish offenders. Together with the 
absence of independently-audited sources of information about doctors’ working hours which 
are needed to enforce the regulation, the trends reinforce the state’s broader voluntarist 
approach to regulation. Working time and related issues are essentially perceived as matters 
to be negotiated between employer and employee, which conventionally preclude state 
intervention.
The process of implementation and compliance with the Directive at a 
hospital level
The remainder of this chapter explores the relationships between hospital managers and 
doctors of different seniorities to examine critically the sources of support and resistance to 
the ways in which the EWTD has been implemented and complied with in practice. The 
study found that many informants in the medical profession perceived the EWTD as 
extending managers’ authority over their work and personal lives (see also Hoggett 1996) 
through the wide use of shift patterns involving little or no consultation with doctors. This 
echoes the trends discussed in chapter 4 about the general ascendancy of managerialsm in the
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NHS, and the adverse impact on doctors’ clinical autonomy (Harrison and Ahmad 2000; 
Exworthy and Halford 1999; Flynn 1999; Famham and Horton 1996).
Shift work was generally perceived by managers and doctors alike as the only viable way to 
reduce junior doctors’ working hours. As part of their rotas, most juniors now work full 11- 
to 13-hour night shifts as opposed to on-call arrangements (NWP 2006). Implemented by 
managers in most hospitals as a response to the EWTD, it was now commonplace among Pre- 
Registration House Officers:
All our building of rotas are set against the best option for the junior doctors we’ve no 
option but full shifts for those very junior grades.
Medical staffing manager.
Managers’ authority to organise generic shift patterns for junior doctors was further 
legitimised by the European Court of Justice’s broader definition of working time. It was 
claimed that introducing shift work was the only option to meet the statutory requirements 
laid down by the EWTD. Allowing managers to organise doctors’ working time within these 
parameters reflected the growing authority of the former on the one hand, and the 
profession’s diminution in influence on the other (Exworthy and Halford 1999):
Management have more authority over working life. There are more managers than 
ever now. The EWTD is a managerial job.
Consultant and Professor in Paediatrics.
The implications of increased managerial influence over doctors’ clinical autonomy helped to 
fuel resistance among some doctors towards the EW TD’s implementation process (below). 
Tensions were exacerbated by the managers’ lack of consultation with doctors over arranging 
EWTD-compliance strategies (BMA 2006b). According to the Associate Dean for Flexible 
Training, many doctors had not been consulted on the planning and implementation of the 
Directive:
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I think there has been a very mechanistic approach towards [the EWTD’s] 
implementation. A lot of departments haven’t involved the individuals who are going 
to have to work those patterns.
Associate Dean for Flexible Training.
The experience of being omitted from the EW TD’s consultation processes was seen by some 
of the study’s informants as part of a broader reflection of how the NHS implemented 
different strategies affecting the work conditions of its employees. A senior Operation 
Department Practitioner (ODP), whose work regularly brought him into contact with 
surgeons, maintained that the NHS’ “change overload” often accompanied a lack of 
explanation, and encapsulated an approach that required its workforce to merely “get on and 
do the job”. The increase in managerial authority over doctors’ working and personal lives 
had consequently formed new tensions and had exacerbated some existing ones between 
managers and the professionals. There were some differences, however, in the responses 
given by junior and senior doctors.
Senior doctors
The BMA has outlined how some doctors are “enraged by the proliferation of managers, 
because managers usually have no understanding of clinical priorities, and their protocols 
waste precious doctors’ time” (BMA 2006b). this study found that the primary source of 
resistance to the implementation of the EWTD stemmed from senior doctors:
In trying to implement the policy, the biggest stumbling block has been at consultant 
level, and its ongoing.
Medical staffing manager.
According to the Medical Director interviewed during this study, complaints by the 
consultants had principally centred on the inability to have the same set of junior staff 
working under their supervision for each night and day shift. Some of them circumvented the 
legislation’s monitoring process by harassing individual junior doctors to report EWTD- 
compliant working time, even if they had worked in excess of the Regulations’ limits. This 
practice had come to the attention of both the Deputy Chairman of the BMA’s JDC, and was 
experienced by one PRHO informant:
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They gave the monitoring forms to the mess president who then gave them to us and 
asked, “Do these truly reflect [your working hours]?” And we had to decide. We were 
pushed into saying, “no, they don’t reflect. We work less than that.
Dr F.
This was not an infrequent occurrence as several of the study’s informants claimed to have 
had direct or indirect experience of this practice. It was also raised in a report on the initial 
implementation of the EWTD (BMA 2004b). Submitting inaccurate working time records 
highlights the possible discrepancy between actual and reported hours, and reinforces the 
potentially diluted impact of the EWTD. Furthermore, the influence of senior doctors over 
their junior counterparts underpins the exclusive culture of the medical profession, its close 
socialisation processes among its members and dissociation with its non-members which 
facilitate the transmission of ideas on work conditions, and an occupational resistance to 
measures such as the Directive. This supports the debates contained in the relevant literature 
in chapter 4 (Sinclair 1997a; Haas and Shaffir 1987; Shapiro 1987).
Some of the long-serving senior consultants had experienced various modes of internal and 
external professional governance including self-regulation, the New Deal and a supranational 
form of legislation. For these doctors, their historical modes of regulation helped to foster 
opposition to the EWTD (chapter 6). The Dean of Medicine referred to a wide disregard 
among a number of older consultants towards a fixed work time, and the further 
encroachment of managerial intervention and scrutiny (Harrison 1990a). Many doctors were 
apparently discontent because their work schedules were not a product of their planning or 
control (BMA 2006b). The growing army of increasingly powerful managers reinforced the 
continuing trend that decisions on work conditions were not being made by doctors’ 
themselves, or by their representative bodies (Williams 2001; Harrison and Ahmad 2000).
Junior doctors
The junior doctors interviewed for this study voiced fewer criticisms of hospital managers in 
general, and about the way in which their work was organised in particular, than did their 
senior counterparts (Greer 2005a). This can be explained by reference to the period in which 
juniors were undertaking their training. Unlike the senior doctors, newly qualified PRHOs 
were not accustomed to the debates and complexities surrounding previous modes of the
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profession’s regulation. The juniors’ indifference to working-time restrictions may therefore 
have been shaped by their lack of a comparative benchmark upon which they could contrast 
their work conditions to those set under previous forms of regulation. It appears that their 
only reference point to other work patterns derived from the accounts voiced by senior 
doctors.
Some tensions among the junior doctors did emerge on issues generally surrounding their 
working time, but these were principally confined to annual leave rather than working hours 
per se. The interviews with junior doctors presented managers as an anonymous workforce 
with whom contact was established on individual matters; this relationship tended to shape 
negative views:
We don’t really know them (Medical Staffing). They are just names on paper. We 
couldn’t get hold of them.
Dr F.
This view depicted a tension that resulted from managers’ perceived lack of accessibility and 
flexibility. Dr E, G and J, for example, described how managers left them with very little 
choice as to when they could take their annual leave entitlements. Other junior doctors saw 
managers as a general nuisance whose influence hindered their working conditions, and 
whose support lacked when disputes arose:
Medical personnel are very obstructive and intimidating and introduce a lot of 
paperwork to discourage complaints.
Survey respondent 26.
Thus, both junior and senior doctors concurred that managerial intervention restricted the 
profession’s autonomy to carry out their routine work, in line with their longstanding self­
regulating tradition. Chapter 8 will also show how junior doctors are consulted less about 
their work conditions than their senior counterparts. Some of them saw managers as 
implementing an agenda to achieve EWTD compliance without giving due consideration to 
their personal concerns on matters such as medical training, medical services and anxieties on 
staffing.
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Junior doctors were a source of resistance to the process of EWTD implementation, 
particularly in relation to their inconsistent obligations to monitor working time. This 
reciprocal duty placed on both junior doctors and their employers was not always met in 
practice. The differences between prescribed and actual working hours among junior doctors 
are discussed below to show how patterns of under-reporting working time escapes the 
attention of management, and undermines the legislation’s effect. However, there were also 
some instances in which junior doctors deliberately over-reported their working hours for 
material gain:
Sometimes, it’s a deliberate ploy for them to keep their hours high so they’ll get 
monitored at the extra band. There’s a perverse incentive built into the system because 
if they get monitored as working beyond the number of working hours, there are 
many instances in which they can get paid more.
Dean and Director for Postgraduate and Medical Education.
The medical staffing manager was aware o f these practices and argued that while in many 
cases junior doctors were honest and cooperative, a small number realised the salary benefits 
of appearing to work longer hours. This, at time, shaped their reporting practices:
If there is an opportunity to slightly slip outside the regulations, then they will make 
sure that that’s happened.
Medical Staffing manager.
The above NHS trust had consequently formulated a range of disciplinary processes to deter 
junior doctors from over-reporting their hours. These involved procedures whereby 
consultants verified the work times recorded by PRHOs. The latter’s refusal to cooperate with 
their monitoring obligations would also result in an official warning.
There were also occasions reported in which managers had been perceived as equally 
responsible for failing to comply with their obligations to monitor working-time:
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I’m not aware that I’m being monitored. Nobody monitors when you come in and 
when you go home.
Dr J.
The majority of the PRHO interviewees, however, had received documentation requesting 
them to record their work hours. Dr E referred to other problems including communication 
difficulties between management and doctors as to when the monitoring periods were taking 
place:
I did mine (monitoring) 3 weeks after. Mine was in my pigeon hole and I didn’t check 
it for 3 weeks and the deadline had already passed. They told me to just backdate 
them. So, I did them all in one go.
Dr E.
The problems associated with the monitoring processes at hospital level were therefore 
attributable to the behaviour of both managers and doctors. These factors had combined with 
the complexities surrounding the lack of state guidance on the implementation of the EWTD 
on a broader level, to shape uneven EWTD-compliant rates among junior doctors:
Insofar as we are struggling for compliance -  no [we did not adequately prepare for 
the EWTD].
Medical Director.
According to some of the study’s elite informants, the issues surrounding the planning and 
implementation of the EWTD had therefore limited the impact of the law. The state’s 
response to the Directive was seen as rooted in its traditional approach towards the regulation 
of working time. This study sought to explore these experiences in more depth by asking 
PRHOs in Wales to report their working time. The survey found that that the average 
working week of PRHOs was 53 hours. It identified 20% of respondents currently meeting 
the 48-hour week requirements that becomes mandatory in August 2009, and 79% complied 
with the 56 hour week which reflects the August 2007 limits. However, of the junior doctors 
who responded to the survey, 21% continued to work in excess of 58 hours a week. Findings 
from both the surveys and interviews revealed that working time was frequently shaped by
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the particular medical speciality within which PRHOs were training. Dr E highlighted such 
differences by reference to her training in surgery, which entailed an eight-hour shift over a 
five-day period for four weeks followed by two weeks of intense twelve-hour shifts, and her 
earlier experience in Accident and Emergency that involved shorter shift arrangements. For 
many informants, these inconsistencies often reflected discrepancies between their actual and 
prescribed or contracted working time:
When you look at your hours sometimes, what you’re meant to be doing and what 
you’re actually doing are different.
Dr B.
Similarly, Dr C’s working time when training in general practice corresponded to the EWTD 
requirements, but 7pm finishes were the trend in Ear, Nose & Throat; her surgery block 
included both shifts and on-call rotas, amounting on occasions to 116 hours per week with no 
protected sleep. Survey respondent 99 reported working 102-108 hours a week during her 
intense shift periods with additional on-call commitments. Overall, the survey found that 68% 
of all respondents worked an average of five hours a week over their prescribed hours, with 
23% of that figure working more than five hours each time. The Dean and Director for 
Postgraduate Medical and Dental Education echoed was not surprised by these findings, and 
acknowledged that the number of doctors who actually worked in excess of their officially 
monitored time in Wales was between 30 and 40 per cent.
These trends were not replicated among flexible PRHO trainees. They were required to work 
a minimum 50% of the equivalent full-time training programme, but over a two-year period. 
In Wales they currently worked between 50-60% of this overall proportion, resulting in an 
average working week of between 28 and 33 hours. Unlike the work patterns of full-time 
PRHOs, the Associate Dean for Flexible Training at the Postgraduate Deanery did not 
identify a general disparity in flexible trainees’ actual and contracted working hours, though 
some exceeded their prescribed hours to complete their PRHO training more quickly. This 
trend was generally attributable to a funding policy run by the Deanery:
Even if the part-time trainees are being placed in departments where the full-time 
trainees aren’t compliant, then we can specify that they can only receive funding for 
part-time training if the posts they go into are EWTD compliant.
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Associate Dean for Flexible Training.
The effect of this policy had been two-fold. The findings showed that the EWTD had had a 
direct impact on the organisation of working time among flexible PRHOs. Secondly, and 
partially as a result, there had been greater levels of interest among PRHOs in applying for 
flexible rather than full-time training (discussed below).
With the exception of flexible trainees, the PRHOs’ experiences of long and inconsistent 
working hours reflected some of the broader issues surrounding the monitoring and 
enforcement of the regulations, discussed above. The dual impact of poor auditing systems 
implemented and enforced by the state had, according to these findings, allowed some junior 
doctors to work excessive hours. This experience also reflects managers’ inconsistent 
implementation of the EWTD among different hospitals and NHS trusts. The state’s role in 
maintaining a voluntarist approach towards the issue of workplace regulation, in this context, 
therefore contributed to the failure to limit the working time of particular segments of the 
medical profession. Together with the lack of reported prosecutions in light of the Directive’s 
non-compliance, these findings support the symbolic nature of the law (Kuhn 1961). 
Ambiguously defined and perhaps even deliberately ‘fudged’ by the state, the EWTD has 
provided sufficient room for those charged with implementing the regulation to interpret and 
effect the provisions in such a way that limits the overall substantive impact.
Furthermore, both managers and senior doctors are also responsible for improperly 
implementing and monitoring the legislation in a manner that corresponds to the spirit of its 
health and safety rationale, by permitting junior doctors to work variable hours -  some of 
which evidently offend the Regulations’ provisions — within the different medical specialities. 
The experience of inconsistent work patterns among PRHOs had consequently shaped their 
variable perspectives on the EWTD. Some of them reflected the criticisms of external 
regulation that were found among a number o f the medical elites in chapter 6, drawing upon 
the perceived demands of the work involved in providing medical care identified in chapter 5:
[Doctors] are expected to work late, to work on. They have to work on-call. They
have to be there eight in the morning and 8 at night.
Medical Student.
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This view echoes that which traditionally resists attempts to regulate doctors’ labour 
conditions, in favour of a self-governed work environment free from external restrictions. 
The survey sought to identify how common these attitudes were among junior doctors by 
asking them to indicate whether or not they would opt-out of the legislation if given the 
choice (as is the case for the general labour market). This also aimed to explore the 
consistency in views between the senior and junior doctors on the issue of EC regulation. The 
results showed that 56% of all respondents would opt out of the EWTD if permitted to do so, 
and that 78% who worked excessive hours thought that doctors should be exempt from the 
EWTD. This suggests that a particular group of junior doctors would choose to work longer 
hours in the absence of regulation, which paradoxically shows how members of a health- 
based profession would put their own welfare at risk in addition to that of their patients by 
working excessive time. Like their seniors, a small proportion of PRHOs viewed the 
Directive as a constraint on their work arguing, as did the elite informants in chapter 6, that 
the regulation failed to accommodate the perceived concerns of medical care:
In a lot of areas you are expected to stay on and be responsible to your patient, finish 
the job you are doing. In some areas that is appropriate.
BMA Deputy Chairman JDC.
Among other factors, the historical “ethos of medicine” (Dr H) had therefore created an 
expectation among some junior doctors to work beyond the hours prescribed by managers 
and legislatures. They were conditioned from the outset to adopt such attitudes while at 
medical school:
It goes back right back to when you start Med School. You are segregated by the 
amount of commitment you’re expected to give.
Dr C.
Experiences of long hours in medical school therefore shaped the attitudes of junior doctors, 
and led to a perceived expectation to such work patterns later on in their careers. These 
longstanding ideas were nurtured and recycled between different generations of doctors 
within a typically closed and elitist professional culture (Beardwood 1999; Stacey 1992), 
whose members shared a common background. This facilitated a process of enhancing and 
reinforcing collective attitudes towards matters such as legal regulation (Kirk-Smith and
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Stretch 2003). On being asked about this culture, the Sub-Dean for Admissions at a medical 
school related to certain characteristics that were common among many of the medical 
students’ backgrounds. Along with the Head of Postgraduate Recruitment and Widening 
Access, he confirmed that this profession generally drew applicants from the higher socio­
economic classes; this was largely attributable to the expense associated with pursuing 
medicine at University:
All the data does show that there are certain groups from social groupings [one to 
three] that tend to apply. Medicine could be more inclusive than what it is at the 
moment.
Sub-Dean for Admissions, Medical School.
In addition to the social class from which medical professionals were more likely to be 
drawn, the Sub-Dean believed that a substantial proportion of medical school applicants came 
from families within which medicine was already practised. Thus recycling cultural notions 
of professionalism and regulation can often take place within and outside of the boundaries of 
medical school and the hospital. The students’ and doctors’ mutual backgrounds were further 
reinforced by the intense dual socialisation and dissociation processes which they underwent 
during their periods of training (Sinclair 1997; Shapiro 1987). Dr C referred to the 
commitments expected of students attending medical school and its consequential segregation 
from other university students, and a medical student similarly spoke about the “cliquey 
bunch” label attached to her course colleagues whose academic and social time was largely 
spent with each other. In line with the socialisation process among medical students was 
therefore a concurrent inclination towards dissociation from other ‘lay’ students (Shapiro 
1987; Elliot 1972). These patterns explained why some junior doctors approached issues such 
as regulation in a similar manner to that adopted by the senior doctors. Certain views were 
therefore contained and transmitted within a closed and exclusive group.
Despite little over half of the survey respondents indicating that they would opt-out of the 
Directive if given the opportunity to do so, every PRHO interviewee agreed on the necessity 
of working to a statutory maximum weekly schedule, and a significant majority of 
respondents (80%) were of the opinion that doctors should not be excluded from within the 
scope of the legislation. This was particularly the case among female PRHOs (86% compared 
to 69% of males) which perhaps reflected their concerns of achieving a good balance between
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work and family life during their more senior grades. This inconsistency in outlook reflects 
the mixed attitudes towards EC regulation adopted by the elite informants in chapter 6. While 
the prospect of better work hours, health and work-life balance influenced a pro-regulatory 
school of thought among many of the juniors, the discussions in the next chapter explore 
facets of the EWTD which they perceived as adversely affecting other aspects of their 
medical services and training. On the one hand, some of their concerns related to the 
legislation itself and, on the other, to both the strategies put into place to implement the 
legislation and the nature of their working environment, neither of which falls within the 
Directive’s ambit.
In response to the resistance to regulation among some of senior consultants interviewed in 
this study, a number of junior doctor informants argued that regulation was vital to address 
these longstanding attitudes. Dr C, for example, often came across consultants referring to 
working-time practices “in their day”. A senior staffing manager similarly argued that the 
senior doctors’ cultural ideas impeded management’s progress on attaining EWTD 
compliance:
The overwhelming views of the consultants are that [regulation on working time] has 
been unfair; its “inappropriate” ; “I have to work seven days a week, so why can’t 
they?”
Medical staffing manager.
The study therefore identified a shared attitude among some of the senior members of the 
medical profession which believed that today’s junior doctors must work long hours simply 
because this was their experience of medical training. Their reference to the working hours 
then and now was used to resist regulation. This view was particularly criticised by one 
informant:
Medicine now is so different and technological, and the expectations of the people in 
the community are such that we cannot compare my experience to the house officer’s 
experience [now].
Consultant Occupational Physician.
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As noted by the Occupational Physician, it was simply incorrect to compare working time 
now against the period in which many of the senior doctors trained, because of the changes in 
the delivery of medical services and training that had occurred over time. Such comparisons, 
and references to “how things were done in their day” (Dr B), tended to generate tensions 
between senior and junior doctors. The latter, by contrast, spoke in length about the 
satisfaction from working far shorter hours:
I don’t think we work too many hours now. I’m quite happy. My hours are good.
Dr E.
Reflecting these thoughts, both the Consultant Surgeon and the Deputy Chair of the BMA’s 
Junior Doctor Committee recorded fewer complaints by junior doctors nowadays about their 
working time, poor health and an ill-balanced work-life. These overall views amounted to 
evidence of more tolerance among juniors than their seniors towards external regulation 
resulting, possibly, from their lack of experience of any other mode of work organisation. 
The Dean of Medicine, a consultant whose work remit oversaw the general welfare and 
teaching of all Medical School students, identified this shift in outlook among the younger 
consultants:
I think what you will find these days are that most consultants, particularly younger 
ones will not expect you to stay.
Dean of Medicine.
Both the Consultant Occupational Physician and the Chief Medical Officer at WAG also 
argued that the long hours’ culture was adjusting alongside the evolving attitudes among 
younger generations of the profession. Such changes are significant insofar as they illustrate 
the developing nature of the medical profession generally, and its particular expectation to 
work excessive hours. The profession is consequently facing internal divisions and 
inconsistencies on the issue of regulation, with the majority of the senior generations on the 
one hand advocating a retraction from EC governance to forms of self-regulation and New 
Deal arrangements (chapter 6), and a significant proportion of junior doctors, together with 
some younger consultants on the other, supporting highly centralised state regulation (Greer 
2005a). Together with the wider evolution of the medical culture, the fragmentation of the 
medical community’s outlook on external regulation, evidenced by the junior doctors’
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attitudes that generally tolerate shorter working hours in compliance with the EWTD, has 
meant that collective opposition to the legislation is perhaps not strong enough to prevent the 
implementation of various management-led approaches that aim to secure compliance with 
the Directive’s requirements. In broader terms, this reflects the ascendancy of managerialism 
and the adjusted dominance of the medical profession over policymaking and the 
administration of medical care (Williams 2001; Harrison and Ahmad 2000; Berg 1997; 
Strong and Robinson 1990).
Supported by its criminal sanctions, the EWTD may have had a restricted role to play in these 
changes insofar as it has highlighted the need to reduce the working hours of doctors in line 
with the rest of the labour market. It had consequently led managers and the profession to 
consider implementing approaches that tackle the long hours’ culture. The Chief Medical 
Officer, along with other informants, explicitly attributed some of these general patterns and 
attitudinal trends to the Directive:
I think [junior doctors’ working hours] have definitely come down as a result of the 
EWTD. That’s what has brought the impetus.
MEP, Labour.
The data pointed towards a general trend of shorter working hours among junior doctors, 
which had been facilitated by management’s wide use of shift systems. However, these 
patterns may have been part of a longer trend; the symbolic and substantive impact of the law 
is discussed in more detail in the study’s conclusions.
Assessment
Hospital Trusts were apparently ill prepared to implement and enforce the EWTD within this 
context, which consequently highlighted the role of the state in the broader process. It affirms 
the generally voluntarist nature of employment relations which continue to govern the 
conditions of work in the UK labour market (Dawson et al. 1988). This trend also 
demonstrates the ambiguous approach adopted by both the state and the medical profession 
towards the Directive. The absence of unambiguous standards has left doctors and their 
employers to shape the legislation’s implementation in a way that accommodates their
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respective concerns over the criminal sanctions for non-compliance on the one hand, and the 
perceived impact of the regulation on medical training and service on the other.
The views on the regulation have therefore highlighted a tension in the different priorities and 
concerns encapsulated by both management and the medical profession. Chapter 6 showed 
how, on one view, the anxieties of managers over the imposition of criminal sanctions had 
compelled them to introduce shorter hours for junior doctors. It might be argued that the use 
of such punishments can achieve compliance far more effectively than with conventional 
regulation whose enforcement techniques are characterised by advice, persuasion and 
negotiation (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). This was largely the position under the 
provisions contained within the doctors’ New Deal. Chapter 6 showed how the differences in 
sanctions underscored the distinct approaches adopted by managers towards New Deal and 
EWTD compliance.
However, this line of argument is, to an extent, flawed by the EWTD’s enforceability. Both 
the widespread non-compliance among the majority of Member States identified in chapter 6, 
together with the inconsistent patterns of compliance among PRHOs in Wales discussed in 
this chapter has made the European Commission’s possibility of initiating proceedings 
against individual hospital chief executives unrealistic. Thus, it could be argued that the 
primary impact of the EWTD therefore derives from the symbolic element of the law 
discussed in the previous chapter (Yaegar 1991; Kuhn 1961), given that the actual prospect of 
prosecution is unlikely. The contrast between the potential seriousness of the sanctions, and 
the actual practical possibilities of applying them in the absence of proper audited central 
records of work hours, therefore raises some serious questions about the regulations’ 
enforceability (Allot 1980), and particularly what kind of evidence could be possibly 
marshalled in a criminal prosecution under this type of law (Yaegar 1991).
The concerns voiced by the medical profession on the EWTD in chapter 5 were not 
influenced by the legislations’ sanctions, but rather on the perceived impact of regulation on 
junior doctors’ health and work-life, and medical training, staffing and services. The process 
of implementing the EWTD has therefore illustrated the different interests at stake, and the 
influence of professional cultural factors in this socio-legal interaction (Gunningham and 
Grabosky 1998; Gunningham and Rees 1997; Makkai and Braithwaite 1993; Grabosky and 
Braithwaite 1986; Kagan and Scholz 1984). On the one hand, managers and senior hospital
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staff had been charged with the responsibility for organising these patterns of work in the 
general absence of state guidance. On the other, doctors’ service and training were required to 
accommodate this organisation of working time with little consultation. These points of 
contention have exacerbated the working relations by elevating the managerial prerogative 
over the way doctors can pursue their clinical work inside and their personal life outside the 
hospital environment. The strains of this relationship were highlighted by a number of 
informants.
Some of the views held by both junior and senior doctors and their managers indicated a 
broader and consistent tension between the medical profession and their employers (Hunter 
1994; Buchanan et al. 1997; Beardwood 1999; Flynn 1999). Nevertheless, the findings 
identified contrasts between the juniors’ experiences under the EWTD and those of the senior 
doctors (Greer 2005a). The variable experiences between junior and senior doctors, and the 
fewer complaints among the former about the implementation of the EWTD lays the ground 
for possible tensions between the way in which different members of the medical profession 
perceive the impact of the Directive in chapter 8.
Conclusion
These findings illustrate how the state’s historical minimal intervention in labour market 
regulation has resulted in a weak enforcement regime charged with the responsibility to 
oversee the NHS managers’ process of implementing and monitoring the EWTD. The 
absence of clear and consistent national guidance and frameworks, arguably in line with the 
legislature’s intention to implement an ambiguously defined regulation (chapter 6), has also 
adversely affected the legislation’s application and compliance rates at individual hospital 
levels. Assessing the degree of irregularity across Britain is, however, hindered by the lack of 
centrally-held and audited sources of information. The position is slightly different in Wales, 
but even the reliability of data here is not sufficiently strong to draw credible conclusions. 
This poses some significant questions about the general enforceability of the criminal 
sanctions contained in the measure -  a factor upon which the majority of elite informants in 
this study based their initial support for the Directive (chapter 6). The contrast between the 
potential seriousness of the sanctions that could be applied to those who do not comply, and 
the actual possibilities of applying such sanctions given that there are no properly audited 
central records of working hours, suggests not only does the lack of evidence limit the
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possibilities of (successful) criminal prosecutions, but that the authorities are turning a ‘blind 
eye’ to regulatory non-compliance. This issue is further addressed in the study’s conclusions.
In the context of a Directive whose monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are to an extent 
flawed, which has arguably affected the degree of compliance and non-compliance within a 
sample population of junior doctors in Wales, the next chapter further explores the variability 
among senior and junior doctors’ responses to the regulation, working from some of the 
differences and similarities identified in this chapter. Fewer complaints about the process of 
implementing the Directive were voiced by juniors, but the findings recognised a shared 
concern over managers’ intervention in their working lives. As members of the same 
profession, will they perceive the EWTD itself in a similar way to which they see the process 
of implementing the legislation? Will the Regulations’ impact mean the same to the senior 
doctors as it will to the junior doctors? These issues are explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8 
The impact of regulating working hours
Introduction
This chapter explores the impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of junior 
doctors, with specific reference to the European Working Time Directive. It does so by 
analysing the claims made by both junior and more senior members of the medical profession 
as to the impact of the legislation on their life within and outside of work. Their claims, based 
on the personal experiences reported in the surveys, interviews and electronic diaries are 
thematically organised under the topics of health and work-life, medical training, and medical 
staffing and services.
These discussions build on the key themes identified in the literature reviewed in chapter 5, in 
particular the perceived impact of the legislation on different aspects of junior doctors’ work 
and lives. This chapter will therefore examine whether the most junior sector of the medical 
profession regard what they see are the effects of the EWTD in the same light as their senior 
counterparts. This analysis draws out the variations between the senior and junior doctors’ 
experiences on the Directive’s implementation by the widespread use of the shift system and 
inconsistent patterns of compliance, discussed in chapter 7. This theme is further developed 
in this chapter to assess the degree of contradiction between different members of the medical 
profession, and to consider the implications in terms of how the regulation is perceived.
The chapter sets out the claims upon which the junior doctors’ support and oppose the 
Directive in a fashion similar to the discussions which sought to identify the perceptions of 
the elite informants in chapter 6. The differences between both groups, however, may 
presumably be shaped by the juniors’ lack of experience of their profession’s previous modes 
of regulation described in chapter 4. For them, conditions of work have not altered as a result 
of the EWTD. They are unaware of any other forms of work regulation or working-time 
organisation using shift patterns, except for the references made by senior members of the 
profession who have had such experiences. The senior doctors’ views about the tensions 
surrounding the regulation of their work provide a contextual focus for the findings related by 
junior doctors. It is a key reference point within which they operate, and is reinforced by the 
closed and exclusive nature of the medical profession within which certain ideas are
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transmitted between generations of doctors. Chapter 4 identified this source as a particular 
problem in regulating the profession, and the discussions in this chapter explore the 
significance of this phenomenon in the context of the EWTD’s impact. The chapter therefore 
addresses the third research objective by attempting to analyse the apparent impact of 
regulating working time on the work and lives of junior doctors.
Junior doctors’ health & work-life
One would assume that the impact of the EWTD on the health of junior doctors would be 
significant in light of its regulatory objective under article 118a of the Treaty of Rome to 
improve workers’ safety and health by prescribing maximum working hours. The survey, 
however, identified ill health among the PRHO respondents before and after the regulations’ 
implementation. They both ascertained which symptoms of poor health (if any) the 
respondents believed were attributed to long working hours. These findings are presented in 
table 4:
Table 4
Poor health as a result o f long working hours
Symptom All survey respondents (%)
Exhaustion / Fatigue 70.5
Stress 56.1
Tension 44.6
Anxiety 41
Headaches/Migraine 32.4
Insomnia 29.5
Weight loss 28.8
Mood symptoms 28.8
Emotional Distress 22.3
Depression 9.4
Suicidal thoughts 2.9
None 8.6
Exhaustion and/or fatigue represented the most commonly experienced symptom which the 
survey respondents attributed to long working hours, but the overall instances of 
psychological distress -  stress, tension, anxiety, emotional distress, depression and suicidal 
thoughts -  far exceeded this. These findings reflect many of the empirical studies focused on 
the general health/hours relationship in addition to the specific literature on doctors’ health 
discussed in chapter 5 (Beswick and White 2003; Kodz et al. 2003; Kapur et al. 1999; Sparks 
et a l  1997; Spurgeon and Harrington 1989; Firth-Cozens 1987). On the one hand, this 
suggests that the EWTD, as a health and safety regulation, is crucial for the improved welfare
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of junior doctors. On the other, the very fact that the junior doctors were reporting these 
symptoms after the implementation of the EWTD implies that the regulations’ impact has 
thus far proved minimal. These findings suggest that the Directive, ambiguously defined and 
inconsistently applied as a result, has failed to implement changes which correspond to its 
primary health objective. It is thus arguable that the continued discontent among those being 
regulated in reality affirms the role of the legislation as playing a more symbolic function.
Overall, women doctors were characterised as reporting poorer health than men, with the 
exception of tension (47% of men experienced this compared with 43% women). However, it 
does not necessarily follow that men suffer less than women. In fact, more men than women 
in the first cohort reported that they experienced higher levels of exhaustion/fatigue, stress, 
tension, mood symptoms and depression. Other conditions not included in table. 1 emerged in 
the interviews and survey responses which were similarly perceived as resulting from 
working long hours. They included eating disorders, weight loss, difficulties in sleeping, 
sickness and dermatological problems:
Many people, my friends in particular lost loads of weight, couldn’t sleep and were 
really clinically depressed. Most of the girls say if you want an instant diet, go get a 
house officer job!
Dr C.
Survey respondent 101 had experienced suicide thoughts “once after a weekend of 45 hours 
in three days”. These findings accord with national mortality statistics for members of the 
medical profession:
You would find that the standard mortality ratio is higher in doctors than in other 
groups.
Consultant Occupational Physician.
Caution should be taken in interpreting this data as the experiences of poor-health were self- 
reported, and their degree was subjectively measured. The consistency in defining each 
symptom of ill-health was more reliable given that the respondents diagnosed such illnesses 
as part of their everyday work. Nevertheless, the subjectivity associated with the self­
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reporting method potentially raised questions about the variability between respondents’ 
individual tolerances to poor health. Methodologically, the survey’s limitations mean that the 
data cannot be interpreted as providing an authoritative measurement of the specific impact 
of the EWTD, but the findings provide a basis for informed speculation about the effects of 
the regulations’ implementation and the general relationship between work time and health.
Partly as a consequence of their poor health, the PRHOs’ careers were being adversely 
affected. Some of them, for example, had delayed their GMC registration for reasons related 
to their apparent lack of experience and clinical exposure in medical training, but the Dean 
and Director for Postgraduate and Medical Education also acknowledged that a small number 
delayed their registration because of sickness. Dr G, a PRHO training on a flexible basis, had 
contemplated on withdrawing from medicine completely as a result of stress. These types of 
experiences, reiterated by the consultant occupational physician, were shared among other 
junior doctors:
I know a few of my friends who have dropped out, and a house officer I knew in [city
hospital] has just dropped out [he had] had enough the hours they were made to work.
Dr F.
There was a small percentage of newly qualified doctors who were not therefore accredited at 
the end of their PRHO training period with the GMC on grounds that work conditions had 
resulted in poor health and sickness. Some of the elite stakeholders, however, argued that the 
stressful nature of working in a hospital environment was often the source of such illness 
(chapter 6), thus portraying the hours/health interaction as necessitating consideration of the 
broader environmental, organisational and individualistic factors which have a role to play.
The study’s focus on doctors’ health within the context of regulation had revealed some 
interesting paradoxes in line with conclusions drawn from other research (Cartwright et al. 
2002; Moss et al. 1996; Firth-Cozens 1987; Firth 1986). The first paradox related to the 
general experience of illness among those who are themselves charged with providing 
medical care, and who were also working within the limits prescribed by a health-based 
Directive. Half of the respondents who reported experiences of poor health chose to work 
longer hours (50%), and almost half of these respondents would have liked to see doctors 
exempt from working-time regulation altogether (42%). The second paradox related to the
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PRHOs’ general unwillingness to take time off work (72%, with no differences reported 
between males and females). Dr G summed up the reasoning underpinning this trend:
I feel guilty about it (taking time off work). Last year I had the flu and was actually 
sick at work, but felt guilty about taking time off, letting down my team.
Dr G.
The majority of informants echoed Dr G ’s concerns by referring to the importance of team 
support despite sometimes being ill at work with conjunctivitis, the Turgy’, physical sickness 
and even a broken arm! The findings therefore showed how PRHOs, unwilling to take time 
off, yet experiencing such symptoms, consequently exposed illnesses not only to other 
members of the team upon whom they felt they could not ‘let down’ in the first place, but 
also to the patients whose welfare was their professional concern. These paradoxes could be 
explained by what this study identified as a ‘coping culture’ among members of the medical 
profession. This is an expectation which considers doctors to be immune from poor health by 
the very nature of their occupational roles (Cassidy and Griffiths 2004). In attempting to 
maintain this representation, doctors were “expected to grit their teeth” (Consultant in 
Paediatrics) and “to simply get on with their work” (Dr B):
There is certainly an expectation that you will be able to cope with it. Most people do 
cope, and your time and experiences in your studies makes you realise what is 
expected of you. But then sometimes, there are a few who find it more difficult and 
often stressful.
Consultant Surgeon.
The so-called coping culture raised the issue of support and help for those doctors 
experiencing difficulties. Rather than seeking professional advice and using the appropriate 
(and legal) channels, some of the study’s informants had reported self-prescription among a 
few doctors as part of their coping strategy (Forsythe et al. 1999; Baldwin et al. \991b\ 
McKee and Black 1992). The occupational physician had been approached on several 
occasions by consultants and other doctors in their latter years of training for medication to 
‘cope’ with the effects of work. In his experience, doctors often did not resort to consulting a 
GP simply because they found physically accessing one did not coincide with their work 
patterns. These access difficulties were exacerbated for PRHOs whose training periods
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involved moving around different hospitals and specialties over a short term. Doctors also 
avoided visiting their GPs for another reason:
There may be subconsciously a desire to avoid certain diagnoses, not to face up to 
their diagnoses and to consult with somebody whose going to make a diagnosis that 
you don’t want to hear.
Consultant Occupational Physician.
Self-prescriptions and self-referrals were, according to the PRHO informants, confined to the 
senior members of the medical profession, and doctors E, F, and G had all authorised the 
prescription of medication for those in their latter stages of training.
A proportion of the study’s informants perceived the EWTD as potentially delivering a better 
work-life balance by reducing their time spent at work. The latter has been explicitly linked 
with various health effects (Allen 1994). The general EW TD’s phased reduction in doctors’ 
hours had resulted in little over half (56%) of the survey respondents being satisfied with 
their work-life balance, more so among men (59%). PRHOs maintaining their actual working 
hours were more satisfied (80%) compared to those who worked over their prescribed hours 
(46%). The findings therefore identified a corresponding analogy between working hours and 
work-life satisfaction: the fewer the hours worked by junior doctors, the more satisfied they 
were with their work-life balance. For those working 48 hours a week, 82% were content, 
compared to lower satisfaction levels among PRHOs working longer hours (63% and 61% of 
respondents reported satisfaction if they worked a 56-hour and 58-hour week, respectively). 
The reduction in hours, facilitated by the EWTD, therefore underscored the regulatory impact 
on the lives of junior doctors spent outside their working environment:
For those who consider their health, work-life and extra commitments to be important, 
the Directive is a God send!
Dr H.
Conversely, this attitude illustrated the general dissatisfaction with long working hours. In 
line with the literature (Evans et al. 2004; CHI 2004), the junior doctors’ tolerance of external
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regulation was partially driven by their preference for a better work-life before job 
commitment:
People must realise that doctors are not robots. You can’t re-power them in thirty 
seconds. We are human beings. We are entitled to a life. That’s why hours should be 
reduced -  to be in keeping with the quality of life like other people in society.
Dr C.
The overall findings depicted a broader tension between the views generally held by junior 
doctors nowadays and the longstanding professional ethos which, characterising the outlook 
of many senior doctors, underpinned the way in which medicine has been traditionally 
organised. On the issue of work-life, many of the juniors who were interviewed questioned 
why medicine should be considered any different to other sectors in the labour market. The 
desire to standardise work conditions reflected the perceived unequal treatment among the 
younger doctors in the profession compared with general workers. This point of view clearly 
contrasts with the opposition voiced by the elite informants in chapter 6. The ambiguity 
surrounding the fundamental terms of the Directive permitted them to shape a similarly vague 
approach to the Regulations’ implementation and compliance, which ultimately limited the 
impact of the legislation.
Some juniors, however, continued to share the views of their elders, but not for reasons 
influenced by the broader ideological debates surrounding the regulation of their labour 
conditions. Rather, the findings of this study suggest that some perceived the reduction in 
working time brought about by the EWTD as impinging on their salary and as aggravating 
both poor health and work-life. First, the issue of salary was important to all PRHO 
informants, particularly given the expense of attending medical school, a later 
commencement in the labour market compared to other graduates, and the perception 
surrounding the reduction in working hours as a means of curtailing their earning potential. 
The survey therefore asked the following question:
5.5 Would you work longer working hours if your salary and/or overtime 
payments were substantially increased?
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Only a slight majority (56%) of the respondents stated that they would work longer hours if 
they were paid more; this was greater among men (65%) than women (50%). Those working 
shorter hours -  up to and including 48 per week -  were willing to work for longer periods 
accompanied by a corresponding salary (63%), whereas PRHOs working above a 48-hour 
week did not share the same view (51%). This response may have been shaped by an 
assumption that a higher salary would not compensate for more time spent at the workplace. 
More respondents who desired longer hours with a better salary predictably resisted the 
EWTD (71%). Doctors E, F and G, for example, expressed a preference to work longer hours 
with a corresponding income, and each of them intended on undertaking locum work, 
suggesting that they saw working-time regulation as a form of limiting their capacity and 
choice to earn:
It is important that people have a choice to work longer hours. Having a previous
degree/single/no kids/£4000 debt. I want and have to work.
Survey respondent 88.
These attitudes fit in with the broader criticisms made by senior members of the medical 
profession in chapter 6 that regulation, by its very nature, imposes restrictions on certain 
aspects of their individual autonomy. Against a historical backdrop of self-regulation, the 
data gathered from the study’s elite informants showed how external intervention in the form 
of the EWTD had given rise to some strong tensions. These corresponded with the debates in 
chapter 4 which describes how the clinical autonomy of doctors has been gradually restrained 
over time through the ascendancy of both managerialism and statutory control by the state 
(Hunter 1994). As a result of the ECJ’s more specific intervention the informants reverted to 
support the New Deal arrangements. In this instance, the issue of salary underpinned some of 
the junior doctors’ discontent with the constraints associated with the regulation. The 
importance of salary as a factor shaping concerns about the regulations should not, however, 
be over-stated. Very few informants opposed the EWTD on the basis of salary simply 
because the study explicitly found that more doctors preferred a better work-life balance (see 
above). Furthermore, the anxieties surrounding the impact of reduced hours on salary were 
largely resolved by the new pay structure negotiated between the BMA and the Department 
of Health in 2000 (see chapter 5).
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Secondly, chronic fatigue and exhaustion, brought about by intense shift work and an 
accumulation of both insufficient sleep and inadequate recovery periods meant that individual 
doctors “adjust to just not ever having enough sleep” (Dr A):
After the end of the two weeks on shifts, you feel physically exhausted. You could 
work 100, 120 hours. You have no life. You literally go to work, go home and sleep 
again.
Dr E.
Paradoxically some junior doctors were experiencing the opposite effect of what the 
Directive had set out to achieve, and this was reflected in their ongoing poor health identified 
by the surveys. The implementation of shifts was producing levels of fatigue and exhaustion 
that were, according to the RCS, analogous to “permanent jet lag”. Their effects were 
illustrated by three individual accounts by the PRHOs of separate road traffic accidents which 
occurred on junior doctors’ return from hospital after working intense shifts having had little 
opportunity to rest. Coincidentally, a PRHO and personal friend of the author was also 
involved in a car accident on his return from a night shift at the hospital. The doctor recalled 
falling asleep while driving, and simply attributed the incident to such an overwhelming state 
of fatigue accumulated over a period of intense shift patterns. Thus, the methods of 
implementing the welfare-based Directive have ironically led, in a number of instances, to a 
worse state of health among some junior doctors:
My own view, as a clinician, is that we have not done anything to improve the well­
being of the doctors in training. The way the working patterns have been structured 
with blocks of long days or blocks of night shifts is much more difficult to adjust to 
doing four nights in a row than in the past when they did one 24-hour shift.
Associate Dean for Flexible Training.
In spite of the reductions in doctors’ excessive working hours, these experiences suggest that 
the shift system has diluted the potentially significant impact of the EWTD on junior doctors’ 
health and work-life. The discontent associated with this aspect of regulation, however, can 
be attributed to the failure of the medical profession to respond to the EWTD effectively and 
in line with the needs of its own members. By attempting to address juniors’ working time 
through the implementation of generic and monolithic shift work, the profession and hospital
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management have lacked the necessary innovation to apply more appropriate systems that 
accommodate the specific concerns voiced by the profession.
This chapter has thus far focused on the experiences of junior doctors under the EWTD 
regime. These discussions have highlighted some of their variable views, particularly on the 
necessity of regulation and on the perceived impact of the Directive on their health and work- 
life to a smaller extent. It is argued that the different facets of their work and individual life 
experiences have fuelled some of these inconsistent views. The following sections focus on 
certain aspects of the work carried out by junior doctors. They consider medical training and 
medical staffing and services. It is necessary to explore these different contexts as they shape 
and underpin their responses to the regulation. As a result, the findings should identify the 
consistencies and contradictions between junior and senior doctors. These draw upon the 
similarities and differences in attitudes discussed in chapter 7 on the issue of the EWTD’s 
implementation and compliance. The significance of the shift system is therefore again 
explored in the following sections, but in more depth within each of the juniors’ facets of 
medical work.
Medical training
Medical training is important for two reasons. First, it has provided the medical profession 
with a monopoly over expert knowledge unrivalled by other professions and which has 
subsequently permitted doctors to influence policymaking in health care and its generally 
elite position in the labour market (Beardwood 1999; Coburn 1993; Larkin 1993; Stacey 
1992; Freidson 1970a, 1970b). It is from this basis that the profession was permitted clinical 
autonomy and the authority to self-regulate the activities of both itself and the provision of 
medical care (Furst 1998). Secondly, the issue of medical education is particularly important 
for doctors who are currently undertaking their training within the working-time restrictions. 
The need for prolonged clinical exposure and hence long hours has traditionally been 
motivated by such factors as confidence to practice and career progression. The essence of 
regulating working time was therefore inevitably seen as restricting these aspects of medical 
training:
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There is an awful amount of unrest in relation to the way [the EWTD] has been 
implemented... gross reductions in exposure of training times and exposure to trainers; 
gross reductions of experience in outpatient’s clinics in the operating theatres
Chairman of EWTD Steering Group, Royal College of Surgeons.
For some junior doctors, the EWTD was seen as negatively affecting their ability to 
undertake the necessary service and education which met their professional expectations. The 
survey and interview data from PRHOs highlighted three anxieties in particular regarding 
junior doctors’ medical training. Each example was reflected in the literature in chapter 5 (for 
example, Mather 2004; Sim et al. 2004; Scallan 2003; Williams and Cantillon 2000; 
Alkhulaifi et al. 1995), and rested on the premise that the Directive impacted negatively on 
this feature of their working lives. Each one, however, is susceptible to the alternative 
argument which focuses on the lack of creativity by elite stakeholders to implement more 
appropriate work patterns in response to the EWTD. This study does not aim to put forward a 
comprehensive set of proposals on alternative work strategies to implement the Directive, but 
suggests some possible options in the relevant sections of this chapter, and in the study’s 
conclusions.
The first of the PRHOs’ concerns related to the replacement of on-call arrangements with 
shift systems:
When I was doing Medicine, the day-to-day stuff you are not really learning anything. 
What you learn, you learn when you’re on-call.
Dr C.
Given the dependent nature of patients on junior doctors’ medical training and experience, Dr 
C found that her clinical exposure at atypical times of the working day were of most benefit 
to her training. Dr B concurred, and simply stayed on beyond her work hours for similar 
reasons:
If the patient is sick and they are doing procedures, sometimes you stay from that 
point of view, because that’s the only time you’re going to see it and that you’re going 
to be taught it.
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Dr B.
These responses were reflected among a substantial proportion of survey respondents who 
believed that training in both medicine and surgery in particular afforded them with essential 
opportunities to learn about the various clinical procedures but that would not usually occur 
in a routine day or weekly shift (Shabbir et al. 2005). The EWTD was therefore viewed as 
restricting their ability to train outside the time prescribed in their working patterns. 
However, the regulation contains no reference on how the medical training is to operate 
under fewer working hours. This is a matter for the medical profession to resolve by 
organising an adequate training programme that covers different times of the day, thus 
protecting junior doctors under the EWTD provisions whilst retaining the benefit of caseloads 
at atypical times to enhance their training.
The PRHOs’ second concern was linked to the perceived impact of the Directive on the 
reduction of available time to attend educational classes and seminars (Sim et al. 2004; 
William and Cantillon 2000):
[I] Have hardly attended any [classes]. Clashes with clinics/ward rounds and generally
busy job -  I get hassle then from Postgrad saying I’m not attending enough sessions.
By far the annoying bloody thing is I want to go to learn!
Survey respondent 88.
The working-time restrictions were seen as frustrating some essential aspects of medical 
learning, but this study argues that these tensions between service and education have nothing 
to do with the EWTD. It is for both the hospitals, as employers, and the profession to 
accommodate the junior doctors by organising time effectively for service on the one hand, 
and for education on the other. Structured timetabling would therefore seem to resolve some 
of the apprehension surrounding missed classes. The profession should therefore explore 
beyond the boundaries of conventional training methods to situations which can sit side by 
side with unexpected ‘service’ caseloads. The primary example is e-learning; the National 
Workforce Projects (NWP) has continued the work initiated by the Modernisation Agency 
into looking at the use of technology amongst other implementation strategies to facilitate 
junior doctors’ training under the EWTD (chapter 5). It is hoped that such changes to the
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timetabling and delivery of education will allay some of the anxieties of doctors who 
currently experience difficulty in juggling their service and training commitments.
The third and consequential concern voiced by junior doctors on the theme of medical 
training surrounded their confidence and competence to clinically perform within a working 
environment which had seen a reduction in their exposure time (Shabbir et a l  2005; Kapur 
and House 1998). This was summarised by a Plaid Cymru AM and GP:
Because of the restriction in hours, (a) they do not appear to be as confident and, (b) 
as well-trained ‘in the business’ they know they are inexperienced. They are also 
relatively inexperienced to consultants of previous generations who had spent 
thousands of hours in training, and these have got there with hundreds of hours of 
training
AM, Plaid Cymru.
Such an approach reflected the views of many of the senior consultants, however this 
reasoning is flawed on two fronts. First, it was not supported by any substantial evidence; the 
available literature and studies have not conducted competency tests to ascertain levels of 
confidence and capability following the EW TD’s implementation. Such tests would in any 
case raise some serious methodological questions on measuring a factor like competency 
between two periods of time, during which the doctors’ working environment has 
significantly changed. Secondly, and related to the latter point, the claim was based on a 
perception which reverted to the patterns of work carried out almost two decades ago, and 
even longer in some instances. Basing arguments on experiences at a workplace with minimal 
regulation years ago is not sustainable in the comparably regulated modern context.
The survey showed a more significant impact on the organisation of working time among 
flexible PRHOs than their full-time counterparts owing to the funding arrangements which 
were in place if regulatory compliance was achieved (see chapter 7). The Associate Dean for 
Flexible Training, responsible for overseeing flexible training at the Postgraduate Deanery, 
had anticipated the demand for flexible training posts to decrease in line with the working 
hours of full-timers brought about by the Directive. In contrast, she found that the exact 
opposite was occurring:
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The EWTD seems to be driving people into part-time work because they don’t like 
the shift patterns of the full-time workers.
Associate Dean for Flexible Training.
As a result of the criticisms associated with the implementation of the shift system among 
full-time PRHOs, considerable interest had therefore mounted in favour of flexible training. 
However, the Deputy Chairman of the Junior Doctor Committee at the BMA argued that 
while there was “a lot of rhetoric about flexible training and flexible employment”, the 
number of flexible training posts in the NHS had not, in fact, increased in proportion to the 
demand (BMA 2004c):
Flexible working has become in the last few years less flexibly than what it is meant 
to be...there are people who are in Medicine and would like to work part-time, but 
they haven’t even bothered applying for it because they don’t think they’ll get it, and 
there are others who have left Medicine because they can’t find the part-time jobs.
Consultant in palliative care.
Failure to address the issue was, according to this informant, having a detrimental effect on 
recruitment and retention of doctors which was of particular concern in light of the rise in the 
number of female medical students who would later be entering the profession and seeking 
more flexible training options6. The responsibility to fund such posts in order to meet the 
current and future demand rests with the state. Its reluctance to increase the intake on a more 
substantial level arguably reflects its policy of healthcare rationalisation in this particular area 
(chapter 3). Places at medical school require the same amount of state funding irrespective of 
whether the students intend to train on a full- or part-time basis. It is therefore not in the 
interests of the government to later fund PRHO training on a flexible basis when considerable 
investment was put into educating potentially full-time PRHOs. Responsibility for the 
discrepancy between demand and opportunity for flexible training also rests with the medical 
profession and hospital managers. Discussions in this chapter have highlighted their lack of 
innovation in arranging more flexible work systems (for those working in a full-time basis) 
that comply with the Directive’s requirements. It was also argued in the assessment in chapter
6 Unfortunately, the survey did not ask respondents to indicate whether or not they would 
have opted for flexible training had it been made available.
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6 that it was not in the interests of the medical profession to expand on its membership. The 
problems of the current situation were exacerbated by adverse cultural notions:
Not every consultant supports part-time work.
Dean of Medicine.
The reason underpinning some of the consultants’ reluctance to endorse part-time training 
was related, according to the Dean of Medicine, to the absence of a consistent and full-time 
‘medical team’. These views are echoed in some of the literature detailed in chapter 5 (North 
West Wales NHS Trust 2002), but they are arguably the product of the shift system in 
addition to ongoing strategies comprising multi-professional teams (discussed below). The 
current work patterns preclude PRHOs’ presence at the hospital and the approaches to 
incorporating more non-medical professionals into the healthcare team illustrate the general 
move away from the conventional ‘medical team .’
In line with the literature (Allen 1994) some of the junior doctors also held reservations about 
flexible training but for different reasons than those voiced by their seniors. Their anxieties 
firstly surrounded the consultants’ negative perceptions on flexible training, supporting the 
concept of recycled ideas from within a closed and elitist professional community (Allen 
2005). Secondly, with the exception of Dr G, the PRHO interviewees concurred that training 
part-time was “practically impossible and very inflexible” (Dr A). The prolonged training 
period (spread over two years rather than one) was seen as being of a lower quality than the 
full-time programme:
If I was doing flexible training, I’d be worried that I wouldn’t be getting the training 
because it’s not crammed enough.
Dr F.
These concerns were therefore based on the view that training spread over a longer period 
would result in both less time spent at the hospital and less clinical exposure, and suggests 
that doctors undertaking training on a flexible basis would not necessarily cope as well if 
confronted with a full-time model. This view was shared by some hospital managers and 
personnel. The WAG’s Chief Medical Officer acknowledged that certain trusts continued to
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take a dim view of flexible trainees, and that this sometimes transpired in their decisions 
whether or not to employ them (EOR 2003; BMA 2001). Dr G, a part-time PRHO, had 
gained direct experience of this discrimination:
I have had a few problems in applying for SHO jobs. I went for one job in (named a 
hospital). I didn’t get it, and I went to ask why. One of the reasons, they said, was 
because I had worked part-time they didn’t think I would be able to cope with a full­
time SHO job.
Dr G.
The Dean of Medicine, in his experience, had also found that some hospital trusts were “not 
necessarily as positive”. The overall response could be attributed to the failure of the medical 
profession, hospital managers and the state to respond to the EWTD effectively and in line 
with the needs of junior doctors. The Chief Medical Officer was, however, optimistic that the 
general negativity surrounding the work of junior doctors working on flexible rotas would 
soon dispel with the implementation of the EWTD. She was of the opinion that the 
widespread operation of a shift system among full-time PRHOs would gradually reduce their 
working hours in line with the Directive’s phased implementation almost to the same weekly 
hours as those on a flexible basis, thereby putting them all in “the same bucket”. The minimal 
difference in work hours between the two cohorts would, in her view, challenge such 
assumptions that flexible trainees are less able to cope than their full-time counterparts.
Both full-time and flexible PRHOs judged the quality of their training as variable, depending 
on factors such as their particular supervisor/consultant, their speciality and hospital. These 
findings are in line with those contained in the literature (Scallan 2003). Many of the junior 
doctors spoke at length about what they perceived as aspects of their training and service 
requirements which were both unproductive and a poor use of their working time (Bogg et al. 
2001; Lambert et al. 2000). Dr E labelled PRHOs generally as “gophers” while Dr C ’s jobs 
were sometimes described as “crappy”. The latter included answering relatives’ questions on 
whether or not a particular patient had received a brain scan, searching for beds, finding notes 
and portering. Taking blood and collecting X-rays were among other responsibilities that did 
not particularly benefit the junior doctors’ training:
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I feel like a secretary sometimes. I do a lot of paperwork and filing. There could be a 
quicker way of doing this.
Dr F.
Dr B often found herself spending too much time on “a lot more jobs like mundane 
paperwork, rather than learning stuff we may have done five, ten years ago when our hours 
weren’t so restrictive”. Comments taken from two Dictaphone diaries also revealed specific 
differences in the quality of training. Dr E felt particularly frustrated during her shift owing to 
a consultant arriving very late and she felt as though she had not “really had any teaching at 
all” on that day. Dr F, on the other hand, was notably satisfied with the levels of exposure and 
teaching that she received and considered herself “lucky” that both her consultant and 
registrar were “very supportive and very proactive in teaching” her. However, by contrast, a 
later diary entry recorded her anxieties about informing a patient of an imminent operation 
for which she had little knowledge of the procedures involved:
1.40pm. I’ve just been rung by the Registrar on-call who wants me to see a young lad 
he’s just seen with a query about his testes. He needs to be taken to theatre for further 
exploration under anaesthetic, so he’s asked me to go and see him to consent for this 
procedure. I’m not really comfortable asking people to consent to procedures that I’m 
not familiar with. This isn’t one I’ve done before or assisted with before. Ideally, all 
the guidelines state that the surgeon should always consent the patient before doing it 
(the operation)...My supervision today was pretty bad actually.
Dr F, Dictaphone Diary.
The quality of training therefore differed between juniors and their various seniors on a 
substantial scale. Similar experiences were reiterated by other PRHO informants. In spite of 
these trends evidence collected by the NHS Modernisation Agency found that medical 
training for junior doctors was far more structured nowadays than in previous times (White et 
al. 2005) when long working hours were the norm:
A lot of the outcomes on training have actually been improvement in training...better 
support, decision-making. In some of our pilots there have been support workers to 
release the juniors for them to attend their training sessions.
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Acting Director, NHS Modernisation Agency.
This suggests that reform to medical training had only been a recent initiative, with many 
believing that it was the result of a broader effort to comply with the EWTD requirements 
(Marron et al. 2005). While this may be so, an argument which states that both medical 
training and clinical exposure are being adversely affected by the Directive alone disregards 
the lack of innovation on the parts of doctors and hospital managers to address these matters 
by alternative measures rather than solely adopting the widespread use of shift systems. Many 
of the points raised regarding this issue relate to the quality, method and delivery of medical 
training, over which the EWTD has no bearing. In this light, its impact is minimal. Changes 
to work patterns and medical training necessitate a corresponding modification in the senior 
consultants’ attitudes. The Dean and Director o f the Postgraduate Deanery in Wales, 
responsible for organising the overall training of junior doctors, was encouraging the use of 
various teaching techniques in response to the regulated reduction of working time, including 
informal education such as supervision, mentoring and coaching. Like some other 
interviewees, he commented on the “uphill struggle” in convincing the older consultants to 
adapt their educative roles in line with the regulatory changes:
As most of the educational techniques are foreign to most of the consultants whose 
one and only method of teaching is lecturing, and whether it’s one-to-one, standing 
around a bed or in a lecture theatre, they behave the same way.
Director and Dean for Postgraduate Dental and Medical Education.
Notwithstanding the consultants’ attitudes, the Chief Medical Officer believed that the 
delivery of medical education was possible under the EWTD regime, provided that the 
trainee and trainer fully cooperated with the process of change, and used their time 
effectively. These changes again fall outside of the Directive’s ambit. The senior consultants 
not only needed to adapt in line with the modem regulatory requirements, but also in 
response to the broader changes facing the NHS.
Many of the discussions focused on the impact of the EWTD on medical training are flawed 
on the basis that the current state of discontent is largely the product of the methods used to 
implement the legislation. In contrast to some of the claims made by the study’s informants, 
the Directive plays a limited role on the delivery of medical education. It has been argued that
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a collection of these perceptions have been shaped by the influence of senior doctors. 
Medical training, however, only constitutes one of two integral roles for the juniors. Medical 
service forms their second function, but both are inextricably linked (Scallan 2003; North 
West Wales NHS Trust 2002). It is therefore necessary to consider the significance of this 
second aspect of the junior doctors’ purpose to determine the extent of consistency in their 
views surrounding the EWTD.
Medical staffing and services
Opposition to the EWTD for some informants rested on the notion that restricting junior 
doctors’ working time also corresponded to their more limited presence at the hospital (BMA 
2004b), thereby imposing extra pressures on the existing shortages and workload pressures in 
the health system:
It’s quite hard not to work such long hours, because there’s such a large workload, 
and there are not enough doctors to go around
Dr D.
This view reflects the broader concerns which, in the context of current staffing levels, have 
prompted concerns that compliance with the European Directive is unsustainable in the UK 
Health System (Hellawell et al. 2005; Molloy 2003; Pickersgill 2001). The reduced presence 
of juniors in the hospital had therefore provoked within some of these debates the need to 
recruit more doctors to account for the impact of the EWTD. The discussions in chapter 6, 
however, have highlighted the continued restricted entry into the profession despite the strain 
between the demand and supply for medical staffing (Fox 2007). It is argued that this 
experience is arguably shaped by the profession’s historical roots (Larson 1977) and 
longstanding mode of self-regulation, which have conventionally addressed work issues in a 
manner suited to the members of the particular sector (Stacey 1992). This theme has 
consistently underlined the profession’s desire to maintain the status quo and to exclude 
outside influence or intervention, possibly by making its membership less restricted.
According to the Director and Dean for Postgraduate Dental and Medical Education the 
intakes of PRHOs and Medical students were steadily rising, particularly with the 
introduction of a new graduate entry scheme into Medicine in Wales. The next four years
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were going to see an increase from 240 to 350 qualified doctors here, but the benefits would 
not be realised in the short term. Furthermore, the Acting Head of the EWTD Pilots at the 
Department of Health’s NHS Modernisation Agency and the Junior Doctor Coordinator at 
WAG outlined the government’s strategy, which was not to recruit more junior doctors but 
rather to make use of existing resources by ensuring that the presence of junior doctors in 
hospitals was fully utilised and to redistribute some of their work, hitherto confined to the 
medical profession, to other members o f the healthcare professions.
As the agent responsible for politically and legally implementing the EWTD, the state has 
had very little input into the process. Typically maintaining its non-interventionist role in 
workplace relations, since 1997 New Labour has limited its involvement to the funding of a 
series of pilots which have explored innovative ways at how other workers can perform some 
of the duties traditionally carried out by doctors (chapter 5). Its power to expand doctor 
numbers illustrates the continued policy of healthcare rationalisation in areas such as this. 
The process of addressing the issue has therefore been primarily left to the medical and 
healthcare professions, and hospital managers.
The debates surrounding work reorganisation also entail far broader discussions about the 
delivery of medical and healthcare in the NHS than what can be claimed is a result of the 
EWTD. The redistribution of tasks carried out thus far by junior doctors among the allied 
healthcare workforce were cautiously welcomed by the informant allied health professions 
for providing theatre staff, operation department practitioners (ODPs) and nurses with further 
clinical, managerial and educational opportunities. According to the Royal College of 
Nursing, the Hospital at Night project (HAN) had promoted the nurses’ integration in the out- 
of-hours’ healthcare team, and had elevated their clinical responsibilities such as phlebotomy 
and ECG monitoring (chapter 5). There were apparent benefits for junior doctors, too. 
According to both the Dean of Medicine and the Consultant Surgeon, recruiting other non- 
medically qualified staff such as ward clerks, people in filing and phlebotomists to undertake 
many of the responsibilities conventionally assumed by the junior doctors consequently 
released the PRHOs for more clinical work:
I think there are certain skills or actions that do not have to done by doctors.
Consultant Anaesthetist.
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These comments directly link with the discussions on the services carried out by PRHOs 
alongside their training programmes. Some concerns were, however, voiced about the re­
distribution of clinicians’ work among existing NHS staff and newly created posts. The ODP 
described how his workload had recently increased to take account of such changes, and the 
nurse referred to the increase in her demands but without any corresponding increases in her 
salary. The feasibility and desirability of fully implementing this strategy therefore posed 
some difficult questions:
We are aware that you cannot move the problem to another group of staff. You can’t 
change the role of nursing staff to fill the gap.
Acting Director, NHS Modernisation Agency.
Whereas the concerns among existing healthcare workers centred on issues relating to 
workload, some of the informants representing the medical profession, depending on their 
seniority, approached the strategy from a distinctly different perspective. The PRHOs voiced 
some anxieties about becoming deskilled as a result of their tasks being assigned to other 
healthcare workers. A number of them spoke about slipping out of practice if some of their 
duties were not routinely administered by themselves. Senior doctors contributed to this 
aspect of the debate in a very different way from their junior counterparts. For some of them, 
passing medical work on to other NHS staff was seen as a form of professional downgrading:
There is a general downgrading -  not in terms of their training but in terms of their 
ability to undertake service work. Ten years ago, the PRHO used to be the front line; 
now effectively they are only a student, and this will only increase as the years go by.
Medical staffing manager.
This perceived downgrading was blurring the distinctions between the medical and allied 
health professions, with the latter assuming more of the work hitherto carried out by junior 
doctors. Some of the informants embraced these changes, arguing that traditionally 
demarcation in work roles (Beardwood 1999) had over time frustrated attempts to introduce 
changes within the NHS:
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The idea that a nurse auxiliary cannot do that particular job because only a nurse can 
do it, is a whole load of ‘toddle’.. .Why do we put barriers in the way of people? Why 
do we pigeon-hole people and keep them down?
ODP.
Along with other informants, the Acting Head of the EWTD Pilots at the Modernisation 
Agency urged the medical profession to reflect on such attitudes, and to approach clinical 
services by reference to staff competency rather than sustaining assumptions that doctors at a 
particular grade must carry out a particular task for the sake of convention. In his view, the 
continuation of such old ideals was antagonising other staff working within the NHS:
There can be [‘us and them culture’], but that can be between medics and surgeons as 
well.
Dr G.
A physiotherapist interviewee related to this experience, recalling a ward round where it was 
permissible for a medical consultant to have his mobile phone switched on “but nobody else 
would dare”. Despite this hierarchical approach to workplace organisation and professional 
identity, the study did identify certain changes in attitude within the medical profession. The 
RCS promoted the extension of healthcare roles to encompass tasks previously reserved for 
junior doctors, and the Sub Dean for Medical School Admissions had also observed a 
“breaking down of barriers between the professions”. Inter-professional strategies at Medical 
School were in place facilitating the process by encouraging undergraduate medical students 
and their healthcare counterparts to collaborate on certain projects. The benefits of this 
approach were reflected among several of the PRHO interviewees:
As a house officer, you work the closest with nursing staff and nurse practitioners.
Dr F, Dictaphone Diary.
Perceptions such as these reinforced the acceptance by many junior members of the 
profession of the ongoing changes in the organisation of their work. While the discussions 
underscored some common concerns, the evolving notions of professional identity symbolise
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the profession’s fragmented outlook to such matters that would once have been approached in 
a collective manner.
Where does the EWTD fit into this? An officer at the RCN argued that the extension of the 
nurses’ clinical roles was one of the most important repercussions of the EWTD, but at a later 
point in the interview, referred to this as being a longer trend in which many experienced 
registered nurses were already conducting tasks that had historically been restricted to 
doctors. The legislation’s remit certainly does not extend to staffing issues. It has therefore 
served only to highlight the continuing pressures facing various aspects of the workforce 
involved in healthcare.
For some informants, the EWTD was seen as adversely impacting on medical services. 
Restricting the working hours of junior doctors translated into less time spent at the hospital 
treating patients, and a consequent lack of continuity of care. Continuity of care means that 
the same doctor conducts or oversees all stages of the treatment until the patient is 
discharged. It was a concept encapsulating a common concern extensively shared among 
members of the medical profession, but the EW TD’s working-time limits were widely seen 
as negatively affecting the patients’ interests:
[Doctors] are professional people and they are not going to go and leave the patient 
half sorted out, and leave it for someone else. One thing we drum into them in 
Medical School is that they have to put the patient above anything else. That 
permeates the Medical ethos.
Dean of Medicine.
Some doctors’ opposition to the legislation on this basis reveals how some informants found 
it difficult to evenly balance the patients’ priority and welfare against their own. For a 
number of them, the very nature of affording patients the necessary continuity of care 
necessitated a working environment free from work time restrictions:
[A lack of] continuity can actually be damaging for patients as well. I would much 
prefer to be given the option to opt-out of EWTD and do a better job for my patients.
Survey respondent 88.
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This view reveals a paradox. Doctors should realise that patients receiving medical services 
should adapt to the imminent changes to doctors’ patterns of work, and accept that continuity 
of care cannot be provided in ways to which they may have been accustomed in the past. For 
patients to demand the continuation of this form of service gives rise to an ironic situation 
that would see them being treated by ill and tired doctors who had spent long hours at the 
hospital, as a consequence increasing the potential for medical errors. This prospect is 
therefore equally as damaging for patients (and their doctors). Rather, more emphasis should 
be on ensuring that better systems are in place with effective ‘hand-over’ procedures relaying 
the necessary patient information between doctors commencing and finishing their shifts 
discussed in the next section.
The study attempted to explore the impact of the regulation on patient services as perceived 
by some of the informants. Looking at the broader picture, it argues that poorer continuity of 
care results from the widespread implementation of shift work rather than from the regulation 
per se:
Doctors [are being turned] from professionals into people that come in to do their job; 
they clock-in, they clock-out. They will not look after the same groups of patients that 
they know well to whom they could provide the best services... many PRHOs find 
their current role is not fulfilling. They are a pair of hands. They don’t feel as though 
they get to know the patients. They get the feeling that their bosses do not know who 
they are because it’s a different person every night.
Consultant Anaesthetist.
Thus arguments over the regulatory impact were again based on perceptions surrounding shift 
patterns, which were applied in light of the Directive. In doing so, the medical profession and 
hospital managers collectively failed to consider more innovative and flexible strategies to 
implement the Regulations which suited the doctors’ concerns over the delivery of patient 
services.
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Alternatives
The discussions in chapter 7 showed how the process of implementing the Directive for 
junior doctors was largely shaped by the widespread application of shift systems. This 
strategy was the hospital Trusts’ attempt to comply with the EWTD’s provisions. Some of the 
claims made by the study’s informants in this chapter as to what they regard as the impact of 
the EWTD are too simplistic. To perceive the Directive as negatively affecting their health, 
work-life, medical training, staffing, and services overlooks the roles played by both hospital 
managers and elite members of the medical profession who are charged with implementing 
EWTD-compliant strategies. The crux of the issue surrounding the EC legislation is not about 
how the legislation is used as a strategy to reduce work hours and consequently limit clinical 
exposure, but it concerns the application of a shift-based system of work for junior doctors. 
Blaming the EC legislature and the regulation itself diverts attention from the lack of 
innovation on the part of hospital managers and the medical profession to implement more 
satisfactory measures to meet the time limits prescribed in the Directive:
Shift working is not conducive to good working practice -  you don’t move to shift 
working, and yet here we are with a professional group of workers leading to a 
working arrangement that is bizarre.
Medical staffing manager.
The EWTD had therefore been a legislative catalyst to the widespread implementation of 
shift systems (Scallan 2003), yet doctors and managers alike agreed that this pattern of work 
did not amount to “good working practice”, particularly for junior doctors. Paradoxically, the 
claims made by those in chapter 6 which characterised the Directive as a monolithic 
legislation whose generic nature was deemed inappropriate for this sector of the labour 
market are themselves responsible for applying a monolithic, ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy, 
standardising the working time of all medical specialities within which junior doctors 
undertake their training, by the universal implementation of shift patterns. Applying a generic 
shift system for juniors has exposed the lack of innovation among hospital managers and 
senior doctors in putting into place more acceptable measures that correspond to the specific 
concerns voiced by the profession. This argument therefore calls into question how far such 
concerns can actually be regarded as an impact of regulation itself, rather than the effects 
resulting from the response to the legislation.
208
In light of these findings and drawing upon the literature in chapter 5 (Academy of Medical 
Royal Colleges 2004; Department of Health 2002b) it is important to consider alternative 
methods to the implementation of the shift system. The study identified a need for the 
profession to develop new and innovative methods of delivering medical training and 
services. The use of technology, for example, should be considered to provide junior doctors 
with a flexible learning resource that can be accessed at times of the day which complement 
the demands of hospital and clinical exposure/training (NWP 2006; Department of Health 
2003d).
As an alternative to the shift pattern, emphasis should be placed on designing work schedules 
that incorporate aspects of on-call, subject to a maximum working-time limit and 
supplemented by adequate compensatory rest. This may resolve some of the concerns voiced 
by a proportion of the junior doctors who felt that the rigidity of the shift system did not 
accommodate the opportunities to experience certain unexpected medical procedures.
As regards medical service, a better balance should be struck between the time spent by 
junior doctors training and working, with more emphasis placed on the former (Academy of 
Medical Royal Colleges 2004). Such changes should also incorporate an approach to work 
that immediately addresses the non-clinical tasks which are of no benefit to their training. 
The study reflected some criticisms voiced in the literature concerning the inappropriate 
service elements that junior doctors were required to carry out (Department of Health 2002b). 
The competency required to undertake some o f these responsibilities mean that some tasks 
can be redistributed among existing healthcare staff. In turn, this would ensure that the 
limited hours of junior doctors spent at the hospital would be more effectively utilised.
Pilot projects should also be designed to develop and test new roles (Academy of Medical 
Royal Colleges 2004) alongside a review of working patterns for all medical staff 
(Department of Health 2003d). These recommendations complement the policies put into 
place to promote greater skills mix and to expand on the number of non-medical practitioner 
roles in the teams treating patients. In the longer term, and in line with the general increases 
in medical school places, policies should be put into place to employ more doctors and non­
medical staff, including the use of foreign doctors (Fox 2007). This strategy would, to an 
extent, alleviate the current workload pressures.
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Such alternatives should be accompanied by broader changes to the way in which the NHS is 
delivered. In addition the allocation of further resources, service delivery should be 
reconfigured so that workloads are firstly transferred appropriately from out-of-hours’ 
periods into normal working days, and that services are diverted geographically to 
accommodate the decreased presence of junior doctors (Department of Health 2002b). Some 
of these ideas build on the Hospital at Night initiative and the out-of-hours medical team (see 
chapter 5).
Conclusion
Having explored junior doctors’ perceptions of the impacts of working-time regulation, this 
chapter shows that despite general support for the EWTD based on its prospects of 
implementing limited working hours, a better work-life balance, and improved health, there 
are some anxieties about its effect on medical training, staffing and services. The juniors’ 
concerns surrounded the Directive’s adverse impact on clinical exposure and opportunities to 
attend educational classes in particular, with a smaller proportion referring to capped salaries, 
poorer quality of patient care and the possibility of becoming deskilled as a result of the 
redistribution of certain tasks to other workers in the NHS. The EWTD was therefore seen by 
these informants as constraining the junior doctors’ ability to undertake the necessary service 
and education to meet their professional expectations. This reflects some of the concerns 
voiced by the senior doctors who criticised the application of a monolithic form of regulation 
which did not take account of these sector-specific issues. The similarities in some of these 
views relating to particular aspects of the EWTD reinforced the exclusive culture of the 
medical profession and its close socialisation processes which facilitate the transmission of 
ideas on issues such as work conditions, and an occupational resistance to measures such as 
the Directive.
Shift work is the one chosen solution to implementing the EWTD provisions, but it does not 
currently work in its present form. Many of the regulatory impacts, however, are not 
associated with the regulation itself. Nowhere does the Directive prescribe the use of shift 
work to attain legislative compliance; the methods, assessment and flexibility surrounding 
medical training are well beyond the legislation’s ambit as are medical services routinely 
performed by junior doctors, staffing issues and the topic of salaries. This study argues that to
210
claim otherwise represents a narrow view of the Regulations’ impact, and fails to take 
account of the responsibility of the profession for the current state of affairs. The discontent 
associated with the EWTD, including instances of ill health and poor work-life balance 
among some doctors, is attributable to the failure of the medical profession to respond to the 
Directive effectively and in line with the needs of its own members. By allowing managers to 
address juniors’ working time through the implementation of generic and monolithic shift 
work, the profession has lacked the necessary innovation to apply more appropriate systems 
that accommodate the specific concerns voiced by its members, and has diluted the potential 
impact of the EWTD. The organisation of working time through shift work is largely at the 
root of poor health and fatigue and experiences of ill-balanced work-life, rather than the 
limited quantity of working hours per se. The rigidity of shift patterns do not conform to the 
flexibility required to deliver patient care in the way it used to be. The discussions have 
therefore underscored a similar rigidity within the profession with reference to its attitudes, 
methods and delivery of medical training.
Debates looking at the impact of the Directive in isolation divert attention from the 
profession’s overall reluctance to modify its views in accordance with the broader changes in 
the NHS. The study did, at times, identify variations in the attitudes of the junior and senior 
doctor informants, notably in the former’s tolerance towards regulation; however, there was 
no consistent approach to the EWTD. This points to emerging changes in the medical culture, 
and signals a departure from some ideas which have long permeated the profession’s 
approach to work.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the study and draws some general conclusions. It is 
divided into three main sections. It commences with an overview of the findings and draws 
upon some of the central themes identified in both the previous chapters and the related 
literature. Secondly, the chapter revisits the research themes and the methods employed to 
address the study’s objectives. It assesses the strengths and limitations of the study and also 
explores the future applicability o f the research. The chapter concludes by exploring the 
study’s contribution towards the broader debates on regulation as part of an overall 
consideration of the limits of legislation such as the EWTD, and the roles of both the state 
and the professions in this process.
Revisiting the study
This study explored the various modes of regulation within the UK labour market, with 
specific reference to the medical profession, to show how historical forms of intervention 
shaped workers’ attitudes towards the organisation of their work today. For senior doctors, 
their historical modes of regulation through self-governance, professional autonomy and 
minimal state intervention helped to foster opposition to the EWTD. Ideologically, the 
Directive represented a centralised form of legal control designed by bureaucrats external to 
both the profession and the UK. Its failure to conform to an arrangement, such as the New 
Deal, which was the product of internal and sector-specific discussions, contributed to 
occupational resistance to the Directive among the higher ranks of the medical profession.
Senior doctors further criticised the application of a monolithic form of regulation that did not 
take into account the concerns voiced by the medical profession on issues such as medical 
training, staffing and services. The essence of working-time restrictions limited juniors’ 
presence at the hospital, and consequently their clinical exposure to procedures and 
attendance at educational classes that benefited their training. It applied pressure to a health 
system already characterised by staff shortages and excessive workloads, and had prompted 
policies that redistributed clinical responsibilities and dispersed medical knowledge hitherto 
confined to the profession, to other members of the workforce. Working-time regulation was
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also perceived as adversely affecting the quality of service afforded to patients by 
fragmenting their continuity of care.
Some of these views had transcended the various medical seniorities, and the study found a 
proportion of junior doctors raising the criticisms voiced by their senior counterparts, and 
sharing aspects of their opposition to the law. These informants saw the Directive negatively 
affecting the junior doctors’ ability to undertake the necessary service and education that met 
their professional expectations. The exclusive culture of the medical profession, its close 
socialisation processes among members and dissociation with non-members facilitated the 
transmission of ideas between senior and junior doctors on work conditions, and an 
occupational resistance to measures such as the Directive.
These views had arisen from the intervention of the European Court of Justice on the 
Regulations. The study identified a general consensus of support among the elite informants 
championing the EWTD prior to the ECJ’s rulings. Initial support for the legislation derived 
from the profession’s reflections on its previous modes of regulating working time through 
self-regulation and the New Deal. Underlined by the latter’s poor rates of compliance, the 
junior doctors’ excessive working hours were not adequately controlled by either 
arrangement, and there was no explicit link between the time spent at hospital and the 
consequent health implications that reinforced the need to promote more stringent forms of 
control. Furthermore, the lack of punitive sanctions contained in the New Deal underscored 
the elite informants’ support for an alternative mode of regulation. The principle of the 
EWTD was therefore originally endorsed on the basis that it dealt with the issue of criminal 
penalties to enforce a statutory maximum working week, while explicitly prioritising the 
welfare of junior doctors.
The European Court’s subsequent interpretation of what constituted working time, however, 
was widely criticised by both policymakers and medical service providers for incorporating 
activities hitherto believed to be outside the Regulations’ definition. Their disapproval of the 
ECJ’s intervention emerged into a broader critique of general EC law. The preference for a 
more narrowly construed interpretation of what should comprise working time implicitly 
renewed support for the New Deal and a working autonomy resembling aspects of self­
regulation -  models under which the poor protection of junior doctors’ hours and health 
initially led the elites to support the principles of EC law. The position therefore left the elite
213
stakeholders facing a variety of policy options, none of which were satisfactory owing to the 
perceived inadequacies in them all. The situation was exacerbated by the weak monitoring 
and enforcement regimes put into place by the state to implement the Directive’s criminal 
sanctions on those who offended against the provisions. This punitive element was a factor 
upon which the majority of elite informants in this study based their initial support for the EC 
law; however, the diluted impact of the Regulations’ disciplinary process provided an 
opportunity for doctors to work long hours and disregard the ECJ rulings without fear of 
criminal sanctions for hospital managers (or whoever would be liable).
These findings gave rise to a series of paradoxes, the most puzzling of which included 
participants in a health-based profession not only reporting poor health as a result of working 
long hours, but also criticising a measure that explicitly prioritised their health by reducing 
working time. Some of the junior doctors’ unwillingness to take time off while ill in order to 
support their hospital team exposed members of that team to poor health. Furthermore, 
symptoms of fatigue resulting from their resistance to the EWTD, by continuing to work long 
hours, were equally damaging the very patients whose well-being was their professional 
priority.
The PRHOs’ reports of their poor health resulting from working long hours represented the 
medical profession’s failure to ensure the best interests of its most junior members. The study 
also argued that this inadequacy was of a far broader nature, and was encapsulated in the 
profession’s overall response to the EWTD provisions by its implementation of a shift system 
monolithically spanning the way in which juniors’ medical service and training was 
organised. Paradoxically, the claims made by senior doctors, which characterised the 
Directive as a legislation whose generic nature was deemed inappropriate for this sector of 
the labour market, were themselves responsible for permitting managers to implement a ‘one- 
size-fits-all’ shift system that standardised the work of all junior doctors. This response to 
regulation illustrated the failure of the profession and hospital managers to put into place 
more flexible and acceptable measures that addressed doctors’ concerns. The shift 
arrangements did not take into account the anxieties voiced by juniors about their poor states 
of health and work-life balance, and the adverse effects on medical training, clinical staffing 
and health services, in very much the same way as the EWTD, according to the medical elite, 
did not accommodate the anxieties expressed by the profession as a whole. Alternative 
methods to the widespread employment of shift systems have included more flexible work
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schedules with a degree of on-call, subject to a maximum limit and compensatory rest; e- 
leaming; and changes to the way in which medical services are currently being delivered by 
the existing staff. Many of these initiatives have already been explored by the Department of 
Health’s Modernisation Agency and NHS NWP.
For reasons that may be related to the recycling of ideals within the closed and elitist medical 
culture the juniors’ apparent discontent with the current state of affairs was directly 
attributable to the EWTD. This study nonetheless argued that while the EWTD played a 
certain role in some of their claims, there were a number of factors, such as medical training, 
staffing and services, which were beyond the Directive’s control. It was therefore necessary 
to look at the roles played by the state, hospital managers and the medical profession to 
highlight how the juniors’ experiences of discontent could be regarded as an impact of the 
effects resulting from the response to the legislation, rather than from the regulation itself.
The general inconsistency in the informants’ responses demonstrates some resistance to 
change within the profession and reflects the some of the mixed attitudes towards EC 
regulation adopted by the elite informants in chapter 6. While the prospect of better work 
hours, health and work-life balance influenced a pro-regulatory school of thought among 
many of the juniors, they perceived the EWTD as adversely affecting other facets of their 
work. The partial fragmentation of the medical community’s outlook on external regulation, 
evidenced by the PRHOs’ general acceptance to work shorter hours in compliance with the 
EWTD, illustrated the evolving nature of the medical profession.
The approach
This study has been guided by an overall aim to analyse the process and impact of legal 
regulation on working conditions in UK labour markets, with specific reference to the EWTD 
and its impact on the junior medical profession. A series of objectives emerging from this 
general concern have been addressed in both the study’s empirical research and findings; they 
attempted to:
1. analyse the views of elite stakeholders about the political and legal debates 
surrounding the regulation of working time;
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2. examine critically the ways in which the EWTD has been implemented and enforced 
in practice in relation to junior doctors, and the sources of support and resistance to 
such processes; and,
3. analyse the apparent impact of regulating working time on the work and lives of 
junior doctors.
These objectives were addressed using a mix of research methods, including semi-structured 
interviews with policymakers, medical service providers and the members of the judiciary; 
two postal questionnaires sent to every PRHO in Wales, and a pair of Dictaphone diaries. In 
line with the methodological limitations, however, the findings must be interpreted 
cautiously. The self-reporting nature of the survey poses questions about the reliability of the 
data gathered, particularly as there is no comparative research against which the responses 
can be verified. Therefore gauging the impact of the Regulations using the questionnaire data 
can be something of a speculative exercise, given that there are few sources of information 
comparing the situation before and after the EW TD’s implementation. Attempts to restrict the 
sampling, geographical and contextual boundaries similarly limit the extrapolation of the 
study’s findings. By defining the issues in terms of labour-market regulation without 
considering the topical emphasis on regulatory governance of a clinical nature in and 
including the ongoing broader reforms in the NHS, the study’s straightforward assessment of 
working-time restrictions on the lives and work of junior doctors is limited. In the same 
respect, the survey respondents have been drawn from one of seventeen Deaneries across the 
UK, restricting the ability to generalise the findings.
The study may have identified different findings had it focused on a single hospital or Trust, 
and had included the use of ethnographic techniques. A greater emphasis on this kind of 
qualitative research could have given rise to a more in-depth understanding of the 
relationships underpinning the social milieu in which the participants inhabited. The findings 
therefore lack the potential rigour of a single-site study. However, the general limitations of 
ethnographic methodology and its focus on understanding the social environment made this 
unsuitable for addressing the research objectives of this study. Nor did the desire to explore 
beyond the parameters of a single setting, and to gauge the attitudes of many stakeholders 
between such extreme micro and macro levels, easily sit alongside the principles associated 
with these qualitative methods.
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It was felt that a study focusing on a sample based at one location would not reflect doctors’ 
variation in experiences nor would it have starkly highlighted such themes as the inconsistent 
implementation, enforcement and compliance with the Directive’s provisions, not only 
between different Trusts and specialities but also between EC Member States. Focusing 
beyond parameters limited to a single location, the study was able to draw out the degree of 
inconsistency in views held by both senior and junior members of the medical profession and 
to elicit the necessary data to correspond with the research themes.
The study has also benefited from drawing rich data from a broad variety of sources 
including a number of elite stakeholders whose perspectives at devolved, national and 
European levels are represented. The process has been facilitated by unique access to a set of 
informants through using personal networks. The importance of the overall study is 
underlined by the tendency in previous research to concentrate on some individual aspects 
and themes of working-time regulation, such as health, work-life, medical training and NHS 
services, within both labour-market and medical-specific contexts. The primary contribution 
made by this study therefore rests in its attempt to address the present lacuna in research by 
encapsulating all of these interrelated issues within a specific and contemporary context 
focusing on a topical European regulation.
Its general importance is also underscored by its comparative value to potential future 
research on working-time regulation. It sets the scene for studies of a similar nature exploring 
issues of implementation and compliance with the EWTD’s stricter limits on doctors’ 
working time by 2009, or for research aiming to analyse comparable objectives among 
different seniorities within the medical profession, or within different geographical areas. The 
findings from this study could also be used to evaluate the similarities and differences 
between the issues facing the medical profession under the EWTD and other sectors in the 
labour market, whether they, too, have a history of self-regulation, such as the legal 
profession, or not.
Regulation: Prospects
The study’s focus on various modes of regulation, and their impact on the labour market, 
reflect some of the broader debates contained in the literature which focus on the role of
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regulation, its limits, and the significance of both the state and those whom are subject to the 
regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Hutter 1997; Hawkins 1984). The regulation of 
public services entails “processes by which standards are set, monitored and/or enforced in 
some way, by bureaucratic actors who are somewhat separate from units or bodies that have 
direct operational or service delivery responsibilities” (Hood and Scott 1996: 321). Its 
rationale stems from a number of factors, which includes the interest of the public at large 
(Baldwin et al. 1998); governments must be seen to be intervening for such legitimate 
purposes (Haines and Gurney 2003). Regulation therefore poses a delicate balance between 
the interests of industry and the public. On the one hand, this study has shown the financial 
reasons underpinning the bureaucratic intervention in the public sector that was initiated by 
the Conservative Party elected in 1979, and its continuance in addition to new forms of state 
regulation carried out by New Labour through clinical governance and GMC reform, to 
ensure the quality of care provided to the public at large (Davies 2000). On the other hand, an 
occupational health and safety measure such as the EWTD specifically illustrates the 
government’s reliance on law to achieve goals of a social nature, namely to create safer 
workplaces (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Haines and Gurbey 2003).
Legal regulation is therefore seen as being able to incorporate (albeit not equally) the varying 
concerns of different stakeholders. The relatively recent increase in the use of law reinforces 
Britain as a regulatory state (Majone 1996). Its management which leaves less scope for local 
variation contrasts with the historical tradition of laissez-faire in the UK. Minimal state 
intervention has been a longstanding feature in the UK’s labour market, and is stimulated by 
concerns voiced by both industry and governments which prioritise the benefits of market 
competition within the economy (Mclvor 1987; Hart 1987).
Centralised statutory regulation of employment relations in the UK has therefore been rare, 
with only the conditions of specific industry sectors and particular workers having been the 
subject of regulatory control (Bishop and Mayer 1995; Dawson et al. 1988). Issues such as 
pay, working time and processes surrounding the termination of employment were chiefly 
negotiated between trade unions and employers alike on a voluntarist standing (Cully et al. 
1999; Dawson et al. 1988). Thus general labour conditions and relations in the UK have been 
consistently set against the interrelated themes of economic competitiveness and regulation- 
free markets. These fundamental characteristics, and the respective bargaining strengths of 
employers and unions, have long associated the former with an overbearing authority on
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matters regarding workers’ conditions of employment (Mclvor 1987). Employers’ influence 
was also reinforced by policies of non-intervention shared by both the state and the judiciary.
These trends have been perceived by some as resulting in poorer protections for the worker 
(Napier 1991). Examples in this study have illustrated the employers’ continuing influence 
over their workers’ conditions of employment to the latter’s detriment by insisting that they 
opt out of the EWTD’s protections (Barnard et al. 2003). However, the general absence of 
historical regulation and predominant role of trade unionism in the UK have not always 
necessarily disadvantaged the workers compared to those in Europe whose labour conditions 
have, by contrast, been more strictly regulated by civil codes. For example, reports in the 
1830s and 1870s revealed that the average weekly hours of work in an English cotton mill 
was 69, compared with 72-84 and 72-90 in France and Switzerland, and in Prussia, 
respectively (Hunt 1981). Britain’s trade union campaigns which focused on attaining a 40- 
hour week in the 1960s resulted in the British workplace being “the more extensively 
regulated by the middle of the twentieth century than any other developed nation” (Mclvor 
2001: 170-71). Such working hours in Europe did not follow suit until the 1970s (Palmer and 
Evans 1985).
Relatively unregulated markets in the UK, supplemented by a tradition of active trade 
unionism, has seen some workers in Britain at particular times in history experiencing 
comparably better labour conditions in spite of recent reports which indicate that they now 
work among the longest hours in Europe (Eurofound 2007). This latter trend, which 
continues almost a decade after the implementation of the EWTD, reflects the limits of 
regulation. Extra-legal factors that affect the implementation of laws include the ambiguous 
nature of legislation, problems of enforcement, and the active resistance of powerful groups 
(Anleu 2001). The success of regulation is therefore often mixed, suggesting that it does not 
consistently achieve its stated or apparent objectives (Dingwall 1989).
Compliance with regulation can be shaped by the nature of the legislation. Some perceive the 
operation of law as a way of resolving uncertainties that arise in specific factual situations 
(Geertz 1983). However laws can, by their tendencies to specify broad and ambiguous 
principles, give organisations a wide scope of discretion to determine the meaning of 
compliance (Edelman 1992). Legislation regulating the employment relationship is a prime 
example of the state’s use of broad and indefinite standards (Hutter 1997). This ambiguity
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can often lead to more detailed and specific legislation, thereby increasing the quantity of 
regulation on the one hand, but also providing more opportunities for contest on the other. By 
attempting to resolve ambiguities, law is used as a recurrent mechanism to reconstitute the 
boundaries of those subject to regulation. Law creation or reform is therefore a “dialectical 
process, whereby conflicts and dilemmas are resolved, yet their resolution creates further 
tensions and disagreements that are often managed by creating more laws, increasingly 
specifying legal provisions and definitions” (Anleu 2001: 436).
This study showed how a European law whose broad and ambiguous principles led to a 
confusion of legislative intentions among the state, judiciary, and the subjects of the 
regulation. Subsequent revisions complicated the legislation’s implementation and resulted in 
widespread non-compliance among the majority of Member States. Two points arise from 
this finding. First, little has been done to address the character of such regulation. The 
European Community continues to pass Directives which are, by nature, typically broad in 
order to allow individual governments to harmonise their national provisions with the 
supranational legislative framework (Snyder 1993). In the UK, New Labour similarly persists 
to transpose such regulation in minimalist form (Smith and Morton 2006; Deakin and 
Wilkinson 2005), thereby sustaining the foundation upon which organisations can interpret 
the ambiguities that accord with their intentions, provide opportunities for further contest, 
revisions and reform, and shape overall regulatory compliance (Yaegar 1991).
Secondly, the confusion resulting from what the medical profession had anticipated was the 
definition of working time, in contrast to the ECJ’s actual interpretation, is arguably the result 
of the state’s broader approach to such social regulation. By ambiguously framing the 
fundamental terms of the EWTD, the legislature shaped this particular law with reference to 
the state’s longstanding concern to ensure that the UK labour market operates with as few 
restrictions as possible, and that the essence of competition is not constrained by regulation. 
The broad nature of the Directive provides the space to limit its practical impact and to 
reduce the constraints and difficulties it might cause for particular sectors in the labour 
market. Yaegar (1991) argues that law is sensitive to the tensions and instabilities inherent in 
political economy. In part to avoid political damage to itself, he also argues that the 
legislature tends to pass regulatory legislation only in outline, leaving the potentially riskier 
implementation decisions, from which higher levels of conflict are likely to emerge, to its
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agencies. In this instance, the opposition among doctors relating to the EWTD was diverted 
from the state, towards hospital managers and the ECJ primarily.
Elements supporting the state’s deliberate attempt to undermine the efficacy of legal 
regulation arguably apply to the UK, particularly in relation to the policing mechanisms put 
into place to ensure the legislative provisions are observed. Enforcement is defined as the 
“consistent application of formal rules, indicating sanctions, to secure compliance with the 
enabling legislation (Snider 1991: 213). Regulatory laws, however, often have weak 
enforcement provisions, and regulators have insufficient resources to police compliance. 
Furthermore, there is little incentive to observe the regulations if their modes of punishment 
do not fall within the ambit of the criminal process (Glasbeek and Roland 1979; Glasbeek 
1984; Pearce and Tombs, 1990a and 1990b). By their nature, regulations are generally not the 
subject of criminal sanctions; the term ‘regulation’ implies a degree of tolerance of the 
activities under scrutiny rather than their elimination. Thus the aim is to regulate or to 
control, not to repress (Hawkins 1984), and to gauge a form of compliance through long­
term cooperation and informal enforcement techniques including education, advice, 
persuasion and negotiation (Hutter 1993; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). This was largely 
the position under the provisions contained within the doctors’ New Deal. Before that 
regulation, working time was a matter restricted to individual doctors (and the BMA) and 
their employers, as was the case for the general workforce resulting from the absence of 
national legislation.
The study found that poor compliance with the New Deal requirements was arguably shaped, 
to an extent, by the lack of credible sanctions facing employers that failed to observe the 
regulation. By contrast, the EWTD could potentially imprison chief executives. It was 
claimed by some of the study’s informants that this feature of the legislation was one of the 
primary factors underlying employers’ attempts to drive down the working hours of junior 
doctors and consequently improved their health. Their views were, however, undermined by 
a number of factors. Many junior doctors continued to work over and above the working-time 
limits prescribed by both the legislation and their employment contracts, and instances of 
poor health continued to be reported despite the legislation in force. Furthermore, the UK’s 
general enforcement and monitoring regimes diluted the potential impact of the regulatory 
sanctions. The contrast between the potential seriousness of the sanctions, and the actual 
practical possibilities of applying them in the absence of proper audited central records of
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work hours, raises questions about the regulations’ enforceability (Yaegar 1991). A 
significant source of law’s weakness and non-compliance results from the absence of 
effective monitoring mechanisms (Allott 1980).
The ambivalent approach to record-keeping also suggests that the authorities were, to a 
degree, turning a ‘blind eye’ to the possibility of non-compliance with the provisions 
contained within the EWTD. This was further supported by the state’s attempt to dilute the 
regulatory impact by ambiguously framing the fundamental terms of the regulation (Edelman 
1992), a claim implicitly referred to by two senior members of the UK and European 
judiciary. These arguments are, however, speculative. Further substantial evidence is required 
from detailed interviews with key stakeholders not included in this study, that is, the 
politicians and specific bureaucrats who actually took the decisions and framed the 
legislation. It is informed speculation nevertheless, supported by some data arising from the 
interviews with the two ECJ judges and in the overall assessment of the contradictions and 
complexities arising from the EWTD, and its implementation in the medical sector.
The state’s consistent minimal intervention -  encapsulated in this context by inadequate 
auditing controls, a consequent weak enforcement regime, and a process of implementing an 
ambiguously defined regulation which is shaped by the absence of clear and consistent 
national guidance -  supports the argument that the EWTD serves more as a symbolic 
function rather than an instrument to effect substantive change. A number of the study’s 
informants perceived the recent reduction in junior doctors’ working time as a direct result of 
the Directive. These trends were claimed to have arisen largely in consequence to hospital 
managers’ fears about the Regulations’ criminal sanctions. However, this line of argument is, 
to an extent, flawed by the EWTD’s weak enforceability. Widespread non-compliance among 
the majority of Member States has made the European Commission’s possibility of initiating 
proceedings against individual hospital chief executives unrealistic. The lack of centralised 
evidence in both the UK and EC of compliance with the EWTD upon which prosecutions can 
be brought represents a drain on the Commission’s limited enforcement capacity. Overall, 
this undermines the fundamental principles of a European Community based on law, and is 
an obstacle to the credibility and legitimacy of supranational regulation (Snyder 1993).
It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that the primary impact of the EWTD (at least to date) 
derives from the symbolic element of the law, given that the actual prospect of prosecution is
unlikely. Those who viewed the Directive as the primary vehicle in driving down junior 
doctors’ hours may or may not have been aware of the existing data which shows that 
working hours were already in decline following initiatives such as the New Deal. In this 
sense, the EWTD has continued an already present trend, rather than signalling a dramatic 
new direction. In similar respects, some of the junior doctors in this study perceived the 
EWTD as providing an element of safety to their personal health against a backdrop of what 
they saw was a long hours’ culture in the medical profession which adversely impacted their 
welfare. In reality, however, information gathered from the interviews and surveys revealed 
that a significant proportion continued to experience some form of illness, despite the 
legislation’s enforcement. It is highly questionable whether a law alone can improve doctors’ 
health and safety, more so in a typically stressful working environment such as the NHS. The 
law therefore has both an expressive function — sending out a strong message about what is 
acceptable and what is not acceptable -  and an instrumental one -  to actively impose controls 
on particular kinds of behaviour (Yaegar 1991; Kuhn 1961). It has also served to invigorate 
key debates (and tensions) on issues such as healthcare roles, patient services and medical 
training (North West Wales NHS 2002), which long existed before the implementation of the 
legislation.
The general problems of enforcement can also be shaped by the way in which regulators can 
be co-opted by the industry they are supposed to regulate (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; 
Gunningham and Rees 1997; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986). The lack of cooperation 
among those being regulated can adversely affect the legislation’s overall compliance 
(Makkai and Braithwaite 1993; Kagan and Scholz 1984). Law must therefore interact with 
other regulatory mechanisms (Hunt 1993). This can sometimes result in tensions between 
legal and other norms, which consequently compromise the impact of legal regulation (Allott 
1980). These issues relate to the broader extra-legal factor that can inhibit the implementation 
of laws, namely the active resistance of powerful groups.
Given that the behaviour of those subject to the regulation may be influenced in some way, 
socio-legal debates look to the significance of cultural and organisational dimensions, and 
their role within the regulatory process (Dingwall 1989). Legislation of a general nature may 
clearly conflict with the normative orders of self-regulating professional communities (Huyse 
and Parmentier 1990), and among those historically accustomed to a degree of autonomy as 
part of their professional work (Freidson 1994). This study argued that the historical modes
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of regulation through self-governance, professional autonomy and minimal state intervention 
helped to foster opposition to the current EC law among many senior doctors:
Legislation and administrative guidelines conflict with professional autonomy by 
regulating areas of work expertise that professional actors consider within their 
exclusive jurisdiction. They thereby seek to defend their professional project from 
what they see as inappropriate legal/government encroachment.
Anleu 2001: 420.
An occupation’s ability to attain professional status is shaped by achieving autonomy and 
immunity from external forces (Freidson 1994). These self-regulatory controls can be 
underpinned by concerns towards alternative modes of governance, which are external and 
bureaucratic by nature (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Gunningham and Rees 1997). Self­
regulation models therefore aim to facilitate the harmonisation of competing interests held by 
both the state and professional groups rather than dichotomising demands and forcing choices 
(Haines and Gurney 2003). In addition to its voluntarist approach to the labour market, the 
state’s lack of medical expertise has meant that it has conventionally left the administration 
and policymaking of medical care to doctors. In turn, the medical profession has self­
regulated both its activities and the delivery of care, securing its elite status in the labour 
market (Freidson 1970a, 1970b). Centralised regulation does not, however, conform to 
sector-specific concerns in the same way as it does not account for local circumstances 
(Davies 2000). Furthermore, McGuire (1989) argues that the individualistic nature of the 
treatment process makes both the choice and the efficacy of treatments open to variation; the 
limits of regulation are also therefore characterised by the nature of the work carried out by 
doctors.
The state, however, retains the authority to allow sectors of the labour market to self-regulate 
(Moran and Wood 1993; Miettinen and Flegel 2003; Hilton and Slotnick 2005), and it did so 
for the medical profession by passing the 1858 Medical Act. As a result, the state in this 
sense remains the ultimate sovereign and if it historically decided to afford the profession 
with autonomy, then it can also retract it (Cruess and Cruess 1997; Hutter 1997):
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Self-regulation will be developed in the shadow of the law where the broad policy 
parameters have already been established by government, and industry is merely 
given discretion over the means by which these overriding objectives are achieved.
Sinclair 1997a: 544.
While the rise in regulatory bodies will correspond to a continuing increase in guidelines, 
policies and best practice (Davies 2004), which pose an ongoing challenge to the medical 
profession (Klein 1998), such regulations -  particularly of a clinical nature -  will necessitate 
the expertise of doctors (Kendall et al. 1996; Flynn 1999). Both managers and its agents 
remain dependent upon the profession for its knowledge (Davies 2000; Kirkpatrick et al. 
2005) and the public perception of legitimacy associated with doctors which managers 
typically lack (Pollitt 1993; Learmonth 1997). Thome (2002) argues that NHS managers are 
weakened by having no specific claims to the expertise that relate to the Health Service. They 
are invisible to patients, have no claim to professional independence and are agents of 
government, employed to implement, rather than question, political decisions.
The result is a “regulative bargain” (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Irvine 2006) and a balance of 
power shared between the profession and the state, with the latter granting the former an 
“organised autonomy” (Freidson 1970b) or a form of “responsible autonomy” (Dent and 
Burtney 1996) rather than a distinct independence (Coburn et a l  1997). As such, there is 
evidence of different modes of external and internal regulation simultaneously operating in 
the way the profession’s work is organised.
The question that thus remains is what the future holds for regulating the profession. 
Bureaucratic intervention and the centrality o f hospital management initiated by the 
Conservatives continue under New Labour (Berg 1997), and the core themes of new public 
management in the NHS look likely to remain for the foreseeable future (Hannigan 1998). 
Managers are now entrusted with greater controls than ever over the terms and conditions of 
doctors’ work (Harrison and Ahmad 2000; Harrison 1999a; Kelleher et al. 1994). The 
ideologies between both governments are reflected in the current climate with renewed 
emphasis on regulating the medical profession through forms of both clinical governance and 
reform to its disciplinary procedures, all of which leaves the future status of the health care 
professionals in a state of uncertainty (Beardwood 1999).
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The emphasis on clinical governance, stemming from concerns surrounding the quality of 
medical care, illustrates the state’s continued attempt to regulate the professions (Davies 
2000), and to scrutinise the work of doctors through a proliferation of clinical regulatory 
bodies. On 21 February 2007, the government published its white paper Trust, assurance and 
safety -  the regulation o f health professionals in the 21st century (Department of Health 
2007), which sets a framework to assure the safety of patients and quality of care. The paper 
considers the English Chief Medical Officer Sir Liam Donaldson’s review of medical 
regulation, Good Doctors, Safer Patients (2006a) to cover areas such as the introduction of an 
effective system of revalidation, to alter the standard of proof in case of doctors’ fitness to 
practise, and to implement modifications to the role, composition and function of the GMC. 
The BMA opposed the proposals, arguing that they further encroach on the work of doctors 
and directly impinge on the self-regulatory nature of the profession (Kmietowicz 2007).
The state’s regulation is not, however, confined to the medical profession alone. The Legal 
Services Bill will soon introduce the so-called ‘Tesco law’, permitting companies, rather than 
solicitors’ or barristers’ chambers alone, to own law firms and provide legal services for the 
first time. The Bill will also set up an independent Office for Legal Complaints, and create 
the Legal Services Board to oversee the regulation of the legal profession. Lawyers, like 
doctors, have opposed what they perceive as an extension of state bureaucracy over their 
profession (Plattem 2004).
Recent domestic trends therefore underscore a consistency in state intervention within the UK 
labour market. Some of these aspects derive from the continent; however there is little 
evidence to suggest that the process will be reversed in the foreseeable future. The 
professions are also diversifying at extraordinary levels (Williams 2001), making the 
transmission of common values more difficult (Cruess and Cruess, 1997). The most 
significant evidence supporting this claim is the apparent departure from traditional attitudes 
among some junior doctors and the younger consultants in the NHS, and a growing 
acceptance of the external regulation of their work.
There is no real resolution regarding the most appropriate model for managing the working 
time of junior doctors. This study has identified a distinction between self-regulation and 
state intervention which is at its best blurred by the simultaneous operation of both forms of 
control on the medical profession. The implications in practice have raised questions about
the role of the state as a public body charged with the responsibility of ensuring the necessary 
resources to deliver a system of care under the EWTD regime. The debates surrounding the 
regulation -  the doctors’ health and work-life, their medical training, and medical staffing 
and services feature very little in the state policies. The responsibility therefore rests with the 
medical profession to accommodate the Directive within the given parameters. In practice, 
this has been implemented through the widespread application of the shift system. Despite the 
general absence of state intervention, this study has nonetheless showed how the profession 
has relied upon the. former’s deliberate attempts to ‘fudge’ regulation. This apparent 
preference for vague legislative standards is perhaps consistent with the broader history of 
UK workplace relations where self-regulation and corporatist bargaining have been viewed as 
preferable to direct statutory controls. In the light of the findings of this study, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the EWTD in its current form seems unlikely to provide the cure 
for long working hours in the medical profession and all the associated problems.
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POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE: WORKING HOURS AND JUNIOR DOCTORS
Thank you for participating in this survey. The questionnaire should take about 5 minutes of your time 
to complete. Your replies will be treated in strictest confidence, and no individual will be identified in 
the thesis. Please circle the appropriate answer, or write a short reply where requested.
Please specify what type of hospital you are currently working in:
TEACHING NON-TEACHING (Please CIRCLE)
2. GENERAL -  WORKING HOURS
2.1 Currently, how many hours do you work on average per week?
(please include on-call periods when you are required to be physically present at the health 
centre)...........................................................
2.2 Do you work overtime? YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
2.2 If YES, on average how many hours a week of overtime do you work?
3. EFFECTS OF WORKING HOURS: PERSONAL HEALTH & WORK-LIFE BALANCE
3.1 Please indicate if you currently suffer, or have suffered during your training period,
any of the following symptoms that you would attribute to the hours you work (Please TICK 
all that apply)
1. ABOUT YOURSELF
Are you MALE FEMALE (Please CIRCLE)
How old are you? (years)
Depression 
Weight Loss 
Stress
Exhaustion and/or Fatigue 
Mood symptom 
Suicide thoughts
Emotional distress
Insomnia
Anxiety
Tension
Headaches and/or migraine
3.2 How willing are you to take time off work for reasons related to personal health?
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(Please CIRCLE one of the following)
Very Willing Willing Don’t know Unwilling Very Unwilling
3.3 How satisfied are you with your work-life balance?
(Please CIRCLE one of the following)
Very Satisfied Satisfied Undecided Unsatisfied Very Unsatisfied
3.4 Do you think that the NHS offers sufficient flexible working hours options?
YES/NO (PleaseCIRCLE)
4. EFFECTS OF WORKING HOURS: TRAINING & SERVICE
4.1 Do you feel that you have sufficient time to attend educational meetings and/or periods of
educational study?
YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
4.2 Would you be satisfied with a reduction in your working hours if this meant a decrease in 
your study leave allowance?
YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
4.3 Is it possible, in your opinion, to reduce working hours and maintain your current study leave
allowance?
YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
4.4 Please respond to the following statement: “Long working hours for junior doctors 
significantly raises the risk of medical errors”
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
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5. REGULATING DOCTORS* WORKING HOURS
5.1 Are you aware that the Working Time Directive states that from August 1st 2004 junior 
doctors should not work more than 56 hours per week?
YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
5.2 Should doctors in training be exempt from legislation curtailing their working hours?
YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
If yes, please briefly state reasons
5.3 If the terms and conditions of your service exceeded the number of working hours stipulated 
in the legislation, would you take any action?
YES/NO (Please CIRCLE)
If YES, please give brief details of the action you would take (eg. inform Trust, legal action etc)
5.5 Would you work longer working hours if your salary and/or overtime payments were 
substantially increased?
YES / NO (Please CIRCLE)
5.6 Given the option, would you waiver your legal entitlement to work a 48-hour week?
YES/NO (Please CIRCLE)
If yes, please briefly state reasons
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If you would like to be paid to give a short informal interview on the subject of working hours, or 
offer any other views on this research, please provide contact details below:
NAME .... 
ADDRESS
CONTACT PHONE NUMBER........................................................
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME
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DICTAPHONE DIARY
You may use this as a guide of themes to cover before, during and after your working day. Please 
answer or respond to as many of the themes outlined below and, if it is possible during work, keep an 
eye out on whether anybody else (consultants, senior training grades, patients, management, other 
PRHOs and NHS staff) refers to them.
Your Working Day
In a few words, describe your day today.
Has this day differed to your average working day -  if so: how and why?
Who have you socialised with today -  before, during and after work?
Did anything make you angry, annoyed, frustrated, emotional, laugh, etc. today? What & why?
Did/do you have any regrets about going in to work today & why (not)?
What were the high and low points?
Hours of work
How may hours have you worked today?
Did you work below or over your hours? Why?
Did you stay/were you expected to stay?
Did you take any breaks? If so -  how long/many; if not -  why?
Did you have the opportunity, and did you eat / socialise / refresh?
Work Relations
Who did you work with today (consultants, senior training grades, patients, management, other 
PRHOs and NHS staff, etc.)?
Are these any different to your average working day -  how/why?
Please recall what you did and spoke about (work and non-work) with these various people, even 
during break times.
Was there any conflict between these people? If so, what was the issue?
Medical Training
What ‘training’ activities did you undertake today?
Were any of these new to you? If so, how well were they taught, and how confident are you to 
practise them with/without supervision?
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If you did not learn anything ‘new’, how do you feel about this (e.g. frustrated)?
How was your supervision today? Were you satisfied with the teaching methods?
Medical Service
Was there more of training or service today? How do you feel about that?
Describe your service work today, e.g. patients and treatment, and your workload 
Did you receive any complaints (general or personal)? If so, what was your response?
Did you work on-call? If so, for how long? What did you do? Was this of value to your training 
and/or service? Did you feel poorly or tired during or after this period?
Do you feel that you are missing out on experiences, e.g. by not doing on-call work?
How much patient contact did you have? Are you satisfied with this? Did you give the same 
proportion of quality care throughout the whole of your day?
Did you or somebody else commit any errors? What was the reason, if so?
List your separate training and service activities, and in terms how their personal benefit to you?
Were any of your experiences today ‘inadequate’ or your tasks inappropriate?
Was any of your time wasted? How and why?
From the minute you left the house this morning, what would you define as working time, for you 
personally?
Health
Did you feel poorly at all today (including fatigue and tiredness)? If so, what was the significance of 
working time and non-work?
Were any of your colleagues poorly, for the same reasons?
What was the working environment like?
Did/Could you have considered residing at the hospital? Please give reasons explaining what you did. 
Did you prescribe medication to other doctors, or hear about self-prescription among your colleagues?
Work-life
What did you do after work? Did you have plans that you didn’t fulfil?
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Have you got plans scheduled for the rest of week and if so, do you think you will be able to fulfil 
them after today?
How much time have you spent with other people/your partner after work (please say briefly who 
these people are)?
Has your working time become an issue in relation to these people?
General Questions
Given patient and staff numbers, traditionally a long hours job following a long undergraduate course, 
the effects on health and work-life balance, what did you do today that made you think that this job is 
worthwhile?
Was working time mentioned by anybody else today in conversation?
Did anything occur today that you or your colleagues noticed that would lead you to report it to your 
consultant / management or trust / BMA? What, if so, and what was your response (& why)?
Do you think the Working Time Directive would impact on your work /training /personal life, after 
today? If so, how and would you welcome an impact?
How satisfying was your job today, considering all of the above pointers?
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